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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K. THOMAS
And THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an Idaho Corporation
Defendant/Appellants.
Appealed from the District Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in andfor the County of Gem,
Honorable Juneal C. Kerrick, District Judge

William A. Morrow
Attorney for the Appellant

John J. Janis
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney for Respondent

Filed this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _~, 2009

, Clerk
_ _~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Deputy

Damages are expected to include, but may not be limited to, the following:
(1) Loss of the right to ownership interest and income in Thomas Motors and real
property on which Thomas Motors is situated;
Even construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as the court must
do on this motion for summary judgment, the most Plaintif:fs evidence establishes is a subjective
expectation on his part that the alleged agreement for the transfer of the business included the
real property on which Thomas Motors is situated. There is not sufficient evidence for the court
to find the existence of a material issue of fact regarding mutual assent to the transfer of the
property.
B. Definiteness

The minimum requirements for a valid agreement for the transfer of real property include
a description of the property at issue. Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 751 (1993). An oral
agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property that lacks an understanding of the
amount and description of the property is too indefinite to be enforced. Wing v. Munns, 123
Idaho 463 (1993) (holding an alleged oral agreement to lease property too indefinite to be
enforced so as to obviate any need to consider a statute of frauds challenge). Here, there is no
evidence that the parties ever agreed on the amount or boundaries of the property included in the
agreement alleged by Plaintiffs. This is especially important in light of the fact that the evidence
indicates that Thomas Motors encompasses some two (2) or three (3) three separate parcels of
real property.
Based upon the foregoing, the court finds that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment dismissing "any claim by the plaintiff that his alleged oral agreement with the
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defendants includes any real property or land" should be granted. Plaintiffs have not adduced
sufficient evidence for the court to conclude: (1) that the alleged agreement for the transfer of
real property comes within the agreement as defined by the court in its prior order or (2) that the
trier of fact could reasonably find the existence of an enforceable agreement for the transfer of
such land.

c. Statute of Frauds
Although the foregoing renders unnecessary any determination based upon the statute of
frauds, based upon the record adduced in connection with Defendants' motions for summary
judgment, the court would have concluded that the alleged oral agreement is barred by Idaho
Code Section 9-505(4}. Section 9-505(4} invalidates an agreement for the sale of real property
or an interest therein, unless the agreement or a memorandum thereof is subscribed by the party
to be charged. Plaintiff has not made any claim that the alleged agreement is evidenced by any
writing. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that the court should equitably estop Defendants from asserting
the statute of frauds.
In order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a party, the court must find
that such party: (I) engaged in conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment
of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2)
intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted on by the other party; and (3)
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. Hoffman v. S V Company, Inc., 102 Idaho
187, 192 (1981) (quoting Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50,53 (1971). Plaintiff alleges that the
elements of equitable estoppel are satisfied here, or at least that there is an issue of material fact
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precluding summary judgment, based upon Defendants' alleged promise to transfer Thomas
Motors to Plaintiff in consideration of Plaintiff leaving his employment at Lanny Berg to work at
Thomas Motors. However, as noted previously, there is no indication that any of these
representations, even if true, related to the real property. Absent such evidence, it is unclear why
the court should estop the Defendants from asserting the statute of frauds. In addition, it is
unclear how the Plaintiffs can satisfy the ftrst prong required for the application of the doctrine
of equitable estoppel. In its prior order, in addressing Plaintiff's claim for fraud, this court
found, "no evidence in the record that would support a ftnding that Ronald Thomas did not
intend to keep the promise at the time he made it." Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence on this
motion to change that conclusion. Absent such evidence, this court cannot ftnd even an issue of
fact as to whether Defendants engaged in conduct amounting to a false representation or
concealment of material facts.

ORDER
THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment dismissing any claim for breach of an agreement to transfer real property is
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

. --r---

Dated this &day of May, 2008.

~~

eal C. Kerrick
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served upon the
following either by u.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid; by hand delivery; by courthouse
basket; or by facsimile copy:

Mr. Dennis P. Wilkinson
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Mr. John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock St., Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

Dated this I /

'7

~

day of May, 2008.

SHELL Y GANNON
Clerk of the Court

~

BY:rf~
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John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

AUG 0 1 2008

H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

•• * * *
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

)

vs.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

•••••
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COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Lezamiz and Janis, and pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order compelling the
plaintiff to provide full, fair, and complete responses to the following discovery requests by the
defendants:
1.

Interrogatory No.8 and corresponding Request for Production of Documents
No.5 of the Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, dated
July 29,2006;

2.

All of the discovery requests contained in Defendants' Second Set of
Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, dated May 22, 2008; and

3.

To provide all opinions, conclusions and/or information regarding all tests
performed by plaintiffs expert Mr. Speckin, ofChicago, Illinois, pursuant to
the letter agreement between counsel that all pertinent information regarding
the testing done by said expert, including identifying what specific tests were
done, and what specific results or conclusions were reached as a result of said
tests, would be shared with defense counsel immediately afterwards.

This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the Affidavit of
John Janis in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel, filed contemporaneously herewith.
Pursuant to Rule 37(a)(4) the defendants also respectfully move this Honorable Court for an Order
granting said defendants an award of attorneys fees associated with this Motion to Compel.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL - 2
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Respectfully submitted

this3D~ay of July, 2008.
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS

s
ys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, BOiseJ,daho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 3/1 day of July, 2008, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[A u.s. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ J Telecopy (Fax)

0<1 U.S. Mail
[ ) Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecop Fax)
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 359Y)
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

'" '" '" '" '"
R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

Case No. CV 2006-492

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. JANIS IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO COMPEL
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

JOHN J. JANIS being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes and states as
follows:
I. I am an attorney of record for the defendants in the above-entitled action, and
make this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge andlor belief.
2. This Affidavit is submitted in support of the defendants' Motion to Compel. Said
Motion has three components, each of which will be addressed separately and in turn below.
THE DEFENDANTS' FIRST DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF
3. The first component of the defendants' Motion to Compel concerns the initial
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents that were addressed to the damages
component of the plaintiff's claims in this case. This specifically includes Interrogatory No.8 and
corresponding Request for Production of Documents No.5 ofthe Defendants' First Set ofDiscovery
Requests to Plaintiff, which were dated July 29, 2006, meaning more than two years ago. In
response to the Defendants' First Set ofDiscovery Requests, plaintiff's counsel provided preliminary
responses to said requests on July 28, 2006. A true and correct copy of the pertinent responses
provided by the plaintiff to these two subject discovery requests, are attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.
As reflected in Exhibit "A", Interrogatory No. 8 requested the plaintiff provide
specific information regarding the damages claims made in this case on the alleged breach of
contract claim. This included various subparts of the interrogatory directed at getting the specific
amount of damages being claimed, the method by which such damages were computed or claimed
as well as each and every fact regarding such damages claims and amounts. As also reflected in
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. JANIS SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL - 2
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Exhibit "A" hereto, the answer provided by plaintiffs connsel itselfilldicatedthe actual responsive
information was not being provided as the plaintiff at that point was "currently in the process of
itemizing the damages they have suffered". The plaintiff also indicated that when the list of damages
was completed that they "will disclose the same." The corresponding Request for Production of
Documents No. 5 requested copies of any and all documents which had any tendency to prove or
relate to the amount of damages being claimed in any of the counts ofplaintitrs complaint. The
response by plaintiff directed the defendants to see the Answer to Interrogatory No.8 reflected
above, meaning in substance no information was being provided at that point.
The defendants have never received a supplemental response to either of these
discovery requests, that is Interrogatory No.8 and/or Request for Production No.5 of Defendants'
First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff. The defendants have simply never received any
substantive information responsive to

th'~se

discovery requests regarding the damages claimed by

the plaintiff in this case at any point either formally or informally since they were first sent over two
years ago.
4. Plaintitrs counsel did submit a "First Supplemental Responses to Defendants'
First Set of Discovery Requests" on September 21, 2007, a true and correct copy of which is attached
as Exhibit "B" hereto. They filed a supplemental Answer to Defendants original Interrogatory No.
3 relating to anticipated expert testimony. On this subject, they identified an accountant, Mr. Craig
Clarke, who was reportedly going to address some subject matters related to the damages claims.
No specifics were offered as to what opinions the expert would actually offer, but only an indication
that such opinions would be forthcoming. Specifically, the supplemental response indicated that

"Mr. Clarke will prepare a report discussing his opinions in this case." It also indicated that the
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. JANIS SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL - 3
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answer to the expert interrogatory "will be supplemented as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure." See Exhibit "B" hereto.
Here again, there has been no further follow up or information provided to the
defendants regarding any actual opinions by Mr. Clarke on any of the damages subjects. In other
words, no information was given regarding what Mr. Clarke mayor may not testify about, either
formally or informally, although the promise to do so was just short of a year ago.
5. As counsel for the defendants, I wrote to plaintiff's counsel over two months ago
addressing the plaintiff's failure to produce any information regarding what damages were being
claimed in this case. That letter is dated May 22, 2008, a true and correct copy of which is attached
as Exhibit "C". Here again, I have received no response of any kind to the request that the plaintiff
provide information on the damages being claimed in this matter, as was originally requested in a
fonnal discovery request dated over two years ago.
THE DEFENDANTS' SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF

6. On May 22, 2008, I faxed and mailed to plaintiff's counsel the Defendants' Second
Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of these discovery requests are
attached as Exhibit "D" hereto. The responses to these requests were due on or before June 23,
2008, meaning well over a month ago. I have received no responses of any kind to these requests
either, either formal or informal.
EXPERT TESTING
7. Earlier this year, plaintiff's counsel worked with defense counsel for the purpose
of plaintiff's counsel taking the original contracts between the plaintiff and defendant in this case
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN J. JANIS SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL· 4
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and having them sent for "ink dating" and/or other testing to an expert in Chicago, specifically Mr.
Speckin. The Court may recall that the subject of arranging for such testing was addressed to the
Court on prior occasions. In any event, counsel for the parties reached a letter agreement regarding
this testing, by letter dated March 7, 2008. A true and correct copy of this letter agreement is
attached hereto as Exhibit "E". Soon after this letter agreement was reached, plaintiff's counsel did
in fact pick up the original contracts from the office of Ron Bjorkman in Emmett from which point
we understood they would be immediately delivered to the expert in Chicago. I understand the
original contracts were picked up from Ron Bjorkman's office in Emmett on March 12,2008. We
understood those original contracts were going to be hand delivered to the expert within the next
several days after they were picked up.
On April 24, 2008, I wrote a letter to plaintiff's counsel expressing concern about the
status of the so-called ink dating or other testing that the plaintiff had arranged to be performed on
the original contracts by Mr. Speckin well over a month earlier. A true and correct copy ofthis letter
is attached hereto as Exhibit "F". Sometime thereafter, Ron Bjorkman was contacted by plaintiffs
counsel and informed that the substance ofthe testing was that the tests results were "inconclusive."
Since then we have made efforts to request that plaintiff's counsel provide us with
further information about the tests that were done and/or the conclusions reached as a result, other
than the fact that the testing results were inconclusive. An example of this is contained in my letter
of May 22, 2008, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "C".
It is thus true that defense counsel has been given some information about the results
of this testing, which is to the effect that the test results were "inconclusive." However, given the
amount of effort and expense that went into this scientific testing, which is apparently very technical
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and complicated, it would seem to be fair to conclude there would be much more involved in
reporting on the results ofthis testing thanjust having a result ofit being inconclusive. For example,
we know from our own investigation that the whole concept of "ink dating" is based on advanced
forensic testing regarding how long it takes ink to completely and fully dry when put to a piece of
paper. There is some disagreement among experts in this highly specialized field as to how long
they believe it takes for ink to dry on a piece of paper although everyone appears to agree it takes a
number of years to do so, with the disagreement being on how many years. If the plaintiff's expert
has indicated that the tests are inconclusive, that presumably suggests the ink has completely dried
on the paper at this point, which in turn means it must be at least a certain number ofyears old. With
the defendants being entitled to be told about the results of the testing, the bottom line is it would
seemingly be fair to be given a lot more information that we have otherwise been given.
The defendants would thus respectfully request that the Court issue an order
compelling the plaintiff and/or his attorneys to produce any and all information generated by the
expert as a result of the expert testing that was performed on the original contracts in this case, and
what such testing results actually mean as applied to the facts of this case.
DATED this

.3 I

xJ:

day of July, 2

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boised~aho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this 3.L~ay of July, 2008, he caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

()(J U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
I09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)

Cx1
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William A. Morrow
James M. Vavrek
WIllTE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone:
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISB No.:
2451, 7256
wam@whitepeterson.com
jvavrek@whitepeterson.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN 1HE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE THIRD mDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF GEM

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE 1(.
THOMAS and mOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

)

)
)
)
)

--------------------------------------------------------------------COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his undersigned attorneys

of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and responds to Defendants' First Set of

Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, as follows:

EXHIBIT.A.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS. 1
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that the signature of Defendant Elaine Thomas may not be her valid signature and instead her
signature was affixed to Exhibit "A" by Defendant Ronald O. Thomas well after the date at
which it was purportedly signed.
INTERROGATORY NO.8: In your Complaint in this matter, you claim that as a result of an
alleged breach of contract, you have been damaged in an amount to be proven with specificity at
trial, but in excess of $500,000. Regarding this damages claim, please identify and explain the
following:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory on the basis
and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is protected under the
attorney/client and/or work product privileges. Subject to, and without waiving these objections,
Defendants are currently in the process of itemizing the damages they have suffered. When said
list is completed, Defendants will disclose the same. Damages are expected to include, but may
not be limited to, the following:
(1)

Loss of right to ownership interest and income in Thomas Motors and real

property on which Thomas Motors is situated;
(2)

Loss of income based on reliance on agreement and promises with Defendants

based on his taking a position with Thomas Motors at a substantially below market salary
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thereby providing Defendants with a substantial benefit for which Plaintiff is now entitled to
compensation based on Defendant's sale of Thomas Motors to a third party;
(3)

Loss of future income from Thomas Motors as Defendants sold Thomas Motors

to third party in breach of agreement with Plaintiff.
Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement this response as more information is obtained
through the discovery process.

INTERROGATORY NO.9: In Count Two of your Complaint in this action, you claim that as a
direct result of Defendants' purported breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
you have suffered damages in an amount exceeding $10,000 to be proved with specificity at
trial. Regarding this claim of damages, please identify, describe, and explain in full and
complete detail, the following:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please see Answer to Interrogatory Number 8.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: In Count Three of your Complaint in this action, you claim that
the costs of Defendants' failure to compensate you for the actual value of the benefit you
conferred upon them, the Defendant has been unjustly enriched in an amount in excess of
$100,000 to be proved with specificity at trial. Regarding this claim of damages, please identify,
describe, and explain in full and complete detail the. following:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

PLAlNTIFF'S RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS - 12
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that is protected by the attorney/client and/or work product privilege. Subject to, and without
waiving this objection, Plaintiff is not possession of any documents that are responsive to this
request at this time. This response will be supplemented as Plaintiff is able to locate documents
that are responsive to this request.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce copies of any and all of the written
documents or agreements referenced in your response to Interrogatory No. 13 above.

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: See Response to Interrogatory
Number 13 and documents produced herewith (Bates Nos. 76-117).

DATED this

~

J,i day of July, 2006.
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

~~~k~~========----
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
)

County of Canyon

R. DREW THOMAS, being fIrst du1y sworn, depose and say that he is the Plaintiff in the
above-entitled matter, hat he has read the foregoing document. knows the contents thereof. and
believes the facts therein stated to be true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

ti

DATED this~f' day of April, 2008.

SUBSC~y,~p',~ SWORN to before me this ).c.j

day of April, 2008.
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)

William A. Morrow
SarahH. Arnett
WHITE PETERSON, P.A.
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 .
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone~
(208) 466-9272
Facsimile:
(208) 466-4405
ISS No.:
2451,6545 •.. . .
wam@whitepeterson.com ....
sarnett@whitepeterson.co", ·

HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ
& JANIS
.

SEP 21 2007
BOISE; ID

Attorneys·for Plaintiff
. IN THE DISnuCT COURT OF·THE

rinRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF . .~ ..

: .• THE STATE OF IDAHO,INANO F01{.~COlJNTYOF GEM
'_ . :

.

~

DREW THOMAS, .....

}
)
)
)
)
}

Plaintiff;
vs.

)

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES
TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY R:itQUESTS

.)
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, we ,an )
Idaho Corporation, .
)

Defendants.

-------------------------------

)
)

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his counsel
of record, the law firm of White Peterson, P.A., and hereby serves Ills first supplement responses
to Defendants •First Set ofDiscovery Requests to Plaintiff.
GENERAL OBJECTIONS

I.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff to the

extent they seek contentions and information which Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to
develop.

Plaintiff has not completed its own discovery and investigation is continuing.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS-l
~.
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Accordingly, the responses that follow are based upon the best knowledge, information, and
belief of Plaintiff at this time and are to be considered preliminary in nature, subject to
substantial revision as Plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct further research and discovery.
Plaintiff will make a good faith effort to respond to all discovery requests based on the
information presently available to him, with the understanding that his responses are not
necessarily complete and further research may require revision of any and all responses.
Plaintiff reserves the right to make any further responses if it appears that any omission or error
has been made in connection with these responses or if more accurate information is or has
become available. These responses are made without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to use in later
discovery or to present at hearing such evidence as may later be discovered or evaluated.
2.

These responses are made subject to all objections as to competence, relevance,

materiality, and admissibility. These responses are subject to all objections that would require
the exclusions of any statement, material, or information herein provided if the discovery request
were asked concerning any statement, material, or information made or possessed by witnesses
present and testifying in court. All such objections are reserved and may be interposed at the
time of trial or any hearing in this matter.
3.

Plaintiff specifically objects to these discovery requests to the extent that they

seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and the
rules governing the discovery of facts of experts as set forth in Rule 26, Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiff has, to the extent possible, construed each request as requesting only

information and/or documents not subject to any applicable protection.

This objection is

intended to apply to all discovery requests that seek such information and will not be repeated
specifically for each request to which it applies.

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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No incidental or implied admissions are intended. The fact that Plaintiff has responded to any
discovery request or part thereof should not be taken as an admission that Plaintiff accepts that
the discovery request or the response or objection thereto constitutes admissible evidence.
Similarly, the fact that Plaintiff has responded to all or part of a request is not intended to and
shall not be construed to be a waiver by Plaintiff of all or part of any objection to other requests.
Plaintiffs answers to any discovery requests herein do not constitute a waiver of Plaintiffs right
to object to any future additional, or supplemental discovery requests regarding the same or
similar matters.
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please identify each and every person whom you expect to
call as an expert witness al trial, and describe the substance of their expected testimony.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)( 4), for each expert witness you intend to call at the trial of this case,
please describe the substance of the opinions to which each such expert is expected to testify,
and explain the underlying facts and data upon which each such expert's opinions are based, in
conformity with Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.3:
Craig Clarke, CPA, CFE Consultant
The GEC Group
12000 New Hope Road
Star, Idaho 83669
Phone: 208-286-0166
At this time, it is anticipated Mr. Clarke will provide opinions concerning the value of
Thomas Motors, Inc., the market value of services provided by the Plaintiff during 1997-2006
while he was operating Thomas Motors, Inc., whether the Plaintiff was compensated for his
services at the market rates, and the extent to which the Plaintiff s services and efforts
contributed to the value of Thomas Motors, Inc. In developing in his opinions, Mr. Clarke is
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considering data and infonnation contained tax documents, accounting records, bank records,
and other business records and documents relating to Thomas Motors, Inc., and the Plaintiff's
income tax documents. Mr. Clarke is also considering infonnation to be obtained from witnesses
in this case, including the Plaintiff, the Defendant, Shirley Youngstrom, Rob Wilde, James Warr,
Lanny Berg Sr., Jan Flowers, and Penny Hurlbert. Mr. Clarke may also obtain infonnation from
other witnesses, including Don Ovitt, Mark Bottles, representatives of Chrysler Corporation, and
employees of Wells Fargo, Key Bank, and Washington Trust Bank. Mr. Clarke will prepare a
report discussing his opinions in this case. This answer will be supplemented as required by the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See also First Supplemental Response to Request for Production
No.2.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please attach a copy of the educational and
professional qualifications of all expert witnesses you will call at trial and also attach copies of
each and every report generated by each expert witness referred to herein.

FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.
2: See attached CV of Craig Clarke, CPA, CFE Consultant, Bates numbered 000118-000122.
DATED thls~~ay of September, 2007.

WHITE PETERSON, P.A.

By:%~
a-~
ifarah
H. Arnett
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO
County of Canyon

)
) ss.
)

R. DREW THOMAS, being ftrst du1y sworn, deposes and says that he is the Plaintiff in
the above-entitled matter, hat he has read the foregoing docllt11ent, 'knows the contents thereof,
and believes the facts therein stated to be true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
DATED this ~ day of September, 2007.

R. Drew Thomas

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _ _ day of September, 2007.

==Notaryi'ubhc for Idaho
My Commission Expires: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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343-7510
Fax: i208) 342-2927
537 West Bannock Street
P. O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

.vORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS,
LAW

0
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- ESTABLISHED 1952 -

fD.

TWIN FALLS OFFIC
(208) 734-75]
Toll Free: (877) 343-751
Fax: (208) 734-411
133 Shoshone Street NortJ
P. O. Box 38!
Twin Falls, ID 83303-038S

John C. Hepworth
John T. Lezamiz
Robyn M. Brody
Benjamin J. Cluff
JoelA. Beck

J.

Charles Hepworth
John J. Janis
John W. Kluksdal

May 22, 2008

VIA FACSIMILE - 475-2201

William A. Morrow
Dennis Wilkinson
MORROW, DINIUS
5680 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Re:

Thomas v. Thomas
HL&J File No.: 06-2-023

Dear Bill and Dennis:
I am writing about a couple of discovery and other matters needing to be addressed
in the above-referenced matter.
. I. We serit early arscovery requestsalrriosf two years ago at this point asking for
details concerning the damages claims. I also sought to ask questions at your client's deposition
about the damages claims, but we agreed to continue that deposition, among other things, because
damages questions were still up in the air. We also received your supplemental answer to discovery
back in September, 2007, indicating you had hired an expert to produce a report on the damages
subject(s). The bottom line is we don't really have any information at this point on what damages
are being claimed, or how you are going to try to prove such damages.
•
We would like to go ahead with continuing the deposition of your client in this
matter, but do not feel that we can do that until we have the damages information in advance. As
such, we need to get this damages information as soon as possible.
2. I would also like to follow up on what information we can expect to receive
regarding the expert testing you had done by Mr. Speckin in illinois. The information you provided
orally to Ron Bjorkman, besides identifying the type of testing done, basically boiled down to the
tests being "inconclusive." That does not tell us a lot, of course, and we are wondering if we can
expect there to be more information provided to us on this subject. Is your expert intending on
writing a report on the results of his testing? Please let me know what you can about this as well.

Reply to Boise office
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William A. Morrow
Dennis Wilkinson
May 22,2008
Page 2

3. I have also drafted a second set of discovery requests, and am enclosing the same.
Thank. you for your time and attention to these matters.
Very truly yours,
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS

JJJ/sf
pc: Ron Bjorkman w/enclosures
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE TIllRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*• * * *
R. DREW THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)
)

vs.
RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAs and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' SECOND SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO
PLAINTIFF

)
)
)
)
)
)

*****
DEFENDANTS' SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF - 1

EXHIBIT-D

Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis,
hereby require you to answer the following Interrogatories and Requests for Production under oath,
within thirty (30) days after service hereof in the manner prescribed by the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
A.

When answering the following Interrogatories and Requests for Production,

please furnish all information available to you, including information in the possession of your
attorneys, investigators, employees, officers, directors, agents, representatives, or any other person
or persons acting on your behalf, and not merely such information as is known by your own personal
knov,dedge.
B.

If you cannot answer any of the following discovery requests after exercising

due diligence to secure the information to do so, please so state and answer to the extent possible,
specifying your inability to answer the remainder, and stating whatever information or knowledge
you have concerning the unanswered portions.
C.

Each discovery request is intended to and does, request that each and every,

all and singular, the particulars and parts thereof, be answered with the same force and effect as if
each part and particular were the subject of and were asked by separate questions to Plaintiff.
D.

Pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26, these

discovery requests are deemed continuing and your answers thereto are to be supplemented, as
additional information and knowledge becomes available or known to you.
E.

If any document or portion thereof which is responsive to any request herein,
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is or will be withheld from production, inspection or copying (whether because it is claimed to be
work product, communications from attorney to client, or is entitled to be withheld for any other
reason), please fully identify such document or portion thereof in your response and fully state in
your response the reason it is or will be withheld. In addition, if any document is practically
impossible to produce, inspect or copy, please fully identify such document and the reason for the
practical impossibility.
F.

In conducting a search for the documents requested in the Requests for

Production, you are required to make a good faith and reasonable investigation and search for such
documents. Such investigation includes a complete and thorough, but reasonable, search of your
computer hardware and software for docUments that are responsive to the Requests.

DEFINITIONS
As used throughout these discovery requests to Plaintiff:
A.

The term "document" shall mean and include any and all tangible things and

papers whether written, printed, typed, or graphic matter of any kind or nature, however produced
or reproduced, including, but without limitation, all mechanical and electronic sound or video
recordings or transcripts thereof, papers, agreements, contracts, notes, memoranda, correspondence,
letters, telegrams, phone logs, statements, books, manuals, reports, studies, minutes, records,
accounting books, maps, plans, drawings, diagrams, photographs, analyses or studies, whether or not
they are in your possession or under your control, relating to or pertaining in any way to the subject
matter in connection with which it is used, and includes but without limitation, originals, all file
copies and all other copies no matter how or by whom prepared, and all drafts prepared in connection
with such writings, whether used or not.
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B.

The tenn "identify" when used with respect to a document, or the description

or identification of a document, shall be deemed to include a request for the following infonnation
with respect to that document:
1.

The nature and substance of the document with sufficient particularity to
enable the same to be precisely identified.

2.

The date of such document and the person to whom it was sent.

3.

The date the document

was received and the person(s) who received it, if

known.
4.

The names of all persons executing the documents and the names of all
persons participating in the preparation thereof, if different from the persons
executing it.

5.

The present location of the original, or, if none, of a legible copy of the
document.

C.

The tenn "identify~' when used with respect to a person, or a request for the

description or identification of a person, shall be deemed to include a request for the following
infonnation with respect to such person:
1.

The person's full name.

2.

The person's last known business address and the person's last known
residence.

3.

The person's business and residence telephone number.

4.

If a natural person, the person's company affiliation and the person's
occupation and duties.
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D.

The term "identify" when used with respect to oral communications, or a

request for the description or identification of oral communications shall be deemed to include a
request for the following information with respect to each of said oral communications.
1.

The date and place thereof.

2.

Whether said communication was in person or by telephone.

3.

Identify each person who participated in or heard any part of said
communication.

4.

The substance of what was said by each person who participated in said
communication.

5.

A chronological description of all documents or recordings summarizing,
confirming or in any manner referring to said communication, in the manner
described and defined in paragraph B of these Definitions referring to
identification of documents.

E.

The terms "Plaintiff," ''you'' and ''your'' refers to the Plaintiff in this action,

R. Drew Thomas, and any divisions, subsidiaries, companies or corporations affiliated in any way
to said Plaintiff and each or all of his agents, officers, employees, representatives, investigators,
consultants, owners, and/or attorneys.
REOUESTFORPRODUCTIONNO.l:Pleaseproducecopiesofyourtaxreturns
for the calendar years 2006 and 2007, inclusive.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce copies of any and all
documents which indicate or relate to any eamings made by you in the current calendar year 2008.
Your response to this request should include any paycheck stubs, paychecks, deposit slips, business

DEFENDANTS' SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO PLAINTIFF - 5

U()083~

records, or any other such documents that identify amounts you have been paid or earned in the
current calendar year.

INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please describe the financial terms of your current
employment, including your salary , bonuses, commissions, benefit package or any other terms
relating to any financial benefits you receive as a result of your current employment.

INTERROGATORY NO.2: Please identify and describe in full and complete detail
each and every communication you or your representatives have had with accountant Rob Wilde that
relates in any way to the present lawsuit. Your response to this Interrogatory should include, but
not be limited to, the following:
(a)

Identify each and every date for each such communication;

(b)

Identify the form of communication (e.g., by phone, personal meeting, email,
etc.);

(c)

Identify each and every person who participated in each such communication
in addition to Mr. Wilde;

(d)

The substance of each such communication, meaning what was said or
communicated by each party to the communication; and

(e)

To the extent any communication with Mr. Wilde involved any discussion of
whether communication with him violated any privilege Mr. Wilde may have
had with Thomas Motors, Inc. or the individual defendants in this case,
describe how this privilege issue was resolved in favor of Mr. Wilde
continuing such communication with you or your representatives; and

(f)

Identify each and every document that in any way relates to any
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communications you or your representatives have had with accountant Rob
Wilde that in any way related to this lawsuit.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce copies of any and all
docwnents which relate to any communication you or your representatives have had with accountant
Rob Wilde that in any way relate to any issues presented in this lawsuit.

INTERROGATORY NO.3: In this lawsuit you claim, among other things, that you
expected that you would at some point take over the ownership of the business known as Thomas
Motors, Inc. Do you agree that if you assumed the ownership of that business you would have been
required to obtain a line of credit with a lending institution in order to continue the business? If so,
please identify and explain the following:
(a)

Identify the lending institution(s) that you would have expected to apply for
such a line of credit with;

(b)

Identify any specific individuals at such lending institutions with whom you
would have expected to directly communicate about obtaining such a line of
credit; and

(c)

Identify the amount of the line of credit that you would have expected to have
requested from such lending institution and/or approved for, for the purpose
of continuing the business; and

(d)

Explain in full and complete detail the basis upon which you could
reasonably have expected to have been approved for the line of credit
identified above.

INTERROGATORY NO.4: In this lawsuit, you claim "The Defendants consistently
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used assets and funds of Thomas Motors for their personal use." Regarding this allegation, please
identify and describe, in full and complete detaiL each of the following:
(a)

Identify each and every occasion or instance the defendants used any assets
or funds of Thomas Motors for their personal use;

(b)

Identify the dates involved in each such transaction;

(c)

Identify the amounts involved in each such transaction;

(d)

Explain the details of such transactions including how such transactions were
recorded in the books of Thomas Motors, and for what "personal use" you
claim such funds were specifically used for; and

(e)

Identify each and every document which identifies, explains, or in any way
relates to this allegation that the defendants used assets and funds of Thomas
Motors for their personal use.

REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce copies of any and all
documents which identify, describe, explain, or which in any way relate to the defendants
purportedly using assets and funds of Thomas Motors for their personal use.

INTERROGATORY NO.5: In your Complaint in this case, you claim that you had
the discussion with the defendants about leaving Thomas Motors "due to the financial manipulations
by the Defendants." Regarding this allegation, please identify and describe in full and complete
detail each and every one of the "financial manipulations" you are claiming were performed by the
defendants that in any way relate to this allegation. Your response to this Interrogatory should
include, but not be limited to, the follo'Wing:
(a)

Identify each and every transaction which you allege constitutes some kind
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of "fmancial manipulation" on the part of the defendants;
(b)

Identify the dates of each such transaction;

(c)

Identify the amounts involved in each such transaction;

(d)

Identify and describe in detail precisely what was done that amounts to a
fmandal manipulation; and

(e)

Identify each and every document which identifies, describes, or in any way
relates to each such fmancial manipulation occurred.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce copies of any and all
documents which in any way relate to any "fmancial manipulations by the Defendants" referenced
your response to Interrogatory No.5 above.

INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please identify and explain your understanding and/or
belief regarding what was the value of the Thomas Motors "business" at the time it was sold in early
2006. Please also explain in full and complete detail precisely how you arrived at the amount you
believe or claim the Thomas Motors businl!ss was valued at the time it was so sold.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce copies of any and all
documents that in any way relate to the question of what was the value of Thomas Motors business
at the time it was sold in early 20:t

.

DATED this~ day of May) 2008.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
d one of the attorneys for the
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, I~o 8370
, 2008, he caused to be
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this2.2-- day of
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the ethod indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

DEFENDANTS'

SECO~TI

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax)

9(J

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
~] Telecopy (Fax)
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March 7~ 2008
YIII FtlCSimill Tl'tIpIfiBw" alii) Hl-lUZ
John I. Janis

HEPWORm LEZAMIZ Ik. JANIS; CHTD.

537 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2582
Bo~ m 83701-2582

DeatJObD:

Thank you for discussing the 1ettct agreement reaanJing the testing of original documents
The point of entering iIi to the aereement is to essentially Jay out the
ground rules of what happens in the event the original documeuts arc lost or destroyed while in
our possession. The oa1y additioas made 10 the agreement you drafted are with regard to your
notification requirement in the event you decide to have the documeuts tested by your own
cxpc::rt, wt.t to do in 1he event the documents ue lost or destroyed while in your possession and
the proc:;edwe for receipt sod retlIrn of the documents to Ron Bjorkman's office.

with me this aftemoon.

Our aareement is contained in the foUowinC provisions:
1. Whoever picb up the three original documents ftom Mr. Bjorkman's office will sign
a MCeipt acknowledging that they are taking possession of the original documeuIs. At the time
that the documents arc picbd up, Mr. Bjorkman will make a copy oftbe documents and both the
party that pick them up and Mr. Bjorkman will acknowledge that they are true and accurate
copies of the origiDals. When the documents arc .tdI.1J:Ded to Mr. Bjorkman after testing the
receipt win ackoowledge that the returned oriJiDals arc the same as the control CXlpics made by
Mr. Bjorkman. If Mr. Bjor:kman or coW*1 believe that the originals are not the same. the
diffaC':DC\:S atCi to be noted on the receipt and signed by Mr. Bjorkman and the individual that
retumed the documem.

2. If the original documeats are lost \Ybi1e in our possession or that of our experts, or if
the inlegrity of the original doclameats bas bcc:n destroyed or altered to the point that you are left
with the inability to have the original documeors tested in the same manner as we are having
them ~ this will create a rebuttable presumption that the documents weJe sianed at or about
the time claimed by Roll and Elaine Thomas.

EXHIBIT
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John J.Janis

March 7. 200&
Page-2

3. We will provide you with the results of our cxpcri's testing reptdIess ofwbether the
condusioas are favorable or unfavorable to either side. The intormatioD wiD be coaveyed to you
imInedildeJy atte.- our expert PIOvides us with the rcsuI1s of the testin&. his opiDioDsIcoaclusions.
or the lib. This would of course iDclude providina you with a copy of any writteD report that he
ienerates.

4. In the event you re1ain aD expert to test the original documents you will supply us with
the results of my tesdDg or coaclusioDs made by your expert in tho same fasJriop as ovdined in
paragraph number 3 above. If aod wbea you cledde to have the documeats tested we will reach
an agreement reaantinI how to deal with the possibHity of destruction or loss of the originals
prior to you takiaa possessioa of the dnc"meQ~ 8Qd having them tested.
We request that you

sian this letter. at the place iDdicated below. acknowledgina your

aareemeDt to these terms before the documents 11'8 scheduled to be traItSfened to OUt possession.
If you have any questioas or c:oacems please feel fiw to give me a call

Q:ruaseI for the Plaintiff; Drew Thomas. ~ to the tmns and conditions specified
above.

WHITE PBTERSON

~~-== ~--

By:

DemUs P. W'dJdason

Auomey for the Plaintiff
Couoscl for the Defeadant.. Ron Thomas, agrees to the terms and conditions specified

above.

OO()R4~
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Toll Free: (877) 343Fax: (208) 734133 Shoshone Street 1\
P. O. Box
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0

John C. Hepw
John T. LeZa
Robyn M. Br
Benjamin J. C
Joel A. B

J. Charles Hepworth
John J. Janis
John W KluksdaJ

April 24, 2008

VIA FACSIMILE - 466-4405
William A. Morrow
Dennis Wilkinson

WHITE PETERSON
5700 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 200
Nampa, Idaho 83687-76901
Re:

Thomas v. Thomas
HL&J File No.: 06-2-023

Dear Counsel:
We are concerned about the status of the original written contracts, and what is going
on with regard to the ink dating testing you were arranging to have perfonned on those original
contracts. You will recall we reached our written agreement concerning these issues by letter dated
March 7, 2008. Among other things, our letter agreement requires you to notify us "immediately"
about the results of your expert's testing, whether such results were reported to you orally or in
writing. The documents were picked up at Ron Bjorkman's office on Wednesday, March 12,2008,
which is more than six weeks ago at this point.
When the documents were picked up from Mr. Bjorkman's office, we were under the
impression those documents were going to be delivered to the expert in Illinois within a day or two
thereafter. We were also under the impression that the testing would be conducted soon thereafter,
and that the original documents would be returned to us within a couple of weeks, although there
was admittedly no specific deadline or agreement reached regarding a date for the retUrn of the
documents. In any event, now that more than six weeks have gone by, we are concerned about the
original documents, and the status of the testing. We would appreciate it if someone could let us
know where we stand on this, and when we can reasonably expect to hear about the results of the
testing, and have the original documents returned. In this regard, please feel free to contact either
Ron Bjorkman or myself.

Reply to Boise office
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Thank you for time and consideration.
Very truly yours,

HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS

JJJ/sf
pc: Ron Bjorkman

John.J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

'" * * '" '"
R. DREW THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

vs.

)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC.. an Idaho Corporation.
Defendants.
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COMES NOW, the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, and pursuant to Rule 37(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure hereby renew the Defendants' Motion to Compel filed initially on August 4,2008.
This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons as follows:
1. The Defendants' Motion to Compel filed on August 4, 2008, was directed at three
separate discovery subject matters which were as follows:
(a)

specific written discovery which requested detailed information concerning
the damages claims made by the plaintiff, which discovery requests were
more than two years old at the time the Motion to Compel was filed;

(b)

a second set of discovery requests which the plaintiff had filed no answers to
at all, and which were long since overdue; and

(c)

more specific information relating to the expert testing on the original
documents which was arranged pursuant to a stipulation/agreement between
counsel.

2. The hearing on this Motion to Compel by the Defendants was scheduled for three
weeks later, specifically August 25, 2008. On the eve of that hearing, plaintiff's counsel called
defense counsel and requested additional time to respond to the subject discovery requests. This was
beyond the time the plaintiff was required to file a response to the pending Motion and certainly
there had been no efforts since the Motion was filed to actually respond to the discovery requests.
As a pure courtesy and a favor, defense counsel reluctantly agreed to call off the hearing, although
it was subject to the condition that responses to the subject discovery requests would be provided
by August 29, 2008. (See Second Affidavit of John Janis in Support of Defendants lv/otion to
I
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Compel, Exhibit "A ".)

On August 29, 2008, plaintiffs counsel did purport to provide responses to the
discovery requests that were the subject of defendants' Motion to Compel filed on August 4,2008.
However, regarding two of the subject matters that were at issue in the Motion to Compel, the
plaintiff failed to provide any additional meaningful information at all, from that which had
previously been provided, and which led to the Motion to Compel being filed in the first place. The
specifics of this are addressed in more detail below.
3. THE DAMAGES CLAIMS. Regarding the damages claims information, the
plaintiffprovided "Plaintiff s Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' First Set ofDiscovery
Requests." This was dated August 29, 2008, pursuant to the agreement described above. A copy of
these discovery responses are attached as Exhibit "B" to the Second Affidavit of John Janis in
Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel. The first couple of paragraphs of this supposed
"supplemental" answer was basically identical to the answer that had been provided by the plaintiff
in July of 2006, substantially more than 2 years earlier. This was, in other words, the very same
answer that led to the Motion to Compel in the first place, because it provided the defendants with
no meaningful information at all regarding what actual damages were being claimed by the plaintiff
in this case at this point. The only other information provided in this supplemental response
regarded the expert who had been retained by the plaintiff to provide opinions on damages, who had
already been disclosed in the first supplemental answer to these discovery requests provided in
S.;pll.:mber of2007. Here again, there was no substantive information provided about what opinions
this expert would offer on the subject of damages but only references to information that the expert
was either reviewing or going to review. Here again, the point is the same - there is absolutely no
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new information provided of any material nature whatsoever in the plaintiff's second "supplemental"
response to the defendants' first set of discovery requests directed at the damages claims in this
action.
Moreover, and perhaps most important, it was more than obvious that the answer
given in this second supplemental discovery response, which quoted from the information given in
the first response over two years earlier, was now completely out of date. Among other things, it
continues to make claims that are entirely inconsistent with rulings that have been made by this
Court in the intervening couple of years. For example, the plaintiff s original answer to the damages
discovery requests included a reference to claiming as a "general area of damage" the loss of "real
property on which Thomas Motors is situated." The plaintiff is, of course, well aware ofthis Court's
prior ruling in this case made months ago granting a defense motion for partial summary judgment
"dismissing any claim for breach of an agreement to transfer real property." (See, Court's Order on
Deftndants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated May 16, 2008). The Court in this case

point blank ruled that the plaintiff can not claim any damages associated with real property (Le., the
land on which Thomas Motors is located). Yet, the plaintiff nevertheless files a second
"supplemental" answer to discovery four months after this Court's ruling on this subject, and after
the Motion to Compel proceedings referenced above, claiming damages for the value of "real
property on which Thomas Motors is situated." To be blunt, this was inexplicable, and frankly
unbelievable. And, these were not the only problems with the "second supplemental" answer to the
damages discovery requests, addressed further below.
4. In response to receiving this Second Supplemental Responses to Defendants' First
Set u1 Discovery Requests, defense counsel contacted plaintiff's counsel to review these concerns.
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The big picture concern, of course, regarded the events that preceded these discovery responses
which were revealed above. That is, the defense had filed the Motion to Compel, and on the eve of
the hearing without having received any kind of a response to the Motion or the discovery requests
at all, agreed to call off the hearing as simply a courtesy, but on the condition that actual responses
would be given within a certain time frame. The actual responses that were provided on the
damages claims, provided no new information of any kind from that which had been provided two
years earlier, and in any event was making claims for matters that did not even arguably make any
sense at this point in the litigation. To be fair, plaintiff's counsel was receptive to these concerns and
agreed that the problems would be addressed quickly. Defense counsel wrote a letter to plaintiff's
counsel memorializing this conversation, which letter was e~mailed, faxed, and sent via regular mail.
(See, Second Affidavit ofJohn Janis in Support of Defondants' Motion to Compel. Exhibit "C ").

This Jetter address the various issues and/or concerns with the Second Supplemental Responses, and
such letter is dated September 10, 2008.

As reflected in this letter, plaintiffs counsel had

specifically agreed they would provide a "fairly quick turnaround" on this. That was almost six
weeks ago at this point, and literally nothing has happened on this since then ~ no phone calls, no
additional answers, no additional information being provided or request for additional information,
etc. (See, Second Affidavit ofJohn Janis in Support of Defondant's l\1otion to Compel,

~

5).

5. EXPERT TESTING. The defendants described the purpose and reasons for
filing the Motion to Compel in follow up to the Expert Testing the plaintiff arranged on the original
agreements that are at the heart of the controversy between the parties in this case. As reflected
there, the agreement between counsel for the parties surrounding this Expert Testing included a
commitment from plaintiffs counsel that they would provide defense counsel with the conclusions
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of this testing as soon as it was completed. The bottom line is the testing was completed months
ago, and plaintiff's counsel has informed the defense counsel nothing more than the tests were
"inconclusive." As explained by the defendants in their initial Motion to Compel there simply has
to be more to it than that. On the subject of ink dating, for example, the expert's tests presumably
mean that the ink on the paper has dried which in turn translates into the expert believing and/or
concluding that the signatures must have been placed there more than x number of years ago.
Pursuant to the agreement reached regarding this expert testing, the defendants are entitled to this
specific information, and what is meant by the fact that the various tests performed by the plaintiff s
chosen expert was "inconclusive" on all scores. The same point can be made for the other testing
performed by the expert - logic and common sense dictate that there has to be much more to the
results ofthis expert testing than a one word conclusion that the tests were "inconclusive."
As reflected above, the defendants agreed to call off the hearing on their first Motion
to Compel, which included this particular subject regarding the expert testing. The agreement to call
off the hearing was again subject to the condition that actual answers to the subject discovery
requests would be provided by August 29,2008. The only additional follow up on this expert testing
issue was a letter from plaintiffs counsel dated August 28,2008. A copy of this letter is attached
as Exhibit "D" to the Second Affidavit of John Janis in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel.
As reflected there, no additional information of any kind is provided by plaintiff's counsel on this
expert testing. It simply repeated plaintiff's counsel's "understanding that the results of the testing
1:1':

lllconclusive as they related to identifYing specific dates." The defendants respectfully request

that the Court order plaintiff to comply with his discovery agreement regarding this expert testing,
and provide defense counsel with a full and detailed explanation of what is meant by the term
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"inconclusive" regarding all the tests performed by the expert on these original agreements or
alternatively for plaintiff to pay all costs and fees for defense counsel to take the expert's deposition
and get the information directly from the expert.
In summary, the defendants respectfully move this Honorable Court for: (1) an Order
compelling plaintiff to provide actual, meaningful and current responses to the defendants' first set
of discovery directed at obtaining all detailed information concerning the damages claims being
made by the plaintiff in this action; (2) an Order compelling the plaintiff to provided all detailed
information regarding the expert testing, or alternative relief as referenced above; (3) an Order
awarding the defendants all attorneys fees associated with having to file this original Motion to
Compel as well as the Renewed Motion to Compel; and/or (4) such other relief the Court deems
warranted under the circumstances.
This Motion is otherwise based on the record on file with the Court in this action,
including the initial Motion to Compel and First Affidavit of Counsel in Support, together with the
Second Affidavit of Counsel filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this

J3 ~y of October, 2008.
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Ijlaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this.23~ay of October, 2008, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Dennis Wilkinson
MORROW, DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[)q U.S. Mail

[ J Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)

IX] U.S. Mail

r .] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (lSB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

...............
R. DREW THOMAS,
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vs.

)
)
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)

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC .• an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.
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SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN JANIS
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)
)
)
)

...............
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

JOHN JANIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. I am an attorney of record for the defendants in the above-entitled action and make
this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge and/or belief.
2. Attached as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a letter I sent to plaintiffs
counsel, dated August 21, 2008, confirming our agreement to vacate the upcoming hearing on
defendants' Motion to Compel, subject to the condition that the discovery requests at issue in the
Motion to Compel would be answered by the following Friday, August 29, 2008.
3. Attached as Exhibit "B" hereto is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs Second
Supplemental Responses to Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests, dated August 29, 2008.
4. Attached as Exhibit "C" hereto us a true and correct copy of a letter I sent to
plaintiff's counsel dated September 10, 2008. This letter was sent as an e-mail attachment. as well
as faxed, as well as sent by U.S. mail.
5. After sending the letter dated September 10, 2008, Exhibit "C" hereto, I have
received no additional information of any kind from plaintiffs counsel regarding the subject
discovery requests, nor have I been contacted by plaintiffs counsel for any reason since then.
6. Attached as Exhibit "D" hereto is a letter from plaintiffs counsel dated August
28,2008.
DATED this ;2..3

~day of October, 2008.

SECOND AFFIDA VIT OF JOHN JANIS IN SUPPOR

y<i

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me thi~ day of October, 2008.

k~~~

Notary Public for Idah~/.,1.
~
Residing at
I.) ~~
Commission expires
I ,;L \ l , \ ~.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, BoiseJ?aho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this ~ay of October, 2008, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
WHITE, PETERSON, PA
5680 East Franklin Road. Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901

[Xl U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[{J U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ 1Telecopy (Fax)
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Toll Free: (877) 343-751
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J. Janis

,n W. Kluksdal

August 21, 2008

VIA FACSIMILE - 475-2201
Dennis Wilkinson
MORROW, DINIUS
5680 E. Franidin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Re:

Thomas v. Thomas
HL&.J File No.: 06-2-023

Dear Dennis:
This will confirm our agreement that we will vacate the hearing on the Defendants'
Motion to Compel that is otherwise set for Monday, August 25, 2008, per your request for additional
time to respond to the subject discovery requests. We agreed that you would provide responses to
the requests at issue in the discovery motion by next Friday, August 29, 2008.

I am enclosing a copy of a Notice of Status Re: Defendants' Motion to Compel.
When we contacted the Gem County Clerk's office to vacate the hearing, they asked that we file
something to fonnally indicate the hearing was being called off. As the enclosed Notice indicates,
while we have called off the hearing, we have not yet withdrawn the Motion to Compel. We will
do that, of course, if we receive satisfactory answers to the discovery requests that are at issue in the
Mc:>tion to Compel

Thank you.
Very truly yours,
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS

JJJ/sf

pc:

Judge Kerrick (Caldwell chambers) w/enc.
Ron Bjorkman w/enc.

Reply to Boise office

O()0

(

(

- 0,.

EXHIBIT~

rlEPWORTH, LEZ,~\fvllZ
& JANIS

SEP 03 ZJn8
BOISE,IO

William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:
(208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
2451,6023
ISB No.:
wmorrow@morrowdinius.com
dwilkinson@morrowdinius.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)
)
)
)

R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
vs.

)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,

)
)
)

Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 2006-492
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES
TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

)

)

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his counsel
of record, the law firm of Morrow Dinius, and hereby serves his second supplemental responses
to Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff.

GENERAL OBJECTIONS
L

Plaintiff objects to Defendants' First Set of Discovery Requests to Plaintiff to the

extent they seek contentions and information which Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS - I
r" _ • -

develop.

Plaintiff has not completed its own discovery and investigation is continuing.

Accordingly, the responses that follow are based upon the best knowledge, information, and
belief of Plaintiff at this time and are to be considered preliminary in nature, subject to
substantial revision as Plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct further research and discovery.
Plaintiff will make a good faith effort to respond to all discovery requests based on the
information presently available to him, with the understanding that his responses are not
necessarily complete and further research may require revision of any and all responses.
Plaintiff reserves the right to make any further responses if it appears that any omission or error
has been made in connection with these responses or if more accurate information is or has
become available. These responses are made without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to use in later
discovery or to present at hearing such evidence as may later be discovered or evaluated.
2.

These responses are made subject to all objections as to competence, relevance,

materiality, and admissibility. These responses are subject to all objections that would require
the exclusions of any statement, material, or information herein provided if the discovery request
were asked concerning any statement, material, or information made or possessed by witnesses
present and testifying in court. All such objections are reserved and may be interposed at the
time of trial or any hearing in this matter.
3.

Plaintiff specifically objects to these discovery requests to the extent that they

seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and the
rules governing the discovery of facts of experts as set forth in Rule 26, Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure. Plaintiff has, to the extent possible, construed each request as requesting only
information and/or documents not subject to any applicable protection.

This objection is

PLAINTIfF'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
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intended to apply to all discovery requests that seek such information and will not be repeated
specifically for each request to which it applies.
No incidental or implied admissions are intended. The fact that Plaintiff has responded to any
discovery request or part thereof should not be taken as an admission that Plaintiff accepts that
the discovery request or the response or objection thereto constitutes admissible evidence.
Similarly, the fact that Plaintiff has responded to all or part of a request is not intended to and
shall not be construed to be a waiver by Plaintiff of all or part of any objection to other requests.
Plaintiff's answers to any discovery requests herein do not constitute a waiver of Plaintiff's right
to object to any future additional, or supplemental discovery requests regarding the same or
similar matters.
INTERROGATORY NO.8: In your Complaint in this matter, you claim that as a result
of an alleged breach of contract, you have been damaged in an amount to be proven with
specificity at trial, but in excess of $500,000. Regarding this damages claim, please identify and
explain the foIl owing:
(a)

Identify with specificity the amount of damages you are claiming in this regard;

(b)

Explain the method by which you came up with such damages number; and

(c)

To the extent not already address in response to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) above,

please describe and explain each and every fact regarding how you have sustained damages in
such amounts.

SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8: Plaintiff objects to
this Interrogatory on the basis and to the extent that such interrogatory seeks information that is
protected under the attorney/client andlor work product privileges. Subject to, and without
waiving these objections, the plaintiff is currently in the process of itemizing the damages he has
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suffered with the assistance of the previously disclosed expert witness. To date the specific
damages have not yet been computed but with the aid of the retained expert the plaintiff expects
that they will be determined and supplied to the defendant in accordance with the Court's
Scheduling Order. The plaintiff believes that the general areas of damage which were previously
disclosed in his ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8 are:
(l)

Loss of right to ownership interest and income in Thomas Motors and real

property on which Thomas Motors is situated;
(2)

Loss of income based on reliance on agreement and promises with defendants

based on his taking a position with Thomas Motors at a substantially below market salary
thereby providing defendants with a substantial benefit for which plaintiff is now entitled to
compensation based on defendant's sale of Thomas Motors to a third party;
(3)

Loss of future income from Thomas Motors as defendants sold Thomas Motors to

third party in breach of agreement with plaintiff.
The plaintiff has retained and disclosed Craig Clarke, CPA, CFE. It is anticipated Mr.
Clarke will provide opinions concerning the value of Thomas Motors, Inc., the market value of
services provided by the Plaintiff during 1997-2006 while he was operating Thomas Motors,
Inc., whether the Plaintiff was compensated for his services at the market rates, and the extent to
which the Plaintiff's services and efforts contributed to the value of Thomas Motors, Inc. In
developing in his opinions, Mr. Clarke is considering data and information contained tax
documents, accounting records, bank records, and other business records and documents relating
to Thomas Motors, Inc., and the Plaintiff's income tax documents.

Mr. Clarke is also

considering information to be obtained from witnesses in this case, including the plaintiff, the
defendant, Shirley Youngstrom, Rob Wilde, James Warr, Lanny Berg Sr., Jan Flowers, and
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Penny Hurlbert. Mr. Clarke may also obtain information from other witnesses, including Don
Ovitt, Mark Bottles, representatives of Chrysler Corporation, and employees of Wells Fargo,
Key Bank, and Washington Trust Bank. Mr. Clarke will prepare a report discussing his opinions
in this case related to damages.
The plaintiff may also retain additional experts regarding the issue of damages. In the
event additional experts are retained to compute and analyze damages they will be disclosed
promptly and their opinions will be provided to the defendant in accordance with the Court's
Scheduling Order.
This answer will be supplemented as required by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See
also First Supplemental Response to Request for Production No.2.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce copies of any and all documents
which have any tendency to prove or relate to the amount of damages you are claiming in this
action under each or any of Counts One through Five, inclusive, of your Complaint.
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5:
Please see SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO.8. The plaintiff is still
in the process of identifying documents responsive to this request. Further, neither the plaintiff
nor his retained expert has had an opportunity to review many documents related to the business
that are in the custody of the defendant. This response will be supplemented in a timely fashion
consistent with the Court's Scheduling Order.

DA TED this)'( day of August, 2008.
MORROW DINIUS

BY~
t..,. (~
Dennis P. Wilkinson
Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS _ 5
'"

,.
f' '"

r'

(

--

EXHIBlrG

BOISE OFFICE
(208) 343-7510
Fax: (208) 342·2927
537 West Bannock Street
P. O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

~ORTH, LEZAMIZ &
LAW

0

JANIS, (.

FFICES

- ESTABliSHED 1952 -

.~~'D.

TWIN FALLS OFFI<
(208) 734-75
Toll Free: (877) 343-75.
Fax: (208) 734-4lJ
133 Shoshone Street Nor1
P. O. Box 38
Twin Falls, ID 83303-038
John C. Hepwortl
John T. Lezami:

1. Charles Hepworth
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Benjamin J. CluB
Joel A. Beck

September 10, 2008

VIA FACSIMILE - 475-2201
& U.S. MAIL
Dennis Wilkinson
MORROW, DINIUS
5680 E. Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Re:

Thomas v. Thomas
HL&J File No.: 06-2-023

Dear Dennis:
This will confmn the phone conversation we had yesterday regarding concerns I
expressed with the recently received Plaintiff's Second Supplemental Responses to the Defendants'
First Set of Discovery Requests. I thought it would be worthwhile to memorialize some ofthe points
that we discussed, and otherwise identify or explain some of our concerns.
Your Second Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No.8 lists three categories of
damages which were previously disclosed, and which you indicate are the continuing categories of
damages that are being claimed in this matter. I will address each of these three categories of
damages listed, and some of the concerns that we discussed about them.
1. The first "general area of damage" identified is as follows: "Loss of right to
ownership interest and income in Thomas Motors and real property on which Thomas Motors is
situated. "
On this subject, we have the flrst most obvious concern with the plaintiff continuing
to claim damages for any "real property" in this case. As you know, the Court has already ruled the
cannot seek damages for the value of any real property as a matter of law. We would
accordingly like to obtain a clarifled or supplemental answer to this Interrogatory indicating the
plaintiff will not be seeking such damages in this case. This would obviously be preferable to us
having to file a Motion with the Court which would in effect be seeking to confinn her prior ruling.
The other concern with this first category is the reference to the word "income." It
appears that the next categories, addressed further below, are the ones that actually relate to the
clans regarding loss of any income, so I will more specifically address those concerns below. For
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Dennis Wilkinson
September 10,2008
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the moment, however, we are confused as to why the claim of any loss of "income" is included in
this category. It appears the basic thrust of what is being claimed in this regard boils down to the
value of the Thomas Motors business at the time it was sold. Here again, we request that this point
be clarified in some kind of written form.
2. The next category of claimed damages states as follows:
Loss of income based on reliance on agreement and promises with
defendants based on his taking a position with Thomas Motors at a
substantially below market salary thereby providing defendants with
a substantial benefit for which plaintiff is now entitled to
compensation based on defendants' sale of Thomas Motors to a third
party.
We have several concerns with this category of damages, as well, as we discussed. It appears that
the thrust of this category of claimed damages is the plaintiff seeking to recover what he believed
should have been the market rate for his services during the time he was employed at Thomas
Motors, compared with what he was actually paid. To begin with, it would not appear to us that a
claimant can seek the recovery of such damages while at the same time seeking to recover damages
for the value of the business itself. That would amount to a claim seeking a double recovery. In
addition, we believe the Court has already ruled that these damages are not recoverable either. In
that regard, I would direct you to the Court's Order on the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment addressing the prior Quasi-Contract claim, specifically at pages 12 and 13 of such
Decision. There, the Court basically ruled it was improper to allow any claim for additional
compensation for prior employment services with the uncontroverted evidence being the parties had
an express employment agreement covering such wages.
Here again, we would like some clarification of this in some kind of written form.
If the plaintiff actually intends to persist on claiming damages associated with what he believes his
market salary should have been as compared with his allegedly below market salary, we will need
to file the appropriate Motion with the Court, and do so expeditiously.
3. The last category of damages states as follows: "Loss of future income from
Thomas Motors as defendants sold Thomas Motors to third party in breach of agreement with
plaintiff." We are assuming what is meant here is not loss of future "income" from Thomas Motors,
but rather a loss of net profits the plaintiff will somehow attempt to prove he would have received
had he taken over Thomas Motors. We obviously have a substantial number of concerns about how
such a claim could possibly be proved to a reasonable degree of certainty, given all that would have

Dennis Wilkinson
September 10, 2008
Page 3

to be involved in projecting any kind of profits number under the circumstances presented here. In
addition, however, we would like the specific clarification that this category of damages is referring
to net profits, not future "income" (without regard to lines of credit, numbers of vehicles sold,
commissions, overhead, salaries and all the other expenses that would obviously have to be incurred
in running a new car business).
I appreciate you taking the time to speak with me about these concerns. I understand
that while we did not agree to a specific deadline or time to provide us with these clarifications of
the plaintiff s damages claims in this matter, you indicated that you would provide a fairly quick
turnaround on this. We would, of course, appreciate receiving your response or clarifications to
these points as soon as possible.
Thank you again for your time and consideration.
Very truly yours,

111/sf
pc: Ron Bjorkman
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August 28, 2008

BOISE,ID

John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & JANIS, Chtd.
537 W. Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

Re:

Thomas v. Thomas

Dear John:
Thank you for the extension to respond to discovery. Enclosed is our response to your
second set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production as well as a Supplemental Response to
your first request. There are a number of issues that you raised in your motion to compel and in our
phone conversations. There is still a great deal of work to be done with regard to the damage portion
of our case. We must still review the documents contained in your client's storage shed and have the
same reviewed by our damages expert in order to more accurately quantify those damages. I assure
you that we are working on completing the analysis and will provide you with the result in a timely
fashion.
As you know we had the original agreements analyzed by Erich Speckin to make some
detennination regarding the date of the ink. It is my understanding that the results of the testing were
inconclusive as they related to identifying specific dates. We have not received any written reports
from Mr. Speckin and do not presently intend to call him as a witness. In the event that Mr. Speckin
provides us with a report of his fmdings we will of course supply that to you in accordance with our
agreement.
Again, thank you for the extension. If you have any questions or concerns, please do not
hesitate to contact me.
Sincerely,
MORROW DINIUS

~~~~~
Dennis P. Wilkinson
Enclosures
C:
Drew Thomas
Ron Bjorkman
T:\clients\1iThomas, R Drew 21971\Tbomas Motors, IncJ)O(OCom:spondence\Janis.ltr.03.23.08.docx
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John J. Janis (lSB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street. Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
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H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

vs.

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS.
1.\J C'" an Idaho Corporation.

)

Defendants.

DEFENDANTS' SECOND RENEWED
MOTION TO COMPEL

)
)
)
)

)
)

*****
DEFENDANTS' SECOND RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL - 1

COMES NOW, the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and pursuant to Rule 37(a) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure hereby renew for the second time the Defendants' Motion to Compel filed initially on
August 4,2008. The following is a pertinent history relating to this Second Renewed Motion to
Compel:

1. The defendants' original Motion to Compel was filed on August 4, 2008. A
hearing was scheduled for three weeks later, specifically on August 25,2008. On the eve of that
hearing, after the plaintiff andlor his counsel would have been required to file a response to the
Motion \\-ith the Court, plaintiff s counsel called defense counsel and requested as a favor additional
time to respond the discovery request. No actual responses were provided. it was simply a favor
asked by plaintiffs counsel to call off the hearing, if they would be allowed an additional week or
so to file actual responses to the discovery. Defense counsel agreed. (See Second Affidavit o.fJohn
.J Janis in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel, Exhibit "A "J.
2. On August 29, 2008 plaintiff's counsel did purport to provide responses to the
discovery requests that were the subject of the defendant's Motion to Compel filed on August 4,
2008. However, on two of the subject matters at issue the plaintiff failed to provide any additional
meaningful information at all from that which had been previously filed and which led to the Motion
t" ;\Jmpel being filed in the first place. The specifics of this are addressed in the previously filed

"Defendants' Renewed Motion to Compel". As addressed there, the supposedly new discovery
responses added little or nothing to the old responses. and made claims for damages that made no
sense at all, including claims for damages that were not even arguably recoverable in the case (e.g.

DEFENDANTS' SECOND RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL - 2

damages for land values despite Court rulings months earlier that any such claims for damages were
dismissed as a matter of law).
3. The hearing on the Defendants' "Renewed" Motion to Compel was scheduled for
Monday, November 24, 2008. On Thursday, November 20, 2008, plaintiff provided an additional
response to the discovery requests. As reflected in the defendants' Notice of Vacating Hearing,
however, that while the defendants did not believe the responses given to the subject discovery
requests were in any way adequate, the responses nevertheless did make reference to the fact that
their upcoming expert disclosure would reveal more specific information required by the requests.
At that point, the expert disclosure of December 18, 2008 was just several weeks away. As such,
again as explained in the defendants' Notice of Vacating Hearing, defense counsel agreed to call off
the hearing with the specific hope and expectation that the expert disclosures several weeks hence
would finally reveal the discovery information which had been requested by the defendants originally
over two years earlier. In fact, this expectation was the only reason the hearing on the Renewed
Motion to Compel was vacated.
4. The deadline for the plaintiff to provide opinions and reports of their expert
witnesses was December 18, 2008. Inexplicably, no disclosure of any kind was provided by the
plaintiff, and certainly nothing in the form of expert opinions or reports. There was simply no
additional information forthcoming from the plaintiff on the crucial damages subject at all, nor any
communication from plaintiffs counsel about the failure to comply with the expert disclosure
deadline or any of the other matters referenced above.
The bottom line is the defendants have been making repeated requests and filing
several motions to get at the specifics of the damages claims being made by the plaintiff. Numerous
DEFENDANTS' SECOND RENEWED MOTION TO COMPEL - 3
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promises have been made which caused hearings to be called off, but such promises were not kept.
Defendants still at this point more than 2 Y2 years after making the original request for this
information have yet to receive it. The defendants thus respectfully request that the Court Order the
plaintiff to produce the information requested, and award the defendants all reasonable costs and
attorneys fees associated with filing the three Motions to Compel on this same subject and impose
other sanctions or relief appropriate to the circumstances.

/ +'b.

RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this _U_ day of January, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

s
eys for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this Ii ~ day of January, 2009, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax )
[X] E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[X]
ail
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John J. Janis (lSB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701~2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N.Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

Plaintiff:

)
)

vs.

)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF
EXPERT WITNESSES

)
}
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
}

)

*****
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 1

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties and the
Court's Scheduling Order(s) hereby discloses the following as expert witnesses who may testify at
the trial of this action:
1. Ron Thomas - As the defendant and owner of the Thomas Motors business, Mr.
Thomas may be expected to testify to his opinion that the Thomas Motors business by itself had
little or no value at the time it was sold to the group that included Mr. Buckner in early 2006. Mr.
Thomas may also be expected to testify as the owner of the land on which Thomas Motors was
located and the surrounding area, what the fair market value was for such land at the time they were
sold to the group that included Mr. Buckner in early 2006, and that they had a fair market value
between $300,000 and $400,000 per acre.
2. Dennis Reinstein, CPAIABV, ASA. eVA & Peter Butler, ASA. CFA - Mr.
Reinstein and Mr. Butler are experts in the fields of both accounting and business evaluation. A
copy of the Curriculum Vitae for each of them is attached as Exhibit "A" hereto. Mr Reinstein
andlor Mr. Butler may be expected to offer their opinions at trial as to the value of the Thomas
Motors business at the time it was sold. Mr. Butler and Mr. Reinstein have reviewed all the pertinent
financial information from Thomas Motors, including the tax returns, financial statements, affidavits
of witnesses filed in this case, and the documents surrounding the sale of Thomas Motors and the
surrounding land in early 2006. They have also spoken with the accountant for Thomas Motors at
the time of such sale and the preceding year (2005). They may be expected to testify to their opinion
that given all the circumstances, Thomas Motors had a negative equity value as a business entity by
itself at the time of the sale. A report by Mr. Reinstein is attached as Exhibit "B".
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 2
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3. James Warr. CPA - Mr. Warr is a certified public accountant, who was the
accountant for Thomas Motors business at the time of the sale of such business, and for sometime
beforehand. Mr. Warr may be expected to testifY at trial as to his opinion that the Thomas Motors
business commanded little or no value in the sale to the group headed by Mr. Buckner. A copy of
a one page letter written by Mr. Warr on this subject is attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
4. John H. Moulton - Mr. Moulton is an expert in the banking industry. A copy of
his curriculum vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit "D". He may be expected to testifY at trial
regarding the standards of the banking industry for providing loans or financing to those involved
in the business of selling new cars. He may more specifically offer opinions regarding what
standards ofthe industry would have applied to Drew Thomas had he for whatever reason taken over
the Thomas Motors business, and what banking standards and requirements would have applied
regarding him financing either the purchase of the business by himself, or with assistance from
others, as well as the standards regarding a line of credit to finance the continued operation of said
business entity. Mr. Moulton may also be expected to testifY at trial regarding his opinion that given
the background and financial status of the plaintiff Drew Thomas, it is unlikely that he would have
been able to obtain any significant loan for the purchase of Thomas Motors business along with a
line of credit for the continued operation of the business in amounts that would likely generate any
significant difference in the losses generated by the Thomas Motors business historically. Mr.
Moulton may also be expected to testifY to how the economic climate across the country the last
couple of years, including the most recent economic crisis, has adversely affected the industry tor
new car dealerships rather severely, making it one of the least desirable and/or profitable businesses
to be involved with over the last couple of years.
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 3
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5. Michael Spence. Esq. - of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker law firm in Salt Lake City.
Mr. Spence is an attorney and an expert in the field of dealing with new car dealer franchises. A
copy of the resume on his law firm's website is attached hereto as Exhibit "E". Mr. Spence may be
expected to testify at trial regarding the standards that would have applied for the purpose of Drew
Thomas making any application to Dodge/Chrysler for purposes of becoming an approved franchise
owner in Emmett, Idaho in the calendar year 2006, including the hurdles he would have to overcome
in order to be approved and address the likelihood of being approved. Mr. Spence may be expected
to testify as to what laws, rules and regulations would have applied to such an application, as well
as what standards existed in the industry at the time.
DATED this

t 1-/-

_1_ day of January, 2009.
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofldaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Bois7 ?i:aho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this ~day of January, 2009. he caused to be served
a true and correct copy ofthe above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

j)(J U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[X] E-mail

(Xl U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ J Telecopy (Fax)
I)<J
ail
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R. REINSTEIN, CPNABV, ASA, C •.
Birthdate:

November 19, 1952

Education:

University of Idaho
BS Agri-business, 1974
BS Business (Accounting), 1975

Certification:

Licensed in Idaho as CPA, 1976
CVA designation, 1995
ABV designation, 2001
ASA designation, 2003

Career
Experience:

t

Hooper Cornell, PLLC
Partner

January, 2002 - Present

Presnell'Gage Accounting & Consulting
Firm-wide supervisory responsibilities for business consulting services and
electronic data processing services
Boise office
Partner
Partner-in-charge
Partner
Moscow office
Partner-in-charge
Lewiston office
Partner
Manager
Staff Accountant

January, 1996 - December 31,2001
October, 1991 - January, 1996
July, 1989 - September, 1991
October, 1983 - June, 1989
May, 1980 - September, 1983
1979 - 1980
1975 - 1978

Professional experience includes:
(1) Valuation of small businesses and profeSSional practices.
(2) Assistance to clients with the analysis of business operations and
significant business transactions. These include negotiations on purchase
and sale of a business or business segments. including assistance with
valuation of business entities.
(3) Design and assist with implementation of financial accounting and .control
systems for various clients served by the firm.
(4) Supervision of accounting and auditing services provided by the firm's
professional staff and consultation on procedures and methods of
providing client services.
(5) Member of team conducting review of complex mainframe and
microcomputer accounting systems.
(6) Co-authored and presented eight-hour course on cash management.
Presented other client educational seminars and seminars to other service
professionals such as bankers and attorneys.
(7) Duties as a partner-in-charge included the responsibility for managing an
office and personnel in accordance with firm policies.

tL
EXHIBIT.L.L
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R. REINSTEIN, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA (C&. ,cinued)
Career
Experience
continued:

Farmer's Home Administration - Assistant County Supervisor, 1974.
Duties included:
(1) Evaluation of credit applications and preparation of application
packages for review and approval.
(2) Residential real estate and farm appraisals.

Professional
Memberships
and Activities:
Idaho Society of CPAs, member
Chairman of Management of an Accounting Practice Committee
Member of Committees on
Public Relations
Continuing Professional Education
Relations with Bankers
Northern Chapter of Idaho Society of CPAs, president
American Institute of CPAs, member
American Society of Appraisers, member - Business Valuation
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, member
The Institute of Business Appraisers, member
Continental Association of CPAs, Past Chair of Litigation Services Committee
and Information Technology Committee
Boise Estate Planning Council, member
Program Chairman

Public Service
and Community
Activities:
Boise Chamber of Commerce
Member of Small Business Recognition Sub-committee
Member of Small Business Education and Advisory Sub-committee
Chair of Small Business Committee
Member of Garden City Chamber Council
Discovery Center of Idaho, Vice President of Board
Kiwanis
Moscow Chamber of Commerce
Past-President, V. Pres. Treasurer & Board member
Moscow Executive Association
Moscow Rotary
Lewiston Chamber of Commerce
Lewiston Jaycees
Held various offices & a member of Board of Directors
Prepared and presented accounting seminars for Human Advancement's
Inc., Minority Contractors Awareness Seminars and the Lewis-Clark
Homebuilders Association.
Taught night classes in bookkeeping at the Clarkston Branch of Walla Walla
Community College.

The following is a list of cases in which I have given testimony in either deposition or at trial in
the last four years.

1)

Southern Idaho Medical Group, LLC v. Southern Idaho Ambulatory Surgery Center and
William C. Fitzhugh
Trial - Twin Falls, Idaho - August 2004

2)

Idaho State Lottery Commission - In RE: Bingo Licenses Revocation of - Sons and
Daughters of Idaho, Inc. and Snake River Association of The USA Amateur Boxing
Federation, Inc.
Hearing - Boise, Idaho - August 2004

3)

David A Brown v. Tates Rents, Inc. et al.
Trial - Boise, Idaho - September 2004

4)

Russi v. Russi
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - September 2004

5)

Hugh Callow v. Riverview Marina, Inc. dba Custom Weld Marina
Trial- Boise, Idaho - November 2004

6)

Interstate Group, LLC v. Robert Swikert et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - March 2005
Arbitration Panel - St. Louis, Missouri - April 2005

7)

Nathan Ogden v. St. Luke's RMC
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - June 2005
Trial- Boise, Idaho - September 2005

8)

Marty Mark Robison et al. v. Bateman-Hall, Inc. et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - July 2005

OOD88~

9)

Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Washington Capital Joint Master Trust Mortgage
Income Fund, et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - August 2005

10)

Ward W. Leis v. Herman's Carpet Service, Inc. and Morris W. Brown
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - October 2005

11)

Ray Martin and Robert & Lois Short v. Shirley S. Grant
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - February 2006

12)

Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. TFM, LLC, et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - February 2006
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2006

13)

Richard Gomez v. Mastec North America, Inc., et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - February 2006
Trial - Boise, Idaho - August 2006

14)

United States Bankruptcy Court
In re: Steven Paul Cady and Connie Jean Cady
Trial- Boise, Idaho - August 2006

15)

Roy Hall v. Glenns Ferry Grazing Association
Trial - Boise, Idaho - August 2006

16)

MSN Communications, Inc. v. CompuNet, Inc., et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - October 2006

17)

Serenic Software, Inc. v. Protean Technologies, Inc., et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - October 2006

' "\ "'~"
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18)

Shannon L. Allison, et aI., v. Daniel R. Torrez et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - November 2006

19)

Chris Matey, et aI., v. Ford Motor Company et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - November 2006

20)

Michael P. Fisher, et aI., v. Christian Cusimano, et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - March 2007

21)

Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - June 2007

22)

Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Wheatland Agribusiness, Inc., et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2008

23)

J.R. Simplot Company v. Nestle USA, Inc.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - May 2008

24)

United States of America ex reI. Cherri Suter and Melinda Harmer v. National Rehab
Partners Inc. and Magic Valley Regional Medical Center
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - August 2008

25)

Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SEiZ Construction, LLC, et al.
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - September 2008

QUAL/FICA TlONS

See curriculum vitae attached.

COMPENSA TlON

Hourly rate of $255 plus out-of-pocket costs.
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The following is a list of publications I have authored or co-authored over the last 10 years.
1) Understanding Financial Statements and Basic Accounting Principles - presented to
attorneys on behalf of the Idaho Law Foundation, Inc. on January 6, 1998.
2) Issues in County Financial Management - presented at the Idaho Supreme Court 1999
Clerks / Judges Conference on February 8, 1999.
3) Selling Your Business - Non-Family Valuation and Tax Issues, presented to the National
Auctioneers Association - 52nd Auctioneers Conference and Show on July 20, 2001.
4) Litigation Questions, Problems & Solutions: The Bench, Bar and Clients Speak Out.
Participant on the client panel - presented to the Idaho State Bar Litigation Section on
January 10, 2003.
5) Using Business Valuations To Build An Estate - presented to the Boise Estate Planning
Council on November 3, 2003.

6) Business Valuation Basics - presented to the Boise Wells Fargo Business Bankers
meeting on December 5, 2003.
7) Business Valuation Basics: How to Use Valuation/Financial Theory to Increase the Value
of Your Business - presented to TechHelp, Manufacturers Luncheon on January 28,
2005.
8) Tax Planning for Sales of Real Estate - sponsored by Premier Alliance on March 16,
2005.
9) Valuation and Credit Analysis: Similarities and Differences - presented to Boise area
U.S. Bank business bankers on May 11, 2005.
10) The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and The Market Value of "invested"
Capital: Should Market Value of "Stakeholder" Capital be the Appropriate Reference Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2006.
11) A Hybrid Restricted Stock/Pre-I PO Data Point: Lack of Marketability Discount for ESOP's.
- Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2007.
12) Pension Plans and Closely-Held Companies: Valuing Tricky Assets in Divorce presented to the Idaho State Bar Association on May 9. 2008.

O()08G~

PETER BUTLER, CFA, ASA
Education:

United States Naval Academy
BS Mechanical Engineering. 1986
San Diego State University
MBA, FinC¥1ce Concentration, 1994

Certification:

CFA designation. 1998
ASA accreditation in business valuation, 2001

Career
Experience:

Hooper Cornell, PLLC - A diversified accounting firm.
Director of Valuation (2004 - Present)
Sanli Pastore & Hill, Inc. - An independent business valuation firm.
Manager San Diego Office (2001 - 2003)
Equity Valuation Advisors, Inc. (1995 - 2001) - Financial
advisory/litigation support firm, specializing in securities class action
litigation.
Vice President (1999 - 2001)
Financial Analyst (1995 - 1999)
Acorn Technology Partners, LLC - A venture capital fund.
Managing Director (1999 - 2001)
United States Naval Officer (1986 -1994)
Applicable professional experience includes:
(1) Valuation of privately-held businesses for litigation support, estate
and
gift
tax
reporting,
financial
reporting.
and
mergers/acquisitions. including fairness opinions and purchase
price allocations.
(2) Valuation of publicly traded securities involved in securities class
action litigation.
(3) Venture capital investment.
(4) Analysis and calculation of economic damages.
(5) Inventor and co-developer of a technique which quantifies
company-specific risk for the first time in the business valuation
community. The technique, known as the Butler Pinkerton Model™
or the Total Cost of Equity and Public Company-Specific Risk
Calculator™, is commercially available as a web-based software
program located on Business Valuation Resources' website
(www.bvmarketdata.com) and marketed to fellow analysts and
appraisers.
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Career
Experience: (continued)
(6) Co-author of articles in Business Valuation Review, Business
Valuation Update, Business Appraisal Practice and The Value

Examiner.
(7) Regularly speak on business valuation topics. including training to
fellow analysts/appraisers at national and regional conferences on
the quantification of company-specific risk.
(8) Expert witness testimony.

Professional
Memberships
and Activities.

Present
American Society of Appraisers - Business Valuation (1999 - present)
CFA Institute (1995 - present)
CFA Society of Idaho (2004 - present)
President! Program Chair (2008 - present)
U.S. Naval Academy Information Officer Affiliate (Blue and Gold Officer)
(2008 - present)

Prior
CFA Society of Idaho
Secretary (2005 - 2006)
Program Committee (2005 - 2006)
Treasurer (2006 - 2007)
Vice President/Program Chair (2007 - 2008)
American Society of Appraisers, San Diego Chapter (1999 - 2004)
Business Valuation Chairperson (2001 - 2004)
Membership Chairperson (2003 - 2004)
First Vice President (2003 - 2004)
Financial Analysts Society of San Diego (1995 - 2004)

Public Service
and Community
Activities:
Boise Metro Chamber of Commerce
Member of Small Business Recognition Sub-committee (2005)
Graduate of Leadership Boise (Class of 2005 - 2007)

'
() (

''>

Jl

r~

I)"

--

j

,',

Peter Butler, CFA. ASA
PRIOR DEPOSITION OR TRIAL TESTIMONY
The following is a list of cases in which I have given testimony in either deposition or at
trial in the last four years:
1) PMG, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Company and Bechtel BWXT
Idaho
Deposition - Boise, 10 - January 2005
Trial- Pocatello, 10 - October 2007
2) Hytrek v. Richins
Arbitration - Ontario. Oregon - June 2006
3) Transport Truck & Trailer. Inc.fTransport Equipment Leasing. LLC v. Freightliner
LLC, Freightliner Corporation, DaimlerChrysler Services North America LLC,
DaimlerChrysler Services Truck Finance
Deposition - Boise, 10 - November 2007

QUALIFICATIONS
See curriculum vitae attached.

COMPENSATION
Hourly rate of $240 plus out-of-pocket costs.

PUBLICA TlONS
The following is a list of publications I have authored or co-authored over the last 10
years:
1) "Fair Trade and Firm Value: Understanding Antitrust Risk", Valorem Principia,
Volume 10 Issue 3, October 2002.
2) "Company-specific Risk - A Different Paradigm: A New Benchmark", Business
Valuation Review (Spring 2006 - Volume 25, No.1); Co-author (along with Keith
Pinkerton).
3) "The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and The Market Value of
"Invested" Capital: Should Market Value of "Stakeholder" Capital be the
Appropriate Reference?", Business Valuation Review (Summer 2006 - Volume
25, No.2); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton and Dennis Reinstein).

PUBLICA TlONS (continued)
4) "Quantifying Company-Specific Risk: A New, Empirical Framework with Practical
Applications", Business Valuation Update (February 2007); Co-author (along
with Keith Pinkerton).
5) Letter to Editor of Business Valuation Update (March 2007) titled "Hooper
Cornell Offers Supplement to Adjusting Multiples"; Co-author (along with Keith
Pinkerton and Dennis Reinstein).
6) "Quantifying Company-Specific Risk: The Authors Answer Your Questions",
Business Valuation Update (May 2007); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).
7) "The Last Word on Company-Specific Risk", Business Valuation Update (June
2007); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).
8) "A Hybrid Restricted Stock/Pre-IPO Data Point: Lack of Marketability Discount
for ESOPS", Business Valuation Review (Summer 2007 - Volume 26, No.2); Coauthor (along with Keith Pinkerton and Dennis Reinstein).
9) "Company-Specific Risk: The Dow 30 v. Private Company USA", The Value
EXaminer (September/October 2007); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).
10} "Comparing the Butler-Pinkerton Model to Traditional Methods Under Four
Daubert Criteria", Business Valuation Update (November 2007); Co-author
(along with Keith Pinkerton).
11} "Quantifying Company-Specific Risk-Regardless of Your Faith in Beta",
Business Appraisal Practice (Winter 2007/2008) (along with Keith Pinkerton).
12} "Butler Pinkerton Model™ Finds Another Application in SFAS 123R", Business
Valuation Update (March 2008); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).
13) "Total Cost of Equity or Company-Specific Risk - A Better use for the BPM?",
Business Valuation Update (April 2008); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).
14) "The Butler Pinkerton Model: Empirical Support for Company-specific Risk", The
Value EXaminer (May/June 2008); Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).
15) Letter to Editor of Business Valuation Review (Spring 2008) discussing the
volatility of publicly-traded stock relative to private companies; Co-author (along
with Keith Pinkerton).

16) Letter to Editor of The Value EXaminer (July/August 2008) discussing the
benefits of combining a quantitative and qualitative approach to quantifying
company-specific risk; Co-author (along with Keith Pinkerton).

0008J~~

PUBLICA TlONS (continued)
17) Inventor and co-developer of a commercially available web-based software
program, known as the Total Cost of Equity and the Public Company-Specific
Risk Calculator™ or the Butler Pinkerton Model™, located on Business Valuation
Resources' website (www.bvmarketdata.com) and marketed to fellow financial
analysts and appraisers.
Monthly columnist: "For What It's Worth" (along with Keith Pinkerton) for the Idaho
Business Review:
18) "Can You Be Replaced? It's Not Necessarily a Bad Thing", Idaho Business
Review, March 20-26, 2006.
19) "Rule of Thumb Could Cost an Arm and a Leg", Idaho Business Review, April
10-16,2006.
20) "How Not to Increase Your Business's Value", Idaho Business Review, May 1 7,2006.
21) "How a Quarter May End up Being Worth a Dime", Idaho Business Review, May
22-28. 2006.
22) "Get the Right Kind of Advice", Idaho Business Review, July 10-16, 2006.
23) "Formulas - Can You Always Depend on Them?", Idaho Business Review,
August 7, 2006.
24) "Selling a Business?
September 18, 2006.

Keep These Tips in Mind", Idaho Business Review,

25) "Ratios Help in Evaluating Strengths, Weaknesses", Idaho Business Review,
October 23, 2006.
26) "Plan Now to Earn a Return", Idaho Business Review, November 20,2006.
27) "Selling Your Business - Beware the Taxman", Idaho Business Review. January
1 - 7,2007.
28) "Consider Family Limited Partnerships in Estate Planning", Idaho Business
Review, February 19 - 25,2007.
29) "Investors Should Diversify for Best Investment Returns", Idaho Business
Review, May 7. 2007.
30) "So, What's the Value of Your Company?", Idaho Business Review, July 9.2007.

-, <'", ". .
(J () t I;'" 0'

PUBLICATIONS (continued)
31) "Getting and Keeping Goodwill Keeps Customers Coming Back for More",
Idaho Business Review, July 23. 2007.
32) "Last Person Standing - A Good Place to Be?" Idaho Business Review, August
20,2007.
33) "Hidden Volatility, Inefficiency in the Real Estate Market", Idaho Business
Review, October 8,2007 and November 19. 2007.
34) "Stories from the Valuation Trenches", Idaho Business Review, January 28,
2008.
Columnist (along with Keith Pinkerton) for the Idaho Society of CPAs' online newsletter,
The Adjusting Entry:
35) "Company-Specific Risk: Believe It or Not - You Can Quantify It!", Issue I, 2008.
36) "Buy-Sell Agreements: A Misnomer?", Issue II, 2007.
37) "Stock Options: Corporate Lottery Ticket - or Not?", Issue III, 2007.
38) "Why You Should be Aware of the Impact of SSVS-1", Issue 11,2008.
39) "Are You Qualified to Value Businesses in the IRS's Eyes?", Issue III, 2008.

PRESENTA TlONS
The following is a list of presentations I have either delivered or co-delivered over the
last 10 years:
1) "Business Valuation Basics and How to Use Valuation/Finance Theory to
Increase the Value of Your Business" presented to TechHelp (and
manufacturing companies) at Boise State University. (1/28/05)
2) "Benefits of the CFA program" presented to the Financial Management
Association at Boise State University - panel member. (4/6/05)
3) "Valuation and Credit Analysis: Similarities and Differences" - presented to
Boise area U.S. Bank business bankers. (5/11/05)
4) "Business Valuation Basics and How to Use Valuation/Finance Theory to
Increase the Value of Your Business" presented to TechHelp (and
manufacturing companies) at the Idaho Innovation Center in Idaho Falls, Idaho.
(9/20/05)

PRESENTA TlONS (continued)
5) "Business Valuation Theory: Issues in 2006 & Beyond" presented to the Idaho
Society of Certified Public Accountants - Southwest Chapter in Boise, Idaho
(1/25/06)
6) "Business Valuation Basics: Differences Between Privately-held Companies and
Publicly Traded Stock" presented to Boise State University MBA students.
(4/25/06)
7) "Business Valuation Basics and How to Use Valuation/Finance Theory to
Increase the Value of Your Business" presented to the Boise Chamber of
Commerce. (5/12/06)
8) "Privately-held Companies v. Publicly Traded Stock: Differences and Issues for
Valuation" presented to the CFA Society of Idaho. (5/17/06)
9) "How to Use Valuation/Finance Theory to Sell Your Company for Top Dollar"
presented to the Idaho Falls Small Business Development Center (SBDC)
(10/19/06).
10) "How to Use Valuation/Finance Theory to Sell Your Company for Top Dollar"
presented to Idaho State University - College of Technology/Workforce Training
(2/27/07).
11) "Quantification of Company-Specific Risk: Theory and Applications"
teleconference to fellow business appraisers/financial analysts sponsored by
Business Valuation Resources (3/8107).
12) "How to Use Valuation/Finance Theory to Sell Your Company for Top Dollar"
presented to Boise State University MBA students. (4/24/07).
13) "Quantification of Company-Specific Risk: Theory and Applications" presented
to the New York State Society of CPAs at their annual business valuation
conference in New York, New York (5/21/07).
14) "Quantification of Company-Specific Risk: Theory and Applications" presented
to Eide Bailly at their annual business valuation conference in Minneapolis,
Minnesota (5/24/07).
15) "Quantification of Company-Specific Risk: Theory and Applications" presented
at The Institute of Business Appraisers' 2007 Symposium in Denver. Colorado
(6/21/07).
16) "UN-Fairness Opinion" presented at The Institute of Business Appraisers' 2007
Symposium in Denver. Colorado (6/22/07).

PRESENTA TlONS (continued)
17) Center for Advanced Valuation Studies (CAVS) on The Cost of Capital in San
Diego, California (10/27/07); Co-presenter with Roger Grabowski.
18) "Company-Specific Risk - New Theories: You Can't Completely Diversify It. but
You Can Quantify Itl" at the Advanced ASA BV Conference in San Diego,
California (10/29/07); Co-presenter with Rick Sias, Ph.D.
19) "Using the Butler Pinkerton Model™: TCOE and Public Company Specific Risk
Calculator" webinar to fellow business appraisers/financial analysts cosponsored by the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts (NACVA)
and Business Valuation Resources (3/6/08).
20) "Assessing Company-Specific Risks: Current Trends and Models" presented at
the Massachusetts Chapter of NACVA in Boston, Massachusetts (5/22/08).
21} "The Butler Pinkerton Model: Empirical Support for Company-specific Risk"
presented at the National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts' (NACVA)
2008 15th Annual Consultants' Conference in Las Vegas, Nevada (6/9/08).
22) "Looking Behind the Curtain at the Butler Pinkerton Model" presented at the
Financial Consulting Group's (FCG) Fall Conference in Denver, Colorado
(9/9/08).
hThe Butler Pinkerton ModelTM: Benchmarking Company-specific Risk"
presented at the American Business Appraisers' Fall Conference in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (10/25/08).
24) "Business Valuation and the Banker" presented to the Idaho Bankers
Association in Boise, Idaho (11/20/08).
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EXPERT WITNESS REPORT

R. Drew Thomas. v. Ronald O. Thomas, et al.
Gem County case number: CV 2006 - 492

Prepared for:
Hepworth. Lezamiz & Janis

Prepared by:
Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ABV. ASA, CVA
Hooper Cornell, PLLC
250 Bobwhite Court, Suite 300
Boise. Idaho 83706

January 16. 2009

EXHIBIT.J3

•

INTRODUCTION
I was engaged by John J. Janis, Esq., of Hepworth, Lezamiz & Janis, to review the operations
of Thomas Motors, Inc. and estimate the business value of the auto dealership.
Data relied upon in support of the opinions contained herein are as noted in each opinion
and/or as listed in'Tabie '1 ,'WtJicli fdllowsthe opinions. '
In addition to documents referenced in my report, I may summarize information contained in
such documents in exhibit form to assist the explanation of my opinions.
I also may use (as schedules to support my opinions) such documents, and documents
contained in those documents referenced above as having been considered by me in forming
my opinions.
As additional information or testimony becomes available, I may find it appropriate to revise or
supplement my opinions, analyses and conclusions stated herein. I may also be called upon
to provide testimony with regard to additional data or records and/or data received from or
testified to by the other parties and/or their witnesses.

Dennis R. Reinstein, CPNABV, ASA, CVA

1
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OPINION 1
As a going concern, Thomas Motors, Inc. had no positive economic value as of December 31.
2005 or as of the date of its sale on March 31. 2006.
This opinion is based upon:
1) Review of business income tax returns, Dealer Financial Statements, sale documents
and conversations with Ronald O. Thomas and James Warr, CPA.

SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion relied upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents identified
in Table 1.

2
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OPINION 2
The liquidation value of Thomas Motors, Inc. was very likely negative, meaning that the market
value of its liabilities exceeded the market value of its assets as of December 31, 2005 and as
of the date of its sale on March 31,2006.
This opinion is based upon:
1) Review of business income tax returns, Dealer Financial Statements, sale documents
and conversations with Ronald O. Thomas and James Warr, CPA.

SUPPORTING DATA
This opinion relied upon the above noted sources and information and/or documents identified
in Table 1.

3
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TABLE 1

SUPPORTING DATA

1) Second Affidavit of Ronal O. Thomas dated August 17. 2007
2) Defendants' Answer and Demand for Jury Trial.
3) Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
4) U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation. filed by Thomas Motors. Inc. for the
years 1997 through 2006.
5) U.S. Income Tax Retum for an S Corporation, filed by Ronald O. Thomas Enterprises,
Inc. for the years 2003 through 2006.
6) U.S. Individual Income Tax Return filed by Ronald O. and Elaine Thomas for 2006.
7) Phone conversation with James Warr, CPA on January 9,2009
8) Various financial and tax data maintained by James, Warr, CPA.
9) Various checks issued to Thomas Motors, Inc. by Ronald O. Thomas and related
entities.
10) Various closing documents between Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas, and
Bill Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Inc., dated March 29, 2006.
11) Various closing documents between Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas, and
SBH Tree LC, dated March 16,2006.
12) Various closing documents between Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas, and
H2MK. LLC, dated September 1, 2006.
13) Phone conversation with Ronald O. Thomas on January 16.2009.
14) Various conversations with John J. Janis, Esq.
15) Understanding the Value of Your Auto Dealership by Brent A. McDade, CSA, BVAL of
Mercer Capita/.
l6} New Car Dealers in the US: 44111. Industry Report October 10, 2008 published by
IBISWorld.
17) Used Car Dealers in the US: 44112, Industry Report August 21. 2008 published by
IBISWorld.
18) Average Dealership Profile, NADA Data published in AutoExec, May 2004.
19) Bill Buckner Auto Center -Internet data at www.billbucknermotors.com.
20) Industry codes obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor.
4
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TABLE 1

SUPPORTING DATA - continued

21) Transaction data from "Pratt's . Stats, " "BIZCOMPS" and "Mergerstat/BVR Control
Premium Study."
22) Financial Ratio Benchmarks published by the Risk Management Association.
23) Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business Assets dated September 1. 2000.
24) Commercial Lease and Purchase Agreement dated September 1, 2000.
25) Management Contract dated September 1, 2000.

5

O()0904

WILSON, HARRIS

&COMPANY

CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUI'fTAl'iTS
Idaho 83702
www.wllsonharrls.com

1602 W. Franklin Street. Boise,
(208) 344-1355

John H. Hams, C P.A
Brady Wlson, CPA.

MembelS:
Idaho SocIety oC Certilled Public Accountants
American Inslilule of Certllled Public Accounlants

James WeIr, C. P.A
Karan Ge~ C.P.A

Troy Sloan, C.P A

June 5,2008
John Janis
Hepworth lezamlz & Janis
537 W. Bannock
Boise, 10 83702
RE: Ronald Thomas and Thomas Motors, Inc.
Dear Mr. Janis:
I am writing to explain the details of the sale of Thomas Motors, Inc. to Bill Buckner Chrysler
Jeep Dodge. The sale broke down into two main parts: the sale of the business known as
Thomas Motors, Inc. (Corporation assets) and the sale of the land and building that Ronald and
Elaine Thomas owned personally. The sale ofThomas Motors, Inc. resulted in no gain since the
Inventory was purchased by Bill Buckner at cost and breaks down as follows:

Inventory
$1,089,399
PropertY taxes
3,027
Broker fee
100,000
Title charges
6,643
Escrow Fees
931
Total Price
$ 1,200,000
·The sale price of the building and land was $1,750,000 which resulted in a gain of $1,352,026.
Ronald and Elaine Thomas are carrying the note on this sale and are receiving monthly
payments through Alliance Title & Escrow.
The real value of Thomas Motors, Inc. was the real estate that It occupied. The business had
suffered large losses for several years prior to the sale.
Sincerely,

g~rT"?~/ ,?/'//
James P. Warr, CPA
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JOHN H. MOULTON
371 Fernwood Drive
Moraga, California 94556

(925) 376-3717
FAX (925) 376-5132
Moadvisel@aol.com

1988 to Present MOULTON ADVISORS, Moraga, California
Principal
Responsible for advising clients on banking, lending and loan brokering procedures for residential, commercial and
construction financing including sUb-prime credits; credit quality issues and operational matters. Clients include
borrowers, receivers, credit review organizations, financial institutions, government agencies, insurance companies and
law firms. Scope of work: financing issues; credit-risk analysis of real estate, commercial and construction loans; analysis
of collateral and documentation; due diligence loan and portfolio analysis; reviewing underwriting and disbursement
procedures; receiver support and expert testimony.

1987 to 1988 EMBARCADERO MORTGAGE CORPORATION, San Francisco, California
Executive Vice President
Responsible for commercial real estate loan brokerage, marketing and fmancial planning. Member of the Loan and
Management Committees.

1985 to 1987 TRI-V ALLEY NATIONAL BANK, Dublin, California
President and Chief Executive Officer
Responsible for all lending and operational functions. Implemented and managed programs and procedures that reversed
the deterioration of the bank and re-established it in the community. The effects of my policies allowed the National Bank
Examiners to remove a Cease and Desist Order within nine months of my joining the bank and turned a 1985 loss of
$580,000.00 to a modest profit in 1986. Member of the Loan, Management, AssetiLiability, Personnel, Planning
Committees and the Board of Directors.

1977 to 1985 THE HIBERNIA BANK, San Francisco, California
Vice President and Real Estate Loan Administrator
Responsible for all real estate lending operations in 34 branches and 7 departments. Functions managed included:
appraisal; construction, residential and commercial real estate loan origination; commercial lending to real estate
customers; secondary marketing and wrap-around lending; loan servicing, wholesale loan origination; special assets
department and REO sales. Portfolios managed included: mortgage servicing in excess of$2.1 billion and construction
loans in excess of $100 million. Member of the Loan, Pricing, AssetlLiability and Problem Loan Committees.

1972 to 1977 THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA, San Francisco, California
Vice President, Metropolitan Division, Corporate Banking Group
Responsible for managing major corporate relationships which included lines of credit; loan participations; deposit
accounts; trust relationships; and construction, commercial, installment and mortgage lending. Sales Manager of the
Division for three years.

1968 to 1972 THE BANK OF CALIFORNIA, San Diego, California
Loan Officer, Installment and Real Estate Divisions
Responsible for managing relationships including deposit accounts and construction, commercial, installment and
mortgage lending.

1962 to 1968 BANK OF AMERICA, San Diego, California
Loan Officer, San Diego, California. various branches
Responsible for operational functions and installment lending.

EDUCATION
San Diego State College - Business

RELATED ACTIVITIES
Speaker at state's Bankers, Bar, and Realty associations. Lay member of the Contra Costa Superior Court's Alternative Dispute
Resolution Program. Lay member of the Contra Costa Bar Association Fee Arbitration Panel. Co-Founder Contra Costa Real
Estate Mediation Services.

EXHIBIT 1)
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Mr. Spence joined Ray Quinney & Nebeker as a Director and Shareholder in 1999 after
spending fourteen years with his former law firm. He was awarded his B. S. degree in
Business Finance from the University of Utah in 1982. He was awarded his law degree,
with an emphasis on business, debtor and creditor and commercial law from the
University of Utah in 1985. He served as Chairman of Ray Quinney & Nebeker's
Business law Section from both June of 1999 through June of 2004, and is presently
the Chairman of the Firm's Automobile Dealer law Practice Group and its Business
Development Committee. Mr. Spence also has been elected to and serves on Ray
Quinney & Nebeker's Executive Committee. The Executive Committee manages all
aspects of the Firm's business.
Mr. Spence's educational training and his legal practice have always emphasized
corporate, commercial, debtor and creditor, and real estate transactions and litigation.
He has developed a particular expertise in representing banks and automobile dealers.
With respect to his state, regional and nationwide automobile dealer law practice, Mr.
Spence represents new automobile dealers in structuring, negotiating and documenting
dealership sales, mergers and acquisitions and has been the lead attorney in
approximately one hundred thirty such transactions. Mr. Spence is also experienced in
negotiating transactions with, and litigating for dealers against, motor vehicle
manufacturers such as Ford, General Motors, Honda, Mitsubishi, Toyota, Nissan,
lamborghini, Mercedes, Saab, Volvo, Jaguar, Hyundai and Chrysler.
Mr. Spence also represented twelve separate Ford, lincoln-Mercury and Mazda dealers
along the Wasatch Front in negotiating, structuring, documenting and closing their
partnership with Ford Motor Company resulting in what was known at the time as the
Utah Auto Collection. The Utah Auto Collection was the second, and the largest, of the
so-called Ford Retail Networks in the United States. Mr. Spence represented many of
the same dealers in the dissolution of the Utah Auto Collection and related litigation
against Ford Motor Company.
Based on such experience, Mr. Spence is recognized as a leading attorney in
representing motor vehicle dealers in all aspects of their dealership business and legal
needs. He represents many of Utah's, the Intermountain West's and the country's most
well-known and well-respected motor vehicle dealers.
Mr. Spence also has extensive experience representing banks, developers and other
financial institutions in negotiating, structuring, documenting, and litigating real estate
purchase and sale agreements, real estate development and construction agreements,
and real estate financing transactions.
As indicated above, Mr. Spence also knows his way around the courtroom. His litigation
practice focuses on motor vehicle dealer disputes with manufacturers, commercial,
construction, banking and real estate disputes, creditor's rights and creditor
representation in bankruptcy proceedings. He represents his banking, motor vehicle
and other clients in commercial litigation, bankruptcy, dispute resolution and creditors'
rights before administrative agencies, arbitrators, mediators, state, federal and
bankruptcy courts in Utah and throughout the United States.
Mr. Spence also served as a Judge Pro Tem in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt
Lake City from 1993-96, and has been retained on numerous occasions as a mediator
in commercial disputes.
He maintains an "AVW rating with Martindale-Hubbell, which is the highest rating
awarded to attorneys for professional competence and ethics. Mr. Spence has also
been named as one of The Best lawyers in America in Corporate, M&A, and Securities
Law, and has also been repeatedly voted by his peers throughout the State of Utah as
one of Utah's "legal Elite" in the categories of Corporate law, Business litigation,
Banking/Financial Law and Bankruptcy/Creditor Rights law (as published in Utah
Business Magazine).
As managing partner of his former law firm for six years, a current member of Ray
Quinney & Nebeker's Executive Committee, as well as Chair of both the Automobile
Dealer law Practice Group, and his Firm's Business Development Committee, Mr.
.,/
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Spence brings not
proven legal expertise, but also
management judgment, to every legal and business matter he handles.

business and

Education
University of Utah, J.D., 1985
University of Utah, B.S., Finance, 1982
• magna cum laude

• Phi Kappa Phi
• Beta Gamma Sigma

Practice Areas
Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights
Automobile Dealer Law
Real Estate Transactions and Litigation
Banking and Financial Institutions
Business Formation, Planning and Transactions
Litigation
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Construction Law

Prior Professional Experience
Scalley & Reading, P.C., 1985-1999

Admitted to Practice
Utah State Bar, 1985

Professional Affiliations and Memberships
Utah Bar Association
Associate Member - Utah Automobile Dealers Association
Member - National Association of Dealer Counsel (NAOC)

Professional and Civic Activities
Member - Board of Directors, Executive Committee and Chair of Friends For Sight
(formerty The National Association for the Prevention of Blindness, Utah Chapter)
Member of Executive Committee - Utah Coneaurs O'Elegance Classic Car Show
President - Thunderbird Motor Club of Utah
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Suite 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901
Telephone: (208) 475-2200
Facsimile:
(208) 475-2201
ISB No.
2451,6023

wmorrow@morrowdinius.com
dwilkinson@morl'owdinius.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

)

R. DREW THOMAS,

)

PlaintHf,

vs.
RONALD O. mOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS. INC., an
Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

,-----------------------------

)
)

CASE NO. CV. 2006-492

)
)
)

MOTION TO DISALLOW

)

ATTORNEYS FEES

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW. the Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas. by and through his attorneys. the law finn
of MolTOw Dinius and moves this Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6) and
54(e)(6). for its order disallowin€ the attorneys fees sought by the Defendants in pursuit of a

MOTION TO DISALLOW ATIORNEYS FEES· I

•

OOQ

motion to compel the discovery of an expert witness report. This motion, then, is an objection to
the Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees Incurred Re: Motions to Compel dated ]anumy 29.
2009 (the copy sent to PlaintiffwJS not filed stamped). The objection is made for the following
reasons:
1.

The fees sought by the Defendants in the Veri.tled Memorandum are not

reasonable and were not necessarily incurred in pursuit of the Motion to Compel heard by the
Court on January 26. 2009.
2.

At the time of the hearins. the Defendants sought to prevent the Plaintiff from

disclosing an expert witness report (Carl Christensen's report regardina damages), which was
due on December 18. 2008 pursuant to the Court's scheduling order. The only issue at the
hearing before the Court on Janw.uy 26.2009 was whether Plaintiff would be given an extended
period of time within which to d1scloso Mr. Christensen's report, or whether the Court would

order that the expert witness report could not be disclosed because it was not disclosed by the
deadline. In addition. Defendant5 also sought a protective order for the same reasons. At the
conclusion of the hearing. the Court denied the request for protective order and gave Plaintiff'
until February 9,2009 to disclose Mr. Christensen's report. Consequently, the first 12 entries of
Defendants' Memorandum of Attorneys Fees all occurred prior to the original due date for the
disclosure of Plaintiff's expert's report. and are therefore in applicable for consideration of
attorneys fees.
3.

A previous motion to compel was prepared in July, 2008 according to

Defendants' Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees.

This motion pertained to the

identification of the expert. Plait1tiff disclosed the expert, Carl Christensen and the opinions he
was to offer through a discovery response.

At the January 26, 2009 hearin8. counsel for

MOTION TO DISALLOW ATTORNEYS FEES· 2
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Defendants stated that he

W8!l "~atisfied"

with the discovery disclosure and would await the

written report. Thus, the new motion regarding the report was not, in fact, a '~renewed motion"
as characterized by the Defendant:;. Characteri.zini the motion before the Court in January 2009
as a. "renewed motion'~ was nothing more than an inappropriate effon to increase the fees sought
by Defendants. These prior efforts, however, were not germane to the issue of Plaintiff's late

disclosure of Mr. Christensen's report, and thus should be disallowed.
4.

The issue before the Court on January 26, 2009 was a. simple straight forward

issue of whether Plaintiff's expert witness would be allowed to testify. As mentioned above, the
expert witness and the general areas on which he would opine had previously been disclosed in a
discovery response.

Nonetheles:-l, Defense counsel spent 9.3 hours preparing a motion to

compel, which he indicated was renewed :&om a previoDs effort (therefore not requiring much. if
any. additional time). Defense counsel's time and effort in January 2009 for a duplicated but
simple motion and hearing is gros$ly overblown; and the Memorandum of Attorneys Fees, taken
as a whole, is incredibly excessive. Moreover. none of the factors pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure S4(eX3) supports the claim for attorneys fees sought by Defense counsel on this

particular application.
CONCLUSION

The fees sought by Defendants ate u.n.reasonable, u.nnecessarily incUITCd, and excessive
and therefore, should be denied.
DATED this 12th day of february, 2009.

MORROW DINIDS

BY~

P~-...a.---. L J.Att~

Dennis P. Wilkinson

,

. Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
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! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that oj thi.!i 12th day of February, 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing aOCtltnent by the method indicated below to the following:
I

,

!

John 1. Janis

US Mail
Overnight Mail

HEPWORTH, LEZAMIZ & ~ANIS
I

537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. [ZOO
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582

)(

Hand Delivery
Facsintile No. 342-29Z1

US Mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
l09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, m 83617-0188

Overnight Mail

)(

•

Hand Delivery
Facsimile No. 365-4196

I
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
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H. Ronald Bjorkman (lSB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

Case No. CY 2006-492

vs.

)
)
)

VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF
ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED RE:
MOTIONS TO COMPEL

RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

)
)

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

*****
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED RE: MOTIONS TO COMPEL - I

OR IGI ~J b ,000

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
)ss.
)

JOHN 1. JANIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes and states as
follows:
l. I am a partner in the law firm of Hepworth, Janis & Brody who represent the

defendants in the above-entitled matter.
2. At the hearing on the Defendants' Second Renewed Motion to Compel and Motion
for Protective Order, the Court awarded attorneys fees to the defendants associated with such
Motions. The purpose of this Verified Memorandum is to comply with the Court's direction to
submit a memorandum of attorney fees incurred regarding those motions.
3. Attached as Exhibit "A" hereto is a document I prepared based on information
taken directly from attorney fee bills generated in this case. Following the hearing last Monday, I
requested a copy of the document generated by my law office in the regular and ordinary course of
business which details each of the time entries that were or will be included on bills sent to the
clients for all work performed on this case. From that document, 1 selected each of the time entries
that were associated with the various Motions to Compel that were filed and heard on Monday,
January 26, 2009, along with the Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. The entries included on
Exhi bit "A" hereto are taken directly from those records generated in the regular and ordinary course
of our firm's business.
4. The entries and amounts reflected on Exhibit "A" hereto are thus entries and
amounts that either were sent or will be sent to the defendants as part of the bills for legal services
in this case. All of the entries contained on Exhibit "A" are matters we believe to be exclusively

VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED RE: MOTIONS TO COMPEL - 2

related to the Motion to Compel and/or the Motion for Protective Order. All of the entries that are
contained on Exhibit "A" that are prior to January of2009, are time entries and billing matters that
were actually sent to the client for payment, and for part of the bills that were actually paid by the
defendants to our law firm for legal services rendered in this case. The entries contained on Exhibit
"A" hereto that are dated in January of 2009 are taken directly from the time sheets prepared by the
la\\-yers in our office which are used for purposes of being incorporated into legal bills at the end of
each month. The entries for January of 2009 have not yet been sent to the client for payment, and
will not be until the next billing cycle. However, the time entries in January of 2009 that are
contained in Exhibit "A" will in fact be incorporated on bills sent out at the end of the month. All
of the time entries and amounts reflected on Exhibit "A," in other words, are matters that already
have been or will be contained on actual attorney fee bills sent to the clients for payment, and have
either already been paid or will be paid by the defendants.
5. The hourly rates charged by my law firm for myself and Mr. Kluksdal are
consistent with the market rates for attorneys in Boise with similar comparable experience. In tact,
if anything, they are below the average market rate based upon a recent survey performed by my firm
which resulted in the decision to increase the hourly rates. We will not increase hourly rates for
cases that already exist in our office, however.
6. All of the entries reflected on Exhibit "A" are for matters that were directed
exclusively at dealing with the issues associated with the various Motions to Compel that were filed
that culminated in the hearing on the Second Renewed Motion to Compel and the Defendants'
Motion for Protective Order last Monday, January 26, 2009. I have made the effort to extract any
time entries that were contained in our bills to the client that were not associated with the various
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Motions to Compel and/or the Motion for Protective Order. As reflected on Exhibit "A" hereto, the
total amount of attorneys fees associated with the Motions to Compel and/or Motion for Protective
Order are $5.259.50.

.

-b
RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this~ 7 day of January, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

<

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

~

~ day of January, 2009 .

.#m~u~~
Notary Public fW Idaho
Residing at
f?S-tA.J....My Commission Expires I;:;"" \ I

\ , 'd--.-,/

VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED RE: MOTIONS TO COMPEL - 4

00091.8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this ~day of January, 2009, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at l.aw
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

()Q U.S. Mail
[
[
(
[

] Hand Delivered
] Overnight Mail
] Telecopy (Fax)
] E-mail

CXl U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[
ail
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Client

Date

Atty.

Rate

Hours
Billed

Amount

Description

062023

5/27/0S

JJJ

225.00

.30

67.50

Review plaintiffs discovery files; draft
letter to plaintiff's counsel.

062023

07/29/0S

JJJ

225.00

1.00

225.00

Review discovery files; confer with John
Kluksdal; telephone call with Ron
Bjorkman re: motion to compel issues.

062023

07/30/0S

JJJ

225.00

2.00

450.00

Draft and finalize motion to compel and
affidavit in support; telephone call with
Ron Thomas.

062023

OS/20/08

]JJ

225.00

.30

67.50

Telephone call with Dennis Wilkinson

062023

09/0SiOS

]1J

225.00

.80

ISO.OO

Review discovery responses; confer with
John Kluksdal and Charlie Hepworth.

062023

09/30/08

]JJ

225.00

.75

168.75

Confer with 10hn Kluksdal; review motion
to compel files.

062023

lO/23/0S

JJJ

225.00

2.00

450.00

Review discovery and motion files; begin
draft of renewed motion to compel;
telephone call with Ron Bjorkman; confer
with 10hn Kluksdal.

062023

lO/24/08

111

225.00

1.50

337.50

Finalize renewed motion to compel and
affidavit in support, including exhibits.

062023

11117/08

JJJ

225.00

.SO

ISO.OO

Exchange e-mails with plaintiffs counsel
re: motion to compel status; telephone call
with Ron Bjorkman

062023

11118/08

11J

225.00

.25

56.25

Telephone call with Dennis Wilkinson.

062023

IlI20/08

JJJ

225.00

1.00

225.00

Review new discovery responses; confer
with Charlie Hepworth and John Kluksdal;
telephone call with Ron Bjorkman.

062023

IlI2110S

11]

225.00

1.00

225.00

Confer with Charlie Hepworth and 10hn
Kluksdal; draft notice of vacating hearing;
review scheduling order.

062023

Oll07/09

111

250.00

l.5

375.00

Draft motion to compel and motion for
protective order ..

062023

olII9/09

lJJ

250.00

.S

200.00

Telephone call with Bill Morrow and
Dennis Wilkinson; telephone call with Ron
Bjorkman; telephone call with Ron
Thomas.

062023

01/26/09

JJJ

7.00

1750.00

Billable 21

$4,957.50

250.00

Review pleadings/discovery files to
prepare for hearing; draft outline for
argument; travel to Emmett; meeting with
Ron Bjorkman re: hearing on motions;
attend hearing on our renewed motion to
compel and motion for protective order;
telephone conf. with Ron Thomas re:
status and hearing; return travel; confer
with Charlie Hepworth and John Kluksdal
re: results of hearing; begin work on
memorandum of fees.

John J. Janis

062023

07/29/08

JWK

185.00

.3

55.50

Confer with John Janis

062023

09/30/08

JWK

185.00

.3

55.50

Confer with John Janis re motion to compel.

062023

10/22108

JWK

185.00

.4

74.00

Review renewed motion to compel; confer
with John Janis.

062023

11/17/08

JWK

\85.00

.3

55.50

Confer with John Janis re: motion to
compel and damages.

062023

01/06/09

JWK

205.00

.3

61.50

Review renewed motion to compeL

Billable

1.6

Grand Total

$

302.00

John W. Kluksdal

$ 5,259.50

O()09~~2

John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS.
)
Plaintiff~

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)
VS.

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
EXCLUDING PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT
WITNESSES

)
)
)
)
)
)

*****
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER EXCLUDING
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESSES - I

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and pursuant to the Court's ruling at the hearing on
defendants' Motion for Protective of Monday, January 26, 2009, in combination with Rule 16 and
37 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby renews their Motion to this Honorable Court for
a Protective Order precluding the plaintifffrom having any expert witnesses testify at the trial ofthis
action on his behalf. This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that were specified in
the defendants' initial Motion for Protective Order Excluding Plaintiff s Expert Witnesses, which
was filed on January 6,2009, and was heard before the Court on January 26, 2009, in addition to the
following development since then:
1. The Court will recall that the plaintiff was given yet more time to respond to the
subject discovery requests concerning damages and expert opinions, that were at issue in the various
motions to compel that preceded the hearing referenced above, as well as defendants' Motion for
Protective Order. In response, the plaintiff did produce a supplemental response and expert witness
reports on the deadline provided by the Court, a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit
"A" hereto. However, the discovery response and report are anything but satisfactory, and far from
being compliant with the letter or spirit of the Court's Orders in this case or the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, as addressed further below.
2. As reflected in the one page expert witness report, the actual opinion offered by
the expert provides a bottom line numerical value of what he opines the Thomas Motors business
was worth as of March 29,2006, specifically a value of "approximately $1,500,000, not including
the land and buildings." It offers little or nothing, however, in the way of explaining how he got to
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that number. It offers the non-explanation that the value was based upon an assessment of some
values of"various assets" as set by Bill Buckner Dodge Chrysler Jeep. Inc. after their purchase. This
provides the defendants with absolutely no information to go on regarding what values the expert
is talking about, what assets are being referenced. or how they figure into coming up with this sum
that the Thomas Motors business alone was somehow worth $1,500,000. Simply put, the defendants
have no idea how this expert came up with this opinion that the Thomas Motors business alone was
worth this outrageous sum of$1 ,500,000, which would appear to be contradicted by every other fact
known about the sale of that business.
3. The expert also indicates in his report that the opinion provided relied upon
information obtained from conversations and documents identified in what he calls the attached
"Table 1n. The attached Table 1 then lists 14 separate lines of supporting data the expert "relied
upon" to formulate his opinion. A number of these have documents that plaintiffs counsel is well
aware have never been produced in discovery at any point in the 2 Y2 years this case has existed. As
reflected in the various Motions to Compel that were heard on January 26. 2009 before this Court,
the defendants have been asking for any and all documents that in any way tend to prove or relate
to the subject of damages being claimed in this case for 2 Y2 years. At the hearing, the Court then
gave the plaintiff one last shot of additional time to respond to the discovery requests that have never
been fully or properly responded to. Now, the plaintiff provides an expert report identifYing
documents that serve as a significant basis ofthe expert's opinion, but are documents that have never
been produced in this case at any point and still haven't. For example, the expert apparently obtained
a copy of the income tax return filed by Bill Buckner Chrysler. Jeep, Dodge, Inc. for the calendar
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year 2006. There is no explanation offered to how they even got such a private document from a
non-party, but in any event, plaintiffs counsel is well aware of the fact that the defendants have
never seen this document. nor do they have any kind of access to it. In addition, the expert claims
to have reviewed a document that reportedly provided a "price allocation" by Mr. Buckner at the
time he bought the Thomas Motors business, and provided to his accountant, who is apparently
someone named Kevin Oakey, CPA. The plaintiff's counsel again would obviously be well aware
that the defendants have never seen this document, have no idea what it says, or even heard of it for
that matter.
4.

In addition, the expert Mr. Christensen, identifies having a number of

conversations with a substantial number of people. To begin with, it is notable that all of these
"conversations" that are dated by the expert took place within the last two weeks. In any event, it
is even more notable that the expert offers absolutely no explanation of what information was
gathered during any of those numerous conversations that had anything to do with the bottom line
opinion that the business was valued at approximately $1,500,000. Moreover, there are a number
of individuals identified in this list of people with whom this expert had completely unexplained
"conversations," that the defense has never even heard of, and have otherwise never been identified
at any point, in any manner, in this case. This disclosure by the expert is thus notably lacking in
providing any substantive information that was gathered from any of these numerous mystery
conversations that he claims to have "relied upon" in formulating his opinion over the last two
weeks. In addition, the new disclosure now identifies a number of people with whom the expert met
or spoke, who have never been previously disclosed for any purpose in the case, including some
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individuals the undersigned has never even heard of and has no idea who they are.
5. As discussed at the hearing before the Court on January 26,2009, the numerous
efforts made by the defendants to gather the appropriate damages and/or expert information in this
case has been met with nothing but delays and resistance from plaintiff and plaintiff s counsel for
the better part of2 liz years. Now, after all of that, and the Court giving the plaintiff one last chance
to actually comply with the Court's Scheduling Order and/or the Discovery Rules of Civil Procedure,
the plaintiff in substance produces the opinion of an expert that boils down to nothing more than a
number without offering any explanation of how the plaintiffs expert got to that number. To make
matters worse, they identify a number of documents the expert claims to have "relied upon" that have
never been produced and are still not. Worse yet, they identify a number of people the expert met
or spoke with, and gathered some secret information the expert again claims to have "relied upon"
for his opinion that have never been identified before, ever. This leaves the defendants with having
to conduct numerous additional discovery efforts to find out how the plaintiff s expert could possibly
justify this frankly incredible opinion, and to conduct such discovery efforts in a manner that is
completely outside the original intent of the Court's Scheduling Order in governing deadlines in this
case. The substantive result of all this is that as far as moving discovery and time preparation along,
this "disclosure" has not moved anything in a forward direction; on the contrary it is causing
everything to take huge steps backward.
6. The Court will recall that it made a point at the hearing of January 26, 2009, of
indicating that it would not at that point definitively rule on the defendants' Motion for a Protective
Order, but instead just give the plaintiff the additional two weeks, and then take it from there. The
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defendants respectfully submit that the plaintiff has once again violated the letter and spirit of the
Court's Scheduling Order, and the spirit of the discussion at the hearing of January 26, 2009, as well
as the Discovery Rules of Civil Procedure. As a matter of substance and fairness, the disclosure is
completely inadequate, and also now identifies new documents and witnesses that have never been
identified previously. In fact, regarding the never before disclosed documents and witnesses the
plaintiff continues to play "hide the ball" discovery here by not producing the documents, nor
explaining who all the newly identified for the first time witnesses are and what they have in the way
of information. The disclosure here clearly raises a lot more questions than providing answers, and
creates far more effort and expense that need to be incurred than ever before, and all being done way
beyond the original deadlines.
The defendants thus respectfully renew their request that this Honorable Court issue
an order precluding the plaintiff from having expert witnesses testifY on his behalf at trial, or such
other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

-!:!RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED, this - ' - - - day of February, 2009.
f

HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho. with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street. Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise. Idaho 83701. and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter. certifies that on this J.2..!!:-day of February, 2009, he caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below. and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road. Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
b{Telecopy (Fax )
[X] E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
['Xl Telecopy (Fax)
[X] E-mail
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William A. Morrow
Dennis P. Wilkinson

MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franldh1 R.oad, Suite 220

Nampa, Idaho 83687
Telephone:

(208) 475·2200

Facsimilo:
(208) 475·2201
ISB No.:
2451.6023
wmorrow@morrowdinius.com
dwtlkinson@mo"owdinlus.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF mE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF
11IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF OEM

)
)
)
)
)

R. DREW mOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
mOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS. INC., an

Idaho Corporation.,
Defendantli.

----------------------------....

CASE NO. CV 2006-492

PLAlNTIFFtS FlJrI B
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES
TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF
DISCOVERY REQUESTS

)

)
)
)

)

COMES NOW, the above--namcd Plaintiff, R. Drew Thomas, by and through his counsel

of record. the law firm of Morrow Dinius, and hereby serves his fourth supplement responses to

Defondants' First Set ofDiscover)' .Requests to Plaintiff.
GENERAL OBJECTIONS
1.

Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Firs, Sct 0/Discovery Requests 10 Plaintiff to the

extent they seek contentions and lnformation which Plaintiff has not yet had the opportunity to

develop.

Plaintiff has not completed its own discovery and investigation is continuing.

PLAINTIFF'S fIFTH SUPPLEMENTAl, RESPONSES TO DEFENDANTS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY
REQUESTS-)

(J()()

Accordingly, the responses that follow are based upon the best knowledge, information, and
belief of Plaintiff' at this time and are to be considered preliminary in nature. subject to
substantial revision as Plaintiff has the opportunity to conduct further research and discovery.
Plaintiff will make a i00d faitb effort to respond ,to all discovety requests based on the

information presently available to

~

with the understanding that his responses are not

necessarily complete attd further research may require revision of any and all responses.

Plaintiff reserves the right to rnak e any furthet responses if it appears that any omission or error
has been made in connection wi th these responses or if more accurate infonnation is or bas

become available. These responses are made without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to use in later
discovery or to present at hearing such evidence as may later be discovered or evaluated.
2.

These responses

ar;

made subject to all objections as to competence, relevance,

materiality, and admissibility. These responses are subject to aU objections that would require

the exclusions of any statement, material, or infonnation herein provided if the discovery request
were asked concerning any statement, material, or information made or possessed by witnesses
present

and testifying in c;ourt. J\ll such objections are reserved and may be interposed at the

time oftrlal or any hearing in this matter.
Plaintiff specifically objects to these discovery requests to the extent that they

3.

seek infotmation protected by tIl&' attomey-client privile&e, the work-product doctriDe, and the
rules goveminJ the disc;overy of facts of experts as set forth in Rule 26) Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Plaintiff bas, to the extent possible,

construed

each request as requestin& only

information andlor documents not subject to any applicable protection.

This objection is

intended to apply to all discover) requests that seek such information and will not be repeated
~peeifically

for each request to which it applies.
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No incidental or implied admissions an: intended. The fact that Plaintiff has responded to any
discovery request or part thereof should not be taken as an admission that Plaintiff accepts that
the discovery request or the reRpoDSe or objection thereto constitutes admissible evidence.

Similarly, the faot that Plaintiff bas responded to all or part of a request is not intended to and
shalJ not be construed to be a waiver by Plaintiff of all or part of any objection to other requests.
Plaintiff' $ answers to any discovery requests herein do not constitute a waiver of Plaintiff's right

to object 10 any future additjonal, or supplemental discovery requests regatding the same or

similar matters.
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please attach a copy of the educational and
profesJional qualifications of:dl C"xpcrt witncsies you will call at trial and also attach copies of

each and every report generated by each expert witness referred to herein...
SECOND SUPPLEMENfAL RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
NO. %: See attached expert witness report prepaxed by Carl G. Christensen, CPA, Bates

numbeRd 002302·002305.
DATED this 9th day of February, 2009.

MORROW DINIUS

By:

~~
I

Dennis .

ilkinson

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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R.. Drew 1110mas V. Ronald O. Thomas, et al.
Oem Q.)unty case number: CV 2006-492

Prcpated for MoD:ow Dinius
Attorneys at Law

PIepared by:
Carl O. Christensen, CPA
Cbr:lstensen, Jackson. Stone.
Vie and Han. PLLC
1201 S. Kimball Avenue
CaldweU, 10 83605
February 8, 2009

RD mOMAS 002.302

CHRISTENSEN • JACKSON
STONE • VIS & HART • P .L.L.C.
CUTI"'D PUILIC ACCOUNTANTS

cart G. Christenllln, CPA • JerTY L. JlCbon. MBA. CPA • Shelt. R. Stone, eM • Debra L VIs, CPA • Matthew W. Wart. CPA

I wu eft8IPCl by William Morrow, of Morrow DiDiua, Attomeys at Law, to express my opinion on the
value of the auto dealership known II Thomas Motors. Inc. at the time of its sale to BiU Budcner,
Dodp, Chtysler, Jeep, Inc. on March 29, 2006.
The iDformation I relied Upon in reacbiDa my opiDiOll iI set forth in the KcOmpanying listing entitled
"Supportlna Daca." I may present exhibits and summarized iDfbrmatlOJ1 :trom these documents to
UBiIt in the preseatation of my oplniODl.
I

I IU1 find it DOCeIaary to revise or .upplemem my opiDion IS to the value of the business should
additional infonDation or testimony become available tlud would wamot such revision. I may also be
requested to provide testimony regard to addtttonal data or rec:ords testified to by other parties or
wi1neIseI involwd in tbie aotioD.

m

In my opiDion the business Thomas Motors.

mo.

bad a value

ot approximately $1,500,000 not

iDc1udiDa the 1and aDd buildtnp. Thil value is bQed upon an assessment of the values of the vanoUl

assets as set by Bill Buckner. Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, In.c. after their pw'chase from Ron and Blaine
Thomas; and by comparing that fiaure to tho 12..31 ..05 book value ofillVODtories. cub. and rccoivables
net of debt specific to these assets. The value of the Jand and buildings net of ~e related mortpge
i:ndobiDess wou1cl be in b range ofSl,OOO,OOO to $1,050,000.
This opinion is based upon:

1) Review ofbusiDos. aucl per80nal income tax ret:um& and sale docUlDOllts ID4 c;onversaUODS with
Kovfn Oakey. CPA for Bill Buoknerl DOOle. Chrysler, Jeep, Inc.

Supportins data
.
.
This ophUon relied upon tho above noted sources aDcl information and docuJneDta ldend.fled as
s~ data in Table 1.

.aD THOMAS 002303
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Kim""

,.,

Caldwell, ID 83605. 'Phone (208) 459--0021 • Fax (208) 4S1J.2001

Table 1

Supporting Data
1) U.S. Income Tax RetUm for an S Corporation filed by Thomas Motors, Inc. for the years 2005
end 2006.
2) U.S. fncome Tax Return for all S Corporation. filed by Ronald O. Thomas Enterprises. Inc. for
the rear 2006.
3) U,S. II1ctividual Iacome Tax Return filed by Ronald O. and Blaine Thomas for 2006.
4) Various closing documents between Ronald O. Thomas and Elaine K. Thomas, and Bill
Buckner Dodge, Chrysler, Jeep, Ino., dated March 29, 2006.
S) U.S. CotporatiOD IDcome TLX Retum filed by Bill Bucknef Chrysler, Jeep. Dodge, Jnc. for
2006.
6) Purchase price allocation prepared by BID Buckner of 2006 acquisition as provided to Kevin
Oakey, CPA ofRudd & COmpan)'.
1) Pbono conversation with KJMu Oakey, CPA on February 4. 2009.
8) Oem County property tax assessment Information on parcels RP002SSS0~, RP0025SS08.
R.POO25SS22 and RP02024100 for 2006 as set forth in parcel master reports.
9) Phone conversation with Roy Long on January 30, 2009.
10) Phone oo21venadOD 'With Bill Duoknor on February 4, 2009.
11) Phone oonversation with David Hull on Pebruary 4, 2009.
12) Thomas Motors, Inc. January 2006 In house finanoiaJ. statement titled "Dafmler Chrysler 2006
Dealer Financial Statoment."
13) Various conversations with Drew and Monte Thomas.
14)V&rious conversa1icms with William Monow aDd Denais Wilkinson.
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PRIOR DBPOSmON OR IRAlL TESTlMPNX
The following is a list of cases in wbi.ob I have liven testimony in either deposition or at trial in the last
four years.

1) loneav.lones
Trlal- Boise. Idaho - October 2006
2) ComfOtth v. Comf'orth
Trial-- CaldweU. Idaho - November, 2006
3) Miller v. WID·Prater Estate
Trial- Boise, Idaho - Fobruary, 2008

OY4IJFICAnoNS

See cuniculum Yitae pteViously submitted.

COMPENSATION
Hourly me of S175 plus out-of-pocket eosts.
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John J. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

f U fh ~ [Q)~AM
~PM
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H. Ronald Bjorkman (lSB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196

Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)
)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,

)

Defendants.

Case No. CV 2006-492

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL
FOLI~OWING HEARING OF
FEBRUARY 23, 2009

)
)
)
)
)
)

** ***

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL FOLLOWING HEARING OF
FEBRUARY 23, 2009 - 1

ORIGI~L~L

At the hearing before the Court on Monday, February 23, 2009, plaintiffs counsel
specifically assured the Court and defense counsel on the record in open Court that copies of
documents referenced by his expert in the expert disclosure would be provided to defense counsel
the following day, meaning Tuesday, February 24,2009. The documents have not been provided,
however, nor has there been any explanation of why they have not been provided.
The defense thus respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an order expressly and
specifically compelling the plaintiff through counsel to immediately produce copies of the following
documents identified in the expert disclosure by plaintiff, those being the same documents plaintiff s
counsel indicated at the hearing before the Court they would provide to defense counsel the
following day:
1.

"Business and personal income tax returns... for Bill Buckner, Dodge,
Chrysler, Jeep, Inc."; and

2.

"Purchase price allocation prepared by Bill Buckner of2006 acquisition as
provided to Kevin Okey, CPA ofRudd & Company."

3d

RESPECTFULL Y SUBMITTED this _____ day of March, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL FOLLOWING HEARING OF
FEBRUARY 23,2009 - 2

00093

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street. Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, BOIse;,1aho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
day of March. 2009, he caused to be served
Defendants in this matter. certifies that on this OS
a true and correct copy ofthe above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[Xl Telecopy (Fax)

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ J U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[X] Telecopy (Fax)

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL FOLLOWING HEARING OF
FEBRUARY 23,2009 - 3

00093G

fOa,~~
FEB 272009
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

)
)

vs.

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS
FEES TO DEFENDANTS

)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

*****
This Matter came before the Court upon the defendants' Second Renewed Motion
to Compel and Motion for Protective Excluding Plaintiffs Expert Witnesses. The hearing on these
Motions occurred on January 26, 2009. At said hearing, the Court ruled from the bench that the
defendants were to be awarded attorneys fees associated with those Motions.
Following the hearing, defense counsel submitted a Verified Memorandum of
Attorney Fees Incurred Re: Motions to Compel. On February 12,2009, the plaintiff filed a Motion
ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS- 1

to Disallow Attorney Fees. A hearing was held on the plaintiffs Motion before the Court on
February 23, 2009, and arguments were presented on the amount of attorneys fees to be awarded to
the defendants.
The Court now being fully advised in the premises, and after the consideration of all
relevant factors under the applicable Rules of Procedure, and for good cause shown, does hereby
award attorney fees in the amount of$5,259.50 in favor of the defendants against the plaintiff. Said
~I

be paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff to defendants (through counsel) by no later than

_ L __

,2009.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

~I

day

o~/I'c.'-'-G~=I' 2009.

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS- 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

L

The undersigned certifies that on this
day of ~009, she caused
to be served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Ronald 1. Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

)<J U.S. Mail
[
[
[
[

] Hand Delivered
] Overnight Mail
] Telecopy (Fax)
] E-mail

[ ] U.S. Mail

K1 Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail
>KJU.S. Mail
[ 1Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS- 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*** **
R. DREW THOMAS,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CY 2006-492

)

)

VS~

ORDER OF BIFURCATION

)

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

~

)
*****

.

fi

frY'-

~~

De-fe~a~ ~1&-11~.>
/hfJ-nr>"> -frr r~

Dr-o{ ~ E-rch<-J; ~

At the hearing before the Court on February 23, 2009, the Court provided the

~u ..

,:

trf~

defendants in this case with the option of bifurcating the liability issues in this case with the damages [{Jr lh4
issues. The Court has now been notified that defense has accepted the proposal.

ORDER OF BIFURCA nON - 1

The Court does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the trial of this case
currently set to commence on June 16.2009, will relate only to the liability issues presented in this
case, and any damages issues that remain following that trial will be scheduled for an entirely
separate trial thereafter.
IT IS SO ORDERED This

ORDER OF BlFURCA nON - 2

I

_

/'3 ~ay of March, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on this ~ day of March, 2009, she caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

r-{] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ J Overnight Mail
[ J Telecopy (Fax)
[ 1E-mail

Ronald J. Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[ ] U.S. Mail
(~] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

John 1. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

I¥l U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered

[ 1Overnight Mail
[ ] TeJecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

Shelly Gannon
CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER OF BIFURCATION - 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

* * * **
R. DREW THOMAS,

Plaintiff,

)
)

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

)
)

vs.

RONALD O. fHOMAS. ELAINE K.
fHOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC.. an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS
FEES TO DEFENDANTS

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

*****
This Matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Second Renewed Motion to
Compel and Motion tor Protective Order and a hearing was held on such Motions on Monday,
January 26. 2009. At the hearing, the Court decided, among other things. to gram attorneys
associated with the filing of such motions in favor of the defendant~ against the plaintiff. The Court
directed defense couasel to submit the Verified Memorandum of Attorneys Fees regarding the
claimed amount to be awarded of attorneys fees associated with such Motions. which defense
ORDER A WARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS - 1

O(JO~i

counsel has done.
The Court now being fully advised In the premises, and for good cause shown, it does

hereby Order that the defendants are~ledto~over $ ~ Z- S <). s<).gains, the plaintiff.
DATEDthis-!-2daYOf

L!2?~

[1~

. JUNEAL

c. KERRiCK

ORDER A WARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on this J.{) day of~ ,2009, she caused
to be served a true and correct copy of the above and ~ing by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:

William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Road, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
Ronald J. Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
John J. Janis
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582

'rrrU.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

1 ]u.s. Mail

[Xl Hand Delivered

[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

[\(J U.S. Mail

[ J Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[ ] E-mail

Shelly Gannon
CLERK OF THE COURT

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO DEFENDANTS - 3
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John J. Janis (lSB No. 35(9)
HEPWORTH. LEZAMIZ & JANIS
537 W. Bannock Street. Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, ID 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett. Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,

)

)

PlaintitT.

)
)

Case No. CY 2006-492

vs.

) DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF
) \-VITHDRA WAL OF MOTION TO
) COMPEIA

RONALD O. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS.
INC an Idaho Corporation,

)

Dciendants.

)

)
)
)
)
)

*****
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL - 1

COMES NOW, the defendants in the above-entitled action, by and through their
attorneys of record, Hepworth, Janis & Brody, and hereby give notice that the Motion to Compel
Following Hearing of February 23, 2009. tiled with the Court on March 3, 2009, is hereby
WITHDRAWN.

fr

DATED this ~/) _ day of March, 2009.
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF WITHDRA WAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State ofIdaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200, P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701, and one of the attorneys for the
day of March, 2009, he caused to be served
Defendants in this matter, certifies that on this
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

C

William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 East Franklin Rd, Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
[Xl E-mail

H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
l09N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
I)(]
'1

DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL - 3
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John 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street. Stc. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise. ID 83701-2582
Tdephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927
H. Ronald Bjorkman (lSB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COl fRT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

[HE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS.

)
)

Plaintiff:

)

Case No. CV 2006-492

)

vs.

)

)

DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION

) FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RONALD O. THOMAS. ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS.
TNC., an Idaho Corporation.
Defendants.

)

)
)

)
)
)
)

*****
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

COMES NOW the defendants in the above-entitled action, and pursuant to Rule 56
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. hereby respectfully move this Honorable Court for an order
granting summary judgment on the Plaintiffs Complaint in this case. This Motion is made on the
grounds and for the reasons that the application of Idaho law to the undisputed facts of this case
mandates the conclusion that the oral agreement at issue is legally unenforceable, and there is no
genuine issue of material fact.
[his Motion is otherwise based upon the records and pleadings on tile with the Court
in this action, and the Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Affidavit of John Janis which will be timely filed with the Court on or before April
9,2009.
·
' th IS
DATED

2,J.~uay 0 t' Apn,'J -'009

_"

k

•

HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

( )nil q :"; :,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, with offices at 537 W.
Bannock Street, Suite 200. P.O. Box 2582, Boise, Idaho 83701. and one of the attorneys for the
Defendants in this matter. certifies that on this 3 ~ day of April, 2009, he caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing by the mdhod indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
William A. Morrow
Dennis R. Wilkinson
MORROW DINIUS
5680 E. Franklin Rd., Ste. 220
Nampa, Idaho 83687
H. Ronald Bjorkman
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188

[x) U.S. Mail
[ J Hand Delivered

r

J Overnight

Mail

[ I Telecopy (Fax)

[)(J E-mail

!X] U.S. Mail
[ J Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Telecopy (Fax)
l)(1. E-mail

DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

fUlL ~ ~',
Jahn 1. Janis (ISB No. 3599)
HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY
537 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 200
P.O. Box 2582
Boise, Idaho 83701-2582
Telephone No. (208) 343-7510
Fax No. (208) 342-2927

APR 0 9 2009 '"
E

H. Ronald Bjorkman (ISB No. 1765)
Attorney at Law
109 N. Hays
P.O. Box 188
Emmett, Idaho 83617-0188
Telephone No. (208) 365-4136
Fax No. (208) 365-4196
Attorneys for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GEM

*****
R. DREW THOMAS,
Plaintiff,

vs.

RONALD 0. THOMAS, ELAINE K.
THOMAS and THOMAS MOTORS,
INC., an Idaho Corporation,
Defendants.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2006-492

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

*** **
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I (

ORIG\NA~09

I. INTRODUCTION
There are multiple grounds upon which to grant summary judgment on the singular
claim left in this case, when applying the undisputed facts to clear and dispositive Idaho law. After
completing the continued deposition of the plaintiff recently, relating exclusively to what he is
claiming are the actual conditions and terms ofthe oral agreement at issue, it is now clearer than ever
and basically undeniable at this point that summary judgment is warranted.

II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
This case at this point boils down to a singular claim by the plaintiff, that the
defendants breached an alleged oral agreement with the plaintiff to transfer the Thomas Motors
business to him at or about the time the defendant Ron Thomas retired. In exchange for the plaintiff
coming to work there, the entire agreement according to the plaintiff, boils down to "the business
will be yours." The defense in this case has recently completed the continued deposition of the
plaintiff, with the focus on this singular claim, and particularly focusing on what he is claiming were
the specific terms and conditions of that alleged oral agreement. As indicated above, it is simply
clear that the oral agreement the plaintiff is claiming as the basis of this lawsuit is clearly and
unequivocally unenforceable as a matter of law and undisputed fact for a number of different
reasons, any of one of which are sufficient to warrant the entry of summary judgment. Each ofthese
will be addressed separately and in turn.

A. The Indefiniteness Issue
It is fundamental and axiomatic that in order for a contract to be legally enforceable,
it must be sufficiently definite and certain in all of its material and essential terms. See e.g.

Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 155 P.3d 691 (2007); Kohring v.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 44 P.3d 1149 (2002); Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First
National Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 173, 804 P.2d 900 (1991). Conversely stated, if any portion
of terms to an alleged agreement is unsettled, then a legally enforceable contract does not exist. As
stated by the Idaho Supreme Court:
In order to constitute a contract, there must be a distinct
understanding common to both parties. The minds ofthe parties must
meet as to all of its terms, and, if any portion of the proposed terms
is unsettled and unprovided for, there is no contract.
CH LeavellandCompanyv. Grafe and Associates, Inc., 90 Idaho 502, 511, 414P.2d873 (1966).

See a/so, e.g., Matheson v. Harris, 96 Idaho 759, 536 P.2d 754 (1975)(HA contract does not exist

if any portion ofthe proposed terms is unsettled" Id at 760).
It is also fundamental that the questions raised by this summary judgment motion are
questions of law to be decided by the Court. It is, for example, clear that a determination of the
meaning and legal effect of contracts are questions oflaw for determination by the Court. See, e.g.,

Parksv. City ofPocatello, 91 Idaho 241, 419 P.2d 683 (1966); Twin Lakes Village PropertyAss'n,
Inc. v. Crowley, 124 Idaho 132,857 P.2d6Jl (1993); Fullerv. Equitab/eSav. andLoanAss'n, 718
F2d 951 (lJh elr. Idaho 1983); Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007) ("The
determination and legal effect ora contractual provision is a question oflaw." Id at 69).
In this case, the oral agreement the plaintiff claims as the basis of this lawsuit at this
point has a number of specific terms and/or conditions that suffer from the same fatal legal defect
of indefiniteness. That is, they are material and essential terms that were not agreed upon by the
parties as a matter of undisputed fact, and each of these defects are sufficient to render the contract
legally unenforceable as a matter of clear Idaho law. Each of the these material and essential terms

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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will be addressed separately and in turn.

1. The Price Issue
The price issue involved with the subject oral agreement in this case has already been
discussed with the Court as part of the first summary judgment proceedings. In short, defendant
claimed there that the plaintiff acknowledged he had to pay for the business in his deposition
testimony, but that the parties had not reached agreement on the actual price term. Since price is
always an essential term of a contract, the defense argued the contract was unenforceable as a matter
of law. To be a bit more specific on this, the defense as part of the first summary judgment
proceedings provided the Court with excerpts from the plaintiffs first deposition in this case in
which he testified to the effect that he always understood under his alleged oral agreement that in
order for him to get the business he would have to pay something for it, but they had never reached
actual agreement on the precise price term. Examples of this include the following excerpts from
his first deposition of his testimony, and in his own words.
Now, you've got to remember, too, I never thought that I was going
to get this place for free. That never crossed my mind that I'd ever
get it for free.

***

I never thought I would get it for free. I knew I would have to pay
something for it. I mean, it wasn't just going to be here Drew, here
is a dealership.

***

I never thought I would get the dealership for free, just here, I'm 63
years old, here's the keys, its your place, I'll pay for everything. No.
I knew that we had to do something.

See Affidavit ofJohn Janis in Support ofSecond Motion/or Summary Judgment, Exhibit "A ", Depo
ofDrew Thomas taken June 26, 2007, pp. 102-105 (emphasis added). In response to the above, the
plaintiff submitted an Affidavit in which he professed the "need to clarifY" his deposition testimony,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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and otherwise claimed that while he was going to provide his mother and father with retirement
income after getting the business, that his receiving the business "was not contingent" upon him
paying such retirement income. See, Affidavit of R. Drew Thomas in Opposition to Summary

Judgment,

~

12 at p. 6, dated August 13, 2007. The defense filed a Motion to Strike this portion of

the Affidavit claiming it was squarely attempting to contradict his prior sworn testimony. The Court
denied this Motion indicating in its written decision that the Court did not find "any instance where
Plaintiff affirmatively stated that the parties' agreement required him to pay something for the
business as consideration for its transfer." See Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment, at p. 7, filed November 26, 2007. For similar reasoning, the Court denied the summary
judgment motion on this particular claim at that point, ruling the defense had not established an
element of the agreement was "material as a matter oflaw." See Order on Defendants' Motionfor

Summary Judgment, p. 10, filed November 26, 2007.
As indicated earlier, defense counsel recently continued with the second volume of
the plaintiff s deposition, which was done on Tuesday, March 31, 2009. One of the reasons for the
deposition was to address these apparent contradictions concerning a price term, and specifically to
address whether there was a term or condition of the subject oral agreement that required him to
make payments of some kind to his parents. In sum and substance, the answer to this question by
the plaintiff in the continued deposition was a clear and unequivocal "yes."
The plaintiff acknowledged that whenever he discussed the question of whether he
would have to pay something to his parents at the time the business was transferred to him, that at
no point did any of the defendants ever indicate or agree that he would get it for free. See Affidavit

ofJohn Janis. Exhibit "B ", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009 at pp. 13-18. On the
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contrary, every time the matter was discussed, the plaintiff testifies that his father specifically
indicated that he would need a monthly income from the plaintiff, so he and the plaintiffs mother
could live. See Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit "E", Depo of R. Drew Thomas, taken March 31,
2009 at p. 17, ll. 7-15; p. 19, ll. 1-24. The plaintiff testified that the defendant Ron Thomas had

specifically indicated that he needed to get something out of the business at the time it would have
been transferred to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff agreed to this. See Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit
"E", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31,2009., p. 21, ll. 7-25.

To begin with, the plaintiff spent four pages of transcript testimony acknowledging
the point that there was never once any discussion between him and his father suggesting that Drew
could get the business by not paying anything to his mother and father at and after the time of
transfer. Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit HE ", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009, at
pp. 13-16. Every single time the matter was discussed, the plaintiff openly acknowledges the

defendant Ron Thomas always indicated he needed to get something out of the business at the time
of the transfer, and plaintiff "agreed with that."

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

And Ron then going on to tell you words to the effect of it don't take me
much to live, that I. Ron Thomas. don't have to have a lot to live on. but I do
want something out of the business: right?
Uh-huh.
Is that a yes?
Yes, I read that.
I mean, that's you telling me what your dad had told you?
And I believe he used the word "we" once in a while, but a the time, I, we,
my mom and dad, all and the same.
Sure, and the only point that I was trying to get at, Drew, is in these
conversations which you had over the years with your dad wherein there was
a discussion about how much you would pay your mom and dad after the
business was transferred that he was telling you that he wants something out
of the business?
Yes.
And basically you were saying in effect, okay, I agree with that?
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A.
Q.
A.

It was reasonable, yes, 1 agreed with that.
But there was just never a particular agreement reached on whether it would
be 3,000, 5,000 or some particular number in between?
Correct.

Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit HB", Depo of R. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009, p . 21, ll. 725; p. 22, II. 1-8 (emphasis added). This could hardly be clearer at this point. The plaintiff himself
openly acknowledges that his dad repeatedly indicated that he wanted and needed to get something
out of the business at the time he transferred it to Drew in the form of monthly payments for he and
his wife to live on, and that the plaintiff point blank acknowledges "1 agreed with that."
There is also no question that every time the plaintiff and his father talked about the
terms of what the plaintiff is claiming was their oral agreement it was always with the term and
condition being that the plaintiff would have the business entity he took over provide his mother and
father with a monthly income of an amount somewhere between $3,000 and $5,000:

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

And throughout that time frame from when you first started talking about
going to work there, actually working there, through the time it was sold, 1
understand that you did have a number of conversations with your dad
wherein the subject of the amount that would be paid by the business through
you was discussed.
Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of us.
And the thrust of those conversations was him telling you that it had to do
with the fact that they didn't need that much to live on, but it was amounts
that they would be using to live on?
1 would agree.
And that while there had never been a specific agreement between you and
your mom and dad as to whether it would be 3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere
in between, that was the general range?
I agree.
Okay; so then I am understanding that the agreement that is at the heart of
this lawsuit is that in exchange for you going to do what you did. he would.
that is your parents would. in exchange have the business transferred to you
and you would in turn pay them through the business a stream of income
somewhere in the range of3 to 5.000 a month?
I would agree with that.
Okay, that's the agreement we're talking about?
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A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Okay.
Correct?
Dh-huh.
Yes?
Yes.
Okay, that's the agreement that you're testifying is what's at issue in this
lawsuit?
Yes.

Affidavit of John Janis, Exhibit "B", Depo of R. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009, p. 19-20
(emphasis added). The plaintiff thus acknowledges that the monthly payments were a specific term
of the agreement that is at issue in this case, and part of what he was required to do "in exchange"
for him getting the business. ld
To the extent it needs to be made any clearer, the plaintiff also testified that a
"condition" of the oral agreement was for him to pay his parents this stream of monthly income
between $3,000 and $5,000, with a specific amount to be decided at or about the time of transfer:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Okay, you're claiming in this lawsuit that you had an oral agreement with
your mother and father that had certain terms or conditions. Am I right so
far?
Such as if you - Just that it has certain terms and conditions.
Okay.
We're going to get to what they are in a minute.
Okay, I agree.
SO far you're with me?
So far I'm with you.
All right, because before I leave this deposition, what I want to understand is
exactly what those terms and conditions are, and here's what I understand
you've told me today or clarified again for me today that at the time had this
deal actually occurred, materialized, happened - Upon his retirement.
- - upon his retirement at or about 63 years old and the transfer of the
business took place, one ofthe conditions that would have happened is that
you would pay your mom and dad some stream of monthly income between
and 3 and $5,000.
Correct.
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Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit HB ", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, p. 55, II. 1-25, p. 56, I. 1 (emphasis
added). The plaintiff thus agrees in his sworn testimony that one of the "conditions and terms" of
the oral agreement was for him to have the business pay his mom and dad a monthly income
somewhere between 3 and $5,000.
This undisputed fact alone is clearly fatal to the plaintiff's claims. Here again, it is
a fundamental principle of contract law that a contract must provide for a definite and specific price
in order to be legally enforceable. See, e.g. Garmo v. Clanton, 97 Idaho 696, 699,551 P.2d 1332
(1976).

An "agreement to agree" or an agreement that leaves any material terms for future

negotiation is not a legally enforceable agreement:
Generally, an agreement to agree is unenforceable as its terms are so
indefinite that it fails to show a mutual intent to create an enforceable
obligation. No enforceable contract comes into being when parties
leave a material term for future negotiations, creating a mere
agreement to agree.
}.1aroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 614, 114 P.3d 974 (2005). See also, e.g.
Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230,697 P.2d 1244 (1985) (Hlfterms necessary to a contract are
leftfor future negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced" Id at 234).

In this case, it is simply clear at this point that price was a term and condition of this
alleged oral agreement. That is, the defendants needed some monthly income to live on to take out
the business, and the plaintiff agreed to pay them that at the time of the transfer (e.g., in his words
"I agreed with that"). They had simply not yet agreed on the actual amount to be paid and therefore,
the most basic and elemental material term of this contract - the price - was left for future
negotiation. Such a contract is legally unenforceable as a matter of clear Idaho law.
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2. The DebtslReceivables Issue
The price term is by no means the only term ofthe oral agreement at issue that serves
as a basis or reason for the agreement being legally unenforceable. The agreement in question boils
down to nothing more than the plaintiff being purportedly told that in exchange for his coming to
work for this new business at the time, "the business will be yours" when the defendant Ron Thomas
retired at or about 63 years old. As far as the terms of what the parties agreed upon, as to what
would actually happen at the time the business transferred to the plaintiff, the answer is basically no
agreement was reached at all.
We are of course talking about an agreement that involves the eventual transfer of an
entire new car dealership business that has very substantial amounts of money at issue and serious
financial complexities. It is painfully obvious that if such a business is going to be transferred from
one party to another under an agreement, there will have to be a number of essential and material
terms that would need to be negotiated as part of the agreement, so that the parties to the agreement
could understand what their respective obligations would be at the actual time of transfer. This is
exactly what Idaho law requires for all of the material and essential terms, in order to be legally
enforceable. See, e.g., Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 155 P.3d 691

(2007) (HAn agreement must be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that
it can be determined what acts are to be perfOrmed and when perfOrmance is complete. Id at 892).
An obvious example of another material term regards the business debt at the time of the transfer,
as well as the outstanding amount of account receivables. The plaintiff acknowledges that whenever
the transfer of a business would have taken place under his alleged agreement with his parents, the
business at that point would have a potentially significant amount ofdebt and/or receivables, and that
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both of these were essential matters that would have to be addressed between the parties to the
agreement as to who would payor receive what. It is, of course, undeniable that the amount of debt
that a business like Thomas Motors could have at any particular point is extreme. It's a fact that the
business throughout most of the nine years it was owned by the defendants was in significant
amounts of debt. For example, in the fall of2000 when the parties entered into the written contracts,
the plaintiff was well aware of the fact that the Thomas Motors business was approximately
$300,000 beyond its line of credit with the Wells Fargo Bank, otherwise known as being "out of
trust." See, Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit "B", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, p. 24. ll. 5-16.
The plaintiff also was aware of the fact that the defendants Ron and Elaine Thomas
made significant capital contributions to the business from their own personal assets over the years
to keep the business afloat. See, Affidavit ofJohn Janis. Exhibit"B ", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, p.
32, II. 14-25; p. 22, ll. 1-16. Examples of this are in the Court's record in the Second Affidavit of

Ronald Thomas in Support of the defendants' First Motion for Summary Judgment which attached
a number of checks from the defendants' personal accounts to the Thomas Motors business which
total substantially more than $400,000 in loans to the corporation. It is also undisputed that at the
time the business was actually sold to the Bill Buckner group in early 2006, the business was in debt
substantially in excess of $200,000, in addition to the debt owed to Ron and Elaine Thomas
personally, another fact known and acknowledged by the plaintiff. Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit
"B", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, p. 43, II. 13-16.

In any event, the point here is the plaintiff acknowledges that which is otherwise
obvious - that is, at the time the business would have been transferred to him under his alleged oral
agreement with his parents, there would have been very significant financial issues that would have
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to be dealt with one way or the other, and one of those issues would be who would pay the business
debt that existed at the time.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

So in order for the transfer to become complete and for the time for your
Dad's performance to end, it would have to be subject to you working out a
deal with one ofthese partner types?
I would agree.
And even then, whenever that would take place, there would have to be some
discussion, if you will, because even then the business would still have some
debt and some receivables outstanding; right?
I would agree with that. yeah.
I mean, that would always be true. Just pick out a date at random and there's
going to be some debt and there's going to be some receivables due; right?
I would agree.
And it is, of course, conceivable that at the time that transfer took place, in
other words, when you found a partner to help you finance the operation and
so your dad doesn't have to be involved anymore, that the debt at that point
could be substantial.
Possible.
And so you'd have to work out who would be responsible for that debt or do
you think you had worked that out already?
We'd have to work that out.
And had you had any discussions about this money that I was talking about
that were contributed by your mom and dad for working capital purposes and
several ofthe checks indicated they were intended as being loans whether that
would be part of the debt that would be paid back to them?
Never had that conversation.
SO how that part would be treated would be still subiect to future discussion?
Correct.

AjfidavitofJohnJanis, Exhibit "B", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009,p. 40, ll. 1925; p. 41, 1/. 1-25; p. 42, 1I. 1-3 (emphasis added). Again, the question of who would be responsible
for the business debt at the eventual time of transfer is very clearly and undeniably a material and
essential term to any agreement involving the transfer of this business. The undisputed fact is this
term was not negotiated, but was instead left to future negotiation. The plaintiff himself
acknowledges the debt owed by the business at the time of transfer could very well have included
sizeable amounts of money and that regarding who would have to pay it, that he would "have to"
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have worked this out with the defendants in the future (Le. at the time of transfer).

He simply had

not done that according to the plaintiff and left it for "future discussions." Again, this renders the
agreement legally unenforceable. See, e.g. Dursteler v. Dursteler, 108 Idaho 230, 697 P.2d 1244

(Ct. App. 1985) (Hlfterms necessary to a contract are left for foture negotiation, the contract cannot
be enforced"

14. at 234).
The Dursteler case cited above is worthy offurther discussion here, because it serves

to forcefully illustrate the points being made about the unenforceability of the oral agreement on
terms that were not negotiated or agreed upon, such as the debt being discussed presently, and
various other terms discussed further below. It also has some factual similarities to the present case.
For example, the parties in the Dursteler case were family members who had entered into a contract
which involved both the sale of land and a business.
More specifically, the plaintiff and defendant in Dursteler had entered into a contract
which involved the sale of real property, as well as an additional agreement to establish a partnership
for the purpose of operating a mink ranching business on that same real property. Durste/er, 108

Idaho at 232. The parties had a written contract prepared for this purpose. 1d After the written
contract was signed, the sellers moved out of the ranch/real property and the buyers moved in. Id.
Shortly thereafter, the parties realized they needed more money to finance the mink ranching
operations (e.g. such as buying and feeding the animals/minks) until such time as they could
eventually start generating revenue from the eventual sale of the mink pelts. Id For that purpose,
the buyer needed to get an assignment from the seller of shares the seller had in a feed co-op that for
all practical purposes represented the only source of food for the mink on the ranch. Id While all
parties recognized the need in this regard, they could not thereafter reach an agreement on a price
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for the seller's shares in that feed co-op. Dursteler, 108 Idaho at 233. In addition, the partnership
between the buyer and seller in Dursteler needed to file a tax return and identify income/expenses
attributable to the partnership, as distinguished from the income/expenses generated by the prepartnership activities of the sellers alone. Id This too was a problem, as the parties could not reach
agreement on how such an allocation should be met for purposes of preparing the partnership tax
return. Id
Dursteler thus involved family members clearly having the intention to enter into

a contract involving the sale of real property as well as creating a partnership for running a business.
In fact, they had drafted and signed a very detailed written contract memorializing such agreement.
The parties also took significant steps to start performance under the contract, with the sellers
moving out of the real property and the buyers moving in and commencing the operation of running
a mink ranch. Nevertheless, after all that happened, it became clear there were a couple of terms to
the agreement that probably by mere oversight had not been negotiated or agreed upon, that wound
up being important, and that were legally fatal to the enforceability of the contract.
The District Court in Dursteler ruled that because the parties had not reached
agreement on terms that the Court concluded were "essential" to carrying out their agreement, the
contract was completely unenforceable as a matter oflaw. Dursteler, 108 Idaho at 233. On appeal,
the Idaho Court of Appeals first stated the basic legal principles of contract law that apply there, and
which of course apply with equal force here:
A contract will be enforced if it is 'complete, definite and certain in
all its material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in
themselves of being reduced to certainty.' To meet this standard the
contract must embody a distinct understanding ofthe parties, showing
a meeting ofthe minds as to all necessary terms ofthe contract. The
obligations of the parties must be identified so that the adequacy of
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performance can be ascertained. If terms necessary to a contract are
left for future negotiation, the contract cannot be enforced.
Dursteler, 108 Idaho at 233-234. The Court of Appeals then went on to address the question of
whether the trial court had correctly ruled that the problems that caused the controversy between the
parties were "essential" to their agreement:
Here, as noted above, the evidence is undisputed that the parties
failed to reach an understanding as to how the partnership initially
would raise money to run the ranch, how the buyers ultimately would
get food for the mink, and how the partnership would report its
income and expenses. The question is whether the trial judge
correctly concluded, as a matter oflaw, that these items were essential
to the contract. We hold that he did. Absent agreement on these
items, the parties' obligations to each other with respect to operation
ofthe ranch could not be fully ascertained. Continuation of the ranch
as a going business was a fundamental ingredient of the transaction.
Accordingly, we sustain the Court's ruling that the contract was
fatally incomplete and therefore unenforceable.
Dursteler, 108 Idaho at 234 (emphasis added). Thus, both the District Court and the Appellate
Court unanimously concluded, as a matter oflaw, that the contract which failed to include negotiated
terms eventually deemed "essential" to carrying out the purposes of the underlying contract meant
that the contract was "fatally incomplete" and therefore legally unenforceable. That is the exact
same situation presented here.
There can be no legitimate question that a material and essential and "fundamental"
term of an agreement involving the eventual sale or transfer of a new motor vehicle dealership would
concern who, as between the parties, would be liable for the business debt that exists for that
business at the time of transfer. This is debt that will likely be in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars that someone will absolutely be required to pay, whenever the business would have been
transferred to the plaintiff. In fact, when you account for the loans made to the business by the
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defendants over the last couple of years before the business was sold, this debt was in fact in the
multiple hundreds of thousands of dollars. The question of who has the obligation to pay what, at
the time for performance of the contract, is clearly a fundamental ingredient to this transaction. In
this case not only does the plaintiff himself acknowledge this otherwise self-evident fact, but also
acknowledges that this was a necessary condition of the deal for which the parties had not reached
any specific agreement yet:

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

But at the time of transfer, as we talked about before, there's got to be some
debt.
Correct, I would agree.
And so the question as to who was going to pay what part of the debt was still
open?
Was not discussed, correct.
And so that was left as a condition of the deal that would have to be met one
way or the other. but it was left for future negotiation?
Correct.

Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit "B ", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009, p. 58, ll. 1725; p. 59, l. 1 (emphasis added).

The plaintiff himself thus acknowledges that the debt was

"condition of the deal" that simply had not been dealt with yet, and was required to be the subject
of "future negotiation".
There is no material difference between the subject terms of the agreement here
regarding the business debt, from the terms involved in the Dursteler case regarding how the parties
would handle financing the operation of the mink ranching business. Either way, the term involved
an issue as to who would handle what part of the finances of the business when the time for it
arrived, and the fact that such term had not been negotiated or agreed upon was legally fatal there,
and is here.
The same thing is true of the other term of the agreement involved in the Dursteler
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case that the parties had not agreed upon, that is how they would handle the allocation of expenses
and income during the same tax year the partnership was created. There again, there is no
substantive difference for that term, from the business debt then at issue here. Either way, it is a
question of how the parties would handle a particular financial issue that would have to exist to
make the transfer of the business complete, which the parties had for whatever reason not negotiated
or agreed upon. Once again, that fact alone is legally fatal to the enforceability of the contract and
there is no legitimate question about it.
Besides the price and debt terms discussed above, there are also various other terms
of the oral agreement at issue here that also make the agreement fatally incomplete and legally
unenforceable. In this regard, the plaintiff was asked in his recent deposition the point blank
question of what are the terms and conditions of the oral agreement he is claiming as the basis of this
lawsuit here, and if the agreement had actually occurred under the terms and conditions of the
agreement he is claiming, who would have been required to do what? That is, as between the
plaintiff and the defendants, what would each of them be obligated to do under the terms and
conditions of the agreement the plaintiff is claiming he had with them.
First, as indicated above, he addressed the price and debt terms and conditions
referenced above. Again, he acknowledges they would have to reach agreement on the actual
amounts the plaintiff would have had to pay his parents (in the form of monthly income) and who
would have been responsible for the debt and/or accounts receivables that existed at the time. Again,
these were terms that were "conditions of the deal" but were left open for future negotiation that
would have had to take place at the time of transfer.
In addition, however, plaintiff also acknowledges there were at least two other things

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 17

that would have had to have happened in order to make the agreement valid or complete. That is,
the plaintiff would have to have obtained a source of financing to allow him to take over the
business, and he would have been required to qualify as an authorized franchise owner by the
Dodge/Chrysler Corporation. The deal simply could not have happened if either of these did not
materialize or occur. The plaintiff had to acknowledge that whether either of these events would
have actually taken place is very much an open question and an unknown. Just as important, the
plaintiff acknowledges how these eventualities would affect the alleged transaction involving the
defendants was not negotiated, and was not agreed upon.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

And what about the debt of the business that would exist? It has to have debt
at some point that the transfer is made.
My dad told me he would stay in the saddle through the transition until we
could get everything transferred into my name and move on.
I don't understand what - well, it doesn't matter ifI understand it, what do
you understand that to mean?
I understood that he would still be a guarantor while I seeked financial
possibilities to actually move them completely out, but that he said that he
would stay - his words were I'll stay in the saddle with you until we can get
that done, everything will be fine.
SO that would leave open, you know, kind of a bunch of possibilities, then,
as one, how long.
Huge possibilities.
Right?
Yes.
Kind of infinite almost in fact; right?
Well, hopefully, get something done so they can enjoy their retirement.
SO number 1 that would be left open is how long he would have to 'stay in
the saddle'; right?
Correct.
I mean, that could be a short period of time, it could be a long period of time?
Correct.
But there had been no specific agreement as to, like, cutting it off at some
point?
Not that I remember, no.
SO basically indefinite and a period of time that would have to be dealt with
down the road?
I would agree.
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Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit "B", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009,p. 36, II. 2025; p. 37, II. 125; p. 38, II. 1-4 (emphasis added).
The plaintiff indicates that he would "likely" have needed to involve a partner in order
to obtain the appropriate financing to make this agreement work, and otherwise be able to run the
business that would have been transferred to him (as opposed to him being able to get financing on
his own). Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit"B ", Depo ofR. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009, p.
40, II. 1-18. He had not talked to any particular individuals, and certainly had not reached any
agreement with any such future partners at any point. Id The plaintiff also indicates that somewhere
around the time of transfer, he would have to go to such people and try to reach agreement with
them, and from that point then seek to obtain some kind of line of credit with a lending institution
of some sort under terms and conditions, and all that again would have to be dealt with far into the
future. In fact, the plaintiff agrees these matters would have to get done "in order for the transfer to
become complete" (i.e., for the documents to be finalized) and also to dictate the time for the
defendants' "performance to end." Id Depo of Drew Thomas, p. 40, II. 19-23.
In the meantime, while the plaintiff would have been making those efforts at or about
the time of transfer, his father would have needed to "stay in the saddle" of the business meaning he
would have continued responsibility of financing the business until such time as the plaintiff could
somehow get this eventual financing to make the deal complete. Id. The plaintiff acknowledges there
is absolutely no way to tell how long this would have taken, not to mention all the other uncertainties
associated with who the partner would be, what the terms of that partnership would be, what the
terms of the lending institution would be, whether any of this could actually occur, etc. In other
words, the plaintiff has to openly acknowledge that there are a huge number of uncertainties
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associated with what would have been required to take place at or about the time of transfer under
the alleged oral agreement at issue in this case, or in his own words, "huge possibilities." Id , D.

Thomas Depo, p. 37, t. 12. Yet, notwithstanding the uncertain nature of all this, and how it would
or would not have happened in the future, the plaintiff agrees it would have all been necessary for
this alleged oral agreement to "become complete." Again, it is undeniable that there were a number
ofmaterial and essential terms and conditions that were left to future negotiations, the very definition
of an agreement that is fatally incomplete as a matter of law.
Additionally, there is also the obvious uncertainty of whether the plaintiff could even
have qualified to become an authorized franchise owner under what is universally recognized as
stringent requirements that the Dodge/Chrysler Corporation has for its franchise owners. The
plaintiff himself again acknowledges the uncertainties associated with this, and that here again he
may have needed someone else to participate in the process in order to get the appropriate
qualifications which would be absolutely necessary to take over this business.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

And another condition that I can think: of that I don't think: we talked about
actually so far is that in order for you to continue with the business, whether
under the name you told me about before or some other name, you would
have to be, you, Drew, would have to be approved as an authorized franchise
owner by Dodge/Chrysler.
Or have a partner that could be, but yes, you would have to be authorized.
And if that couldn't happen. the deal couldn't happen; correct?
Correct.
And so that, too. was a condition of the agreement that was left to be dealt
with after the transfer took place?
During the transfer and after. yes.
And one of the possibilities is it may have been the case that you personally
would not have been solely approved to be a franchise owner by
Dodge/Chrysler, that it would have required you to be involved with
somebody else?
Possibly, but not impossible either. You'd have to walk into that water to
find out at the time.
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Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit "B ", Depo of R. Drew Thomas, taken March 31, 2009, at p. 59, 11.
2-25; p. 60, II. 1-3 (emphasis added). The bottom line is this "condition" of the agreement was also

left to be dealt with in the future, and that it was entirely possible that it would not have happened
at all. If so, the plaintiff agrees the deal simply could not happen. Thus, not only is the deal being
claimed by the plaintiff here fraught with uncertainty, but also making it clear that the agreement in
question does not include any terms addressing what would happen in the event of certain realities
coming to pass that would be very material and essential to the agreement having any force or effect
at all. ld at 760.
The financing and approval from Dodge/Chrysler issue is in all material senses
identical to the terms involved in the Dursteler case address earlier, that served to render the contract
there as null and void due to being legally enforceable. Just as the financial terms involved in
Dursteler were important to the "continuation of the ranch business" at issue, and thus a

"fundamental ingredient to the transaction" so too are the issues here regarding the plaintiff needing
to get specific financing and be approved as franchise owner.
One of the basic purposes of the rules relating to the law requiring there being a
meeting of the minds on all material and essential terms in order to be legally enforceable, is the
basic point that an agreement is fatally indefinite if it cannot be determined from the terms of the
agreement itself what actual obligations the parties would have to each other under the agreement
at the time the agreement calls for performance, in addition to knowing when performance is
supposed to take place. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court:
It is essential to an enforceable contract that it be sufficiently definite
and certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined
what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete. As
Corbin in his treatise on contracts notes:
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A court cannot enforce a contract unless it can
determine what it is. It is not enough that the parties
think that they have made a contract; they must have
expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable
of understanding. It is not even enough that they have
actually agreed, iftheir expressions, when interpreted
in light of accompanying factors and circumstances,
are not such that the court can determine what the
terms ofthat agreement are. Vagueness ofexpression,
indefiniteness, and uncertainty as to any of the
essential terms of an agreement, have been held to
prevent the creation of an enforceable contract.
Dale's Service Company v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 664, 534 P.2d 1102 (1975). See also, e.g.
Bajrektarevic v. Lighthouse Home Loans, Inc., 143 Idaho 890, 155 P. 3d 691 (2007) (HAn agreement
must be sufficiently definite and certain in its terms and requirements so that it can be determined
what acts are to be performed and when performance is complete." Id at 892).

Applying this fundamental principle of contract law to the present case makes it
basically obvious that the contract in question here is fatally incomplete, indefinite, and
unenforceable. Besides the fact that there were major financial parts ofthis alleged agreement that
had simply not been negotiated or agreed upon, (e.g., price, debts and receivables) it is also
impossible to identify the parties' precise obligations at the time performance would have been
called for under this alleged oral contract. In fact, it is not even clear when the defendant would have
actually "performed" under the contract, since he was according to the plaintiff required to be "in
the saddle" financing the business until plaintiff went through a process of obtaining his own
financing andlor being approved of being a franchise owner, both of which the plaintiff
acknowledges are of indefinite duration at best, and may have never happened at all at worst.
In summary, the defendants respectfully submit that it is undisputable at this point
that the agreement that serves as the basis of the remaining cause of action in this case is fatally
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 22

O(J091'

incomplete, indefinite, and unenforceable as a matter of undisputed fact and Idaho law. Any of the
singular terms addressed above being left open for future negotiation are sufficient by themselves
to render the subject oral agreement legally unenforceable. It is of course all the more compelling
that there are a substantial number of essential terms that all have the same fatal legal problem.

B. The Statute of FraudslIndivisible Issue
The Court in this case has already correctly ruled that the plaintiff's claim for breach
of oral agreement cannot include any real property as being part ofthe claim for damages here, under
Idaho's Statute of Frauds. See, Order on Defendants' Motionfor Partial Summary Judgment,jiled
May 19, 2008. The question then becomes whether the plaintiff's remaining claim for a breach of

oral agreement is or is not "severable" from his claim that the oral agreement included the land on
which Thomas Motors was located. If the agreement regarding the business is not severable, or is
"indivisible" from the land part of the agreement, then the oral agreement is void in its entirety as
a matter of law. The general rule of law in this regard is stated in the Am Jur Treatise as follows:
If a contract is not severable, and part of it is within the statute of
frauds, the general rule universally approved by the courts is that it is
unenforceable as a whole and no action can be maintained to enforce
a part which would not have been affected by the statute of frauds if
it had been separate and distinct from the other part. Thus, if a
promise is integral to and indivisible from the contract as a whole,
and if that promise falls within the statute of frauds ... the entire
contract is subject to the statute and is void unless it is in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged.
73 Am Jur. 2d Statute ofFrauds § 435 (emphasis added).

The legal standards for determining whether a contract is indivisible or severable is
also very well settled and established universally, including in Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court has
had a number of decisions addressing this issue. The Court has, for example, stated as follows:
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Whether a contract is entire or severable depends upon the intention
ofthe parties. The general rule is stated in 17 A.C.J.S.C. Contracts
§ 331, p. 302, as follows:
'As a general rule it may be said that a contract is
entire when by its terms, nature, and purpose it
contemplates and intends that each and all of its parts
and the consideration shall be common each to the
other and interdependent.'
A contract may bot in its nature and by its terms be
severable and yet rendered entire by the intention of
the parties. We think: that perhaps the best test is
whether all of the things, as a whole, are of the
essence of the contract.
Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho 337, 347, 399 P.2d 635 (1965). The Idaho Appellate Courts have
otherwise repeatedly stated that the question ofwhether a contract is indivisible or severable depends
upon the intentions of the parties. See, e.g., Vancev. Connell, 96 Idaho 417, 529 P.2d 1289 (1974);
Coppedge v. Leiser, 71 Idaho 248,229 P.2d 977 (1951); Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
68 Idaho 506,201 P.2d 976 (1948).
The Coppedge case cited above is further instructive here, since it has quite similar
facts as those presented here. In Coppedge, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract that
involved the sale of the business and its assets in the Caldwell area, as well as the buyer entering into
a sub-lease agreement with the seller. Coppedge, 71 Idaho at 250. Unlike the facts of this case, the
parties in Coppedge had entered into a very detailed written contract, the entirety of which is quoted
in the Opinion. Id In any event, the sale of the business involved various assets and amounts as
specified in the contract, and the sub-leasing part of the contract also involved the payment of several
amounts. Id at 250-51. The buyer/defendant made his first payment under the contract in a timely
manner "and assumed control of the business". Coppedge, 71 Idaho at 251. Just several days later,
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however, the defendant refused to make the other payments that were due, and stopped payment on
the first check as well, and basically sought to end the deal. The plaintiff/seller sued.
The first issue in the case was whether the sub-lease part of the agreement was void
because it involved real estate, and the plaintiff/seller did not have his wife sign the written
agreement, which the defendant argued was legally required by Idaho statute at the time. Coppedge,
71 Idaho at 251. The Supreme Court held in this regard that an Idaho statute did require the wife
to sign, and since the facts established that did not happen, "it follows that the agreement of the
plaintiff to transfer the lease is void and plaintiff cannot enforce it against defendant." Id. at 251.
The next question regarded the question of whether the leasehold portion of the contract was
severable or indivisible from the sale of the business. The Court found it persuasive that the lease
agreement had expressly provided that the purpose of the leasing agreement was for the buyer to
conduct the business on those same premises. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded there was "an
abundant showing of intention" to not make a severable contract, but rather an indivisible one.
Coppedge, 71 Idaho at 254. On this basis, the entire agreement was declared unenforceable as a
matter oflaw. Id.
In the present case, we are also dealing with an agreement that the plaintiff claims
involve both land and a business. It has already been decided by the Court that the land part of that
deal is unenforceable under Idaho's Statute of Frauds, similar to the leasehold part of the deal in
Coppedge. As to the question of whether the sale of the business portion of the alleged oral
agreement at issue here is severable or indivisible from the land part ofthe deal, the plaintiff himself
provides the answer that the agreement was indivisible. According to him in fact, there is no doubt
about it. In other words, as far as determining the intention of the parties as to whether the subject
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oral agreement allegedly involving both land and a business was indivisible or severable, one need
look no further than the sworn testimony of the plaintiff himself:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

And so your understanding of the agreement of having the business, always
contemplated the business would be located where it actually was located, not
moving it anywhere?
Correct, the building, right.
And so as I understand what you're telling me, then, you're understanding of
the agreement is that the land was simply part and parcel of the whole deal?
It was, and part of the reasoning if this helps was when we had enough
inventory which we were cramped, the north side of the building, between it
and Highway 16 was really small. The east side of the building was very
small. Because ofthe street, we couldn't expand that way, so the only thing
that made sense was we would take the west side of the building and make
that the face and that's why he had the new approachway put in off of the
highway legally so we could use that as an approachway to the new frontage
of the dealership when we expanded. That's why that new entranceway was
put in by my dad.
SO from your perspective, then, the agreement about getting the business was
basically inextricably interwoven with the land?
Yes, correct.
Otherwise stated, the agreement that you had - - in other words, the
agreement that's at issue in this case, your understanding of the agreement
you had with your mom and dad that the business would be transferred to you
at or about retirement at or about 63 based on the terms we've been talking
about all morning was a package deal. business and land?
The way I understood it through the years, yes.
And I take it from your standpoint it's kind of like with one comes the other;
right?
The way I understood it. I mean, John, we walked the property, drove the
property talking about the new ideas and how we were going to do it.
SO it was never a deal in your mind that the business was separate or divisible
from the land?
Correct. not the way I understood it with all the conversations we had. You
couldn't have had it separated for the plans that he had. You wouldn't have
had any room.
SO as far as the agreement as far as you're concerned, the two are indivisible?
Yes, I would agree.

Affidavit ofJohn Janis, Exhibit "B", depo excerpt of R. Drew Thomas taken March 31, 2009, pp.
46 - 48.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 26

U0098~

There is accordingly no doubt the agreement "intended" to involve both the sale of
land and a business, which were "indivisible" from each other. As far as the plaintiff is concerned,
that was the intention of the overall agreement, no question and no exception. It is already the law
of the case that the land part of the deal is legally unenforceable under the Idaho Statute of Frauds,
and the undisputed facts. The rest of the agreement was "inextricably interwoven" with the land ,
could not have been separated from the land, and was thus specifically "indivisible" from the land.
This renders the entire agreement legally unenforceable.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully pray and beseech the Court to
enter summary judgment on the remaining claim(s) by the plaintiff, on the grounds that the subject
oral agreement is unenforceable as a matter of law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

L -rl:.-day of April, 2009.

HEPWORTH, JANIS & BRODY

's

eys for Defendants
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STATE OF IDAHO

)
)ss.
)

County of Ada

JOHN J. JANIS being first duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes and states as
follows:
1. I am an attorney of record for the defendants in the above-entitled action, and
make this Affidavit on the basis of my own personal knowledge and/or belief.
2. This Affidavit is submitted in support of the Defendants' Second Motion for
Summary Judgment.
3. Attached as Exhibit "A" are excerpts of the Depo ofR. Drew Thomas taken June
26,2007, specifically pages 102-105. Excerpts from these pages are referenced in the Brief in
Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
4. Attached as Exhibit "B" is a copy of the continued deposition ofR. Drew Thomas,
taken March 31,2009, without the exhibits. This is a mini-script of the deposition with 4 pages per
single page. A significant number of references are made to this more recent deposition testimony
in the Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment. There are
enough citations or quotes from this deposition in the brief, and it is short enough, that it was deemed
warranted to put the entire deposition into the record .
. ~
DATED this
day of April, 2009.
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R. Drew Thomas

June 26, 2007

1 a control thing for me. It was about ending the day
2 where we originally discussed going when he retired and
3 having the wherewithal to make that happen, however we
4 did it You might have to ask him about how he planned
5 to do it, but that's his verbiage.
Q. Well, maybe a better question would be you have
6
7 a fixed purchase price figure set in here.
8
Was there any discussion between you and your
9 dad about that number at all?
l O A . I don't remember a discussion that we
11 disagreed. I don't remember it being an issue of where
12 we both - he had a problem or I had a problem.
13
Q. Okay. Do you know where the number came from?
14
A. Ron Thomas.
15
Q. That was a bad question.
16
Do you have any idea how he -17
A. How he came to it?
18
Q. Yeah, exactly what went into it.
19
A. I do not know how he came to it.
20
Q. Was there any discussion with him that preceded
21 the signing of this document to the effect of how much
22 debt the business had at that moment?
23
A. You'd have to ask me that again.
24
Q. Was there any discussion with your dad before
25 you signed this Exhibit 3 that related to the subject of
Page 100
1

2
3
4

5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
L8
.9

o
1
2
3
I.

how much debt the business had?
A. Not that I recall.
Q. But at least you would have understood at that
time that the business was 300,000 out of trust?
A. Correct.
Q. Did you have any other understanding about the
financial status of the business besides that?
A. Not that I recall. I knew that it could be a
good business as it is today, I knew it wouldn't take
much to get it there.
Q. Today it's owned by Bill Buckner and his group,
right?
A. Right, Bill Buckner.
Q. And obviously somebody like Bill Buckner has a
significant financial portfolio?
A. I would think.
Q. SO his ability to get a line of credit, that is
Bill Buckner's ability to get a line of credit, might be
different than your average Joe, like you?
A. I would agree.
Q. As of September 19th, 2000, did you understand
that what you were signing was a different agreement with
your dad than that which you had previously had?
A. I understood that this was a way to get the
ball rolling on a commitment from him in the event he
Page 101
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1 died or passed away, that I would have in case of
2 something like that.
3
This was - and I think Rob would back this up.
4 This was - if Carl was still alive - a way to get the
5 ball rolling. This was a way to get - he was so against
6 losing any control, even though he could have had full
7 control until he passed away, this was a way to get him,
8 get the ball started, I guess is the way I can do it.
9
Q. But this represents an agreement wherein you're
10 essentially going to buy the business and become the
11 owner a year after the fact, September of 200 I?
12
A. Okay.
13
Q. Is that right? Because that's what it says.
14
A I would say that's correct. With his help and
15 blessing according to him then.
16
Q. My only point rm trying to get to is then at
1 7 the time you signed this, you're entering into a
18 different agreement than that which you had previously
19 had, because the terms of the prior agreement, you've
20 told me, was you would take over the dealership when he
21 became 63.
22
A It's never different because I never thought I
23 would get it for free. I knew I would have to pay
24 something for it. I mean, it wasn't just going to be
25 here Drew, here is a dealership. It was a way that - I
Page 102
1 was going to have to pay for it one way or the other.
2
This was a way to get the ball rolling on him
3 and I being on the same page, him having an income on the
4 dealership.
5
Do you follow me?
6
Q. No, I really don't to tell you the truth, Drew.
7
A. I never thought I would get the dealership for
8 free, just here, I'm 63 years old, here's the keys, it's
9 your place, I'll pay for everything. No. I knew that we
10 had to do something.
11
And I used to ask him that. How are you just
12 going to give it to me? How are you just going to give
13 it to me for free?
14
Q. But as I understand what you told me before,
15 there was discussion about you taking over the dealership
16 when he became 63, but there was no specifics in terms of
1 7 how much you would have to pay for it, at least before
18 you joined Thomas Motors?
19
A. When I would ask him those questions, John, his
20 response was, I've got it handled. You're worrying too
21 much, just get back in there and get to work. Those are
22 the types ot;..-things I would hear when I asked how this
23 was going to happen.
24
Q. Okay. We're not communicating again.
25
My question boiled down to before you joined
Page 103
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Thomas Motors A. Right.
Q. Remember we talked about that this morning at
length?
A. Correct.
Q. And I asked you probably five times about the
specifics of the discussion. And you basically told me,
as I understand it, that you relayed to me all the
specifics that you can recall.
Do you remember all that?
A. Okay.
Q. Do you remember all that?
A. Yes.
Q. And as I understand, again we're focusing on
before you joined Thomas Motors, that is, before fall of
1997A. Okay.
Q. You at least understood that you wouldn't be
getting the business for nothing, but there was no
specific discussion about what you would have to pay?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And then thereafter, I understand that
you had numerous other discussions about you taking over.
And you had at least a vague or a general understanding
that it was going to be probably you writing checks for

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

A. Okay. Fair to say.
Q. And it also has a very specific date of

transfer of ownership?
A. Fair to say.
Q. And the only point I was getting to originally
is just based on those three facts alone, this represents
a different agreement from that which you had previously
had with your dad; is that fair to say?
A. Fair to say.
Q. Okay. Now, Exhibit 5, the commercial lease and
purchase agreement, that contemplated - I realize it's a
long document, multiple pages, and I certainly don't want
to review the whole thing - but in substance, you
understood this boils down to an agreement whereby Thomas
Motors would lease the property on which it was located
to - I'm sorry - it would pay rent to the owner, i.e.,
Ron Thomas and Elaine Thomas?
A. I understand.
Q. With an eventual option to purchase -- not
option - eventual purchase price at the end of the term
stated?
A. Correct, from what I remember.
23
Q. And you would be the one responsible for making
2 4 the payment to purchase the property outright?
25
A. I'd agree.
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1

three to $5,000 a month, at least that's what I heard.
A. When they retired.
3
Q. When they retired?
4
A. Or until they're dead.
5
Q. And who came up with that figure or figures?
6
A. It wouldn't have been with my mother. It would
7 have been with my father and I.
8
Q. SO would it be fair to say they were just kind
9 of vague discussions without any definite terms?
lOA. They were discussions that we had that he
11 didn't need much to live on, he'd take a small check out
12 of the place, three to 5,000 is what I recollect we
13 talked about. It wasn't a big - it wasn't a huge
14 number, but it wasn't nothing either.
15
Q. But it wasn't also a specific commitment, Drew,
16 here's exactly what you need to pay on a monthly basis?
17
A. Other than your mom and I just need enough to
18 live on.
19
Q. Okay. Now, that is to be compared with Exhibit
2 a 3, which has a very defInite number.
21
A. Okay.
22
Q. Fairtosay?
A. Fair to say.
23
Q. And it also has very specifIc payments
24
25 scheduled; is that fair to say?
2
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Q. I've kind of left my notes here where I had
written this down, but my recollection - do you recall
when the date is under this agreement, at least, Exhibit
5, that you would actually make the $900,000 payment for
the purchase of the property?
A. I do not. I do not.
Q. I'm not remembering it either, but it's in here
somewhere, whatever the actual date is.
I guess the initial term, if you turn to page
2, 2.1, it says the initial term of the lease is seven
years from September 1st of2ooo until August 31st of
2007, this year.
Do you see that?
A. Yes, I do. I was terminated earlier.
Q. Now, had there been, up until this point in
time, which we're now into September of -- well,
September 19th of 2000 when you signed this commercial
lease agreement, had there been any agreement or
discussion with your dad about you'd become the owner of
the land upon which the dealership was located?
A. We would have had those discussions.
Q.•When?
A. ~or to those agreements.
Q. Prior to you joining Thomas Motors?
A. Yes.
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3
4
R. DREW THOMAS,
5 produced as awitness at the instance of the Defendants,
6 having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified
7 as follows:

8

9

10

16

DESCRIPTION

14

14

15

E X H I BIT S

I NDE X

2

9
EXAMINATION
10
11 BY MR. JANIS:
12
Q let the record reflect this is the time
13 and place set for the continued, I guess, deposition of
14 Drew Thomas which was first taken on June 26, 2007.
Esq.
15 Today is being taken pursuant to Notice and to be
16 governed by the Idaho Rules of CIVil Procedure.
17 Mr. Thomas, you are -- have you read the first deposition
18 you took?
19
A I have not.
20
Q Imean ever?
21
A Not completely.
22
Q Because I meant to kind of ask it in two
23 steps: Have you read it to kind of prepare for this
24 deposition?
25
A I have not.
4
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1
Q And then, secondly, I was going to ask you
2 if you read it ever.
3
A I have not read it completely ever.
4
Q Okay; so at some point you read parts of
5 it, but more recently you haven't read any of it?
6
A Correct.
7
Q Okay, but did you read anything else to
8 kind of prepare for this deposition?
9
A Briefly just some affidavit stuff.
10
Q Yeah, tha~s good because that's what
11 we're going to be talking about today. Before we get to
12 that, though, are you currently working?
13
A No.
.14
Q When did you stop working?
115
A I was laid off from Bill Buckner Chrylser
116 Jeep Dodge October 1st of '08 after the owner passed
17 away.
18
Q I'm sorry, after what?
19
A After Don Ovitt passed away.
20
Q So October 1, 2008, that's about fIVe or
21 six months ago, I guess -22
A Yes.
23
Q - is when you were laid off?
24
A Yes.
25
Q And so it wasn~ amatter of you quitting
5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
l2

or a matter of you getting fired, it was, what would you
call that, a reduction in force-type thing?
A Yeah, they were reducing staff.
Q And you were one of the casualties, I
guess?
A Yes.
Q How much staff did they reduce other than
you?
A I dont know the exact number. I think,
if I was guessing, probably four or five people.
Q And that was before the, rll call it the,
Buckner agency or Buckner car company folded; .right?
.3
A This was prior to them, yes, dosing the
4 doors.
5
Q The closing of the doors thing, I'm trying
5 to put in my head as to when it happened. I heard about
1 it when it happened, but was it a month ago or two?
I
A I believe it was -- I want to say December
sounds right.
Q Oh, so it was only about two months before
you were laid off?
A After.
Q You were laid off about two months before
it happened?
A Yes.
6

1,2009

1
Q Okay, and are you seeking employment,
2 part-time employment or doing anything work-wise?
3
A rm on unemployment at the moment. I'm
4 speaking with my prior employers, Lanny Berg, about a
5 possible job with them when the weather changes, possibly
6 May, but we have not done anything in concrete.
7
Q And would that be over here -- we're not
8 in caldwell. Would that be over there in caldwell?
9
A Yeah.
10
Q And are they running a new car business
11 over there still or just a used car?
12
A No, just a used car. Lanny sold the new
13 car franchise.
14
Q Lanny senior did?
15
A Uh-huh.
16
Q So when you say you're talking to Lanny,
17 you're talking about Lanny junior?
18
A Both senior and junior.
19
Q Oh, both senior and junior still run the
20 used car lot?
21
A Yes.
22
Q I see, and, you know, rm hearing, of
23 course, you know what's going on in the car industry as
24 we speak on anational level at least, I'm hearing at
25 least that locally the dealerships, both used and new,

7
1 are, what's the word, having troubles, if you will.
2
A Some of them.
3
Q Do you know of ones that are doing well?
4 I don't know of any that are doing well is the reason rm
5 asking.
6
A My cousin works at Sundance, Larry Miller
7 Sundance Dodge, they're not breaking the bank by any
8 means, but they're seeing a resurgence in profitability
9 and in unit sales.
10
Q You mean like this month-type thing, very
11 recent?
12
A Last month, this month. I talk to him
13 periodically.
14
Q But generally speaking, I mean, you
15 probably know more about the car industry than I do -16
A Irs hurting.
17
Q locally? I mean, it's consistent with the
18 economic crisis we're dealing with and 19
A I would agree.
20
Q Yeah.
21
(Exhibit No. 8was marked for
22 identifICation by the Notary Public.)
23
Q BY MR. JANIS: Showing you what's been
24 marked as Exhibit No.8, do you recognize that as an
25 affidavit you signed in the summer of 200n
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1
2

A Yes.

Q And you understood that when you were

signing this affidavit as it kind of says on the first
page that it amounted to sworn testimony on your
behalf?
A Yes.
Q Or, excuse me, sworn testimony by you, not
on your behalf.
A Okay, yes.
Q Let me ask you to tum to paragraph 12
which is on page 5 and 6 and what I'll ask you to do
right now is just to read it so you familiarize yourself.
Are you there?
A Uh-huh.
Q Now, going over these affidavits is
largely the reason we're here and I want to ask you some
follow-up questions here. In the first deposition, which
I can show you where I'm talking about if you like, you
testified to me or you testifted, not to me, several
times that you never understood that you were going to
get the Thomas Motors business for free, that you always
understood you were going to pay something for it. Do
you remember testifying to that effect?
24
A Yes.
25
Q Again, I have this all highlighted with
9

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

having something of a retirement check out of it and it
would have been healthy for all of us, but it comes back
to one simple thing for me: If I leave Lanny Berg, go to
Emmett and work the dealership, at the end of the day,
which was around 63, he always said that it would be mine
to take on for my lifetime and then my kids' lifetime.
Q I'm asking adifferent question.
A Okay.
Q I was just looking at these depo excerpts
and would you agree with me, for example, this first one
says, this is you, III never thought I was going to get
this place for free. That never crossed my mind that I
would ever get it for free." From that, rm
understanding that your understanding was you were always
going to pay something for the business.
A I was going to -- my labor and my time was
a lot of what I figured was paying for the dealership.
At the end when Dad got tired or wanted to retire or him
and Mom wanted to travel that they would receive asmall
check. He always said I don't need much to live on,
between 3 and 5,000, so I would take that as my labor and
my time through the eight years probably in my opinion
paid for the majority of the dealership, but I never
wanted to have them not have anything or be involved. If
they were still involved, that would have been grea~
11

1 too.
1 stickies and the like. I could show you the excerpts
2 because I know you told me earlier you had not read the
2
Q We're getting aside from my question here.
3 I'm only trying to figure out when you testify that you
3 deposition, do you want to do that?
4 never understood you were going to get the place for
4
A Yeah.
5 free, are you changing that testimony? Were you
5
Q The ones I'm talking about here - this is
6 not going to be very good on the record - are the green
6 intending to change that testimony with this affidavit?
7
A No, I can't say that I was.
7 stickies, not the yellow ones, and it's just the
8 highlighted ones, not the non-highlighted ones. I should
8
Q So it would be also true today as you said
9 June of '07 that you always understood that regardless of
9 also tell you thars not all of them. .Thafs just places
10 that I have it. Irs going to be abit of reading, so
10 how much it was going to be, you were going to pay your
11 mom and dad something for the business?
11 we're going to go off the record for asecond.
12
(Pause in proceedings.)
12
A I would agree.
13
Q BY MR. JANIS: The depo excerpts, if you
13
Q Okay, and that you did in fact have
14 will, that you just read, would you agree with me that
14 conversations with your dad about the amount over the
15 they basically boil down to you testifying to the effect
15 years and that he said words to the effect that the
16 that you always understood that if and when there was
16 amount would have something to do with how much he and
17 your mom would need to live on; right?
17 going to be atransfer of the Thomas Motors business to
18 you that you would never get it for-free, but there would
18
A No, it never was related to how much they
19 be some _. you'd have to pay something for it?
19 would need to live on. It was related to they don't need
20
A It all comes back to we had an agreement
20 much to live on and he proposed the amounts. I never
21 proposed the amounts.
21 that if I left Lanny Berg Chevrolet, came to Emmett, ran
22 the store until he retired that it would be mine to take
22
Q Okay, but did you disagree with it?
23
A I thought it was fair at the time.
23 on to the next generation and, if so, to the next
24 generation. When you say "free,' I expected, as I
24
Q Okay, but the point of what I was trying
25 stated, that they should - I had no problem with them
25 to get a~ and I'm not trying to twist the words around
10
12
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1 to something that they're not, I'm just ttying to get
2 that in the big picture of things that one, you
3 understood at all times that you were going to pay
4 something for it when it was transferred to you; right?
5
A Again, John, I fe~ at the time when I
6 left Berg my efforts and my time was worth something 7
Q I got that, but you ••
S
A -. but at the end of the day when he
9 retired that if they needed some money to live on, Mom
10 and him, I didn't have a problem with that at the time.
11
Q Well, tt wasn't an "if/' that's my point.
12 You said that you never understood you were going to get
13 it for free.
14
A That's correct.
15
Q And you also said that you were going to
16 pay them something at the end when it was transferred.
17
A I had no problem with that.
18
Q But that's what I'm telling you, that was
19 your understanding?
20
A It was my father's statement to me and I
21 had not a problem with his statement. I never proposed
22 it. He proposed it, fdid not disagree with it.
.23
Q Let's put it this way: At no point during
24 the time frames you ever talked about the transfer of the
25 business to you or this agreement that serves as the
13
1 basis of this lawsuit did your dad ever say to you you'll
2 get it for free; is that fair to say?
3
A His statement was this ~ace will be .
4 yours.
5
Q But he never said 6
A He never said the word "free. n
7
Q He never indicated to you in any way that
8 the business would be given to you for free, did he?
9
A It would be •• if you use that whole
10 sentence and dropped off the word "free," that would be
11 more accurate. It will be yours. That's the agreement
l2 we had.
.
.3
Q The record is not going to do this well.
4 Is it correct to say that your dad never said to you that
5 you would get this business for free; is that right? Is
5 that correct?
1
A Okay, repeat it for me.
I
Q Is it correct that your dad never said to
I you that you would be given this business for free?
A He said when I retire, this business will
be yours.
Q It's a yes or no question. Did he ever
say to you that he would give you -.
A I don't remember him saying that exactly,
no.

14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25
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Q Okay; so the agreement that you are ••
that you have filed this lawsuit against your mom and dad
which has this oral agreement as its primary basis is not
an agreement that you're claiming your mom or dad said or
agreed that they would give you this business for free;
is that fair?
A Okay, our agreement was if you leave and
come and do this, I will do this. I··
Q Drew, you keep A can I finish? I left. I did exactly what
I said I would do all the way to the very last day that I
said I would do it when the transfer of the ownership
went to Bill Buckner. I held up my end of the bargain.
I did what I said I would do. I did more than I said I
would do and he never did one thing on his side that he
agreed to do when I started there, so I mean, if we're
trying to focus on the word "free, n I don't know how to
answer that.
Q I'm trying to focus on getting an answer
to my question which hasn't been answered yet. You have
a lawsuit here against your mom and dad.
A Right.
Q You're claiming you had an oral agreement
with them; right?
A Thafs why I left Lanny Berg, yes.
15

1
Q You're daiming you had an oral agreement
2 with them? Yes?
3
A Yes.
4
Q I'm asking you now if that oral agreement,
5 the substance of it was that they would give you the
6 business for free? Yes or no?
7
A I cannot remember him saying the word .
8 "free," but I do remember him saying the rest of the
9 sentence, rn give you the business.
10
Q Okay, I've heard you say that,like, seven
11 or eight times.
12
A And rve agreed that I have not heard him
13 say the word "free. n
14
Q Okay, fine; so you agree with me at least
15 that the agreement that you're suing on the basis of in
16 this lawsuit is not an agreement that you would get this
17 business for free; right?
18
A The word "free" I don't ever remember
19 being talked about. rm not trying to be diffICUlt. I
20 don't remember him sa~ng it's for free. He said for
21 you, for your kids, for that, but he never maybe tattooed
22 it with the word "free" at the end.
23
Q Well, you know, the reason I had these
24 deposition excerpts read by you is because it's you
25 repeated~ saying that you never thought you would get
16
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1 the business for free. You knew that you would have to
1 actually working there through the time it was sold, I
2 pay something for it.
2 understand that you did have anumber of conversations
3
A I did not have a problem with that and his
3 with your dad wherein the subject of the amount that
4 proposal -4 would be paid by the business through you was discussed.
5
Q No, hold on.
5
A Proposed by Ron and discussed by both of
6
A Okay.
6 us.
7
Q So my point of this is, does that
7
Q And the thrust of those conversations was
8 testimony still represent the truth; that is, that you
8 him telling you that it had to do with the fact that they
9 understood that under this agreement you were going to
9 didn't need that much to live on, but it was amounts that
10 pay something for the business when it was transferred?
10 they would be using to live on?
11
A The business -- my understanding was W I l l
A I would agree.
12 fulfilled my end of the bargain that the business would
12
Q And that while there had never been a
13 pay them acheck from 3 to 5,000 was his proposed number, 13 SpecifIC agreement between you and your mom and dad as to
14 that it wasn't free, I guess, is the answer you're
14 whether it would be 3,000 or 5,000 or somewhere in
15 looking for.
15 between, that was the general range?
16
Q Yeah, I just 16
A I agree.
17
A I lived it. I know how it was, but..
17
Q Okay; so then I am understanding that the
18
Q Well, I didn't.
18 agreement that is at the heart of this lawsuit is that in
19
A I know and I'm trying to get -19 exchange for you going to do what you did, he would, that
20
Q And you have a lawsuit thars claiming as
20 is your parents would, in exchange have the business
21 the primary thing we're talking about here is an oral
21 transferred to you and you would in tum pay them through
22 agreement.
22 the business astream of income somewhere in the range of
23
A An agreement.
23 3 to 5[000 amonth?
24
Q What I've been trying to get now for quite
24
A I would agree with that.
25 some time is I want to know exactly what the terms of
25
Q Okay, thars the agreement we're talking
V
~

t about?
1 that agreement are and so that's why I'm aSking a lot
2
A Okay.
2 more questions about it and so specifically, today I'm
3 dealing with the prior deposition and with this
3
Q Correct?
4
A Uh-huh.
4 affidavit, thars where I'm going with all this.
5
Q Yes?
5
A Okay.
6
A Yes.
6
Q And so what I'm reading in the deposition
7 is you previously telling me quite a-number of times that
7
Q Okay, thars the agreement that you're
8 testifying is whars at issue in this lawsuit?
8 at the time the business was going to be taken over by
9
A Yes.
9 you that there was going -- that through you that
10 business would pay some kind of money to your mom and dad 10
Q Okay. Now, I read - can you use this
11 under the agreement
11 deposition so I don't have to hover over your shoulder?
12
A I would agree with that
12
MR. WILKINSON: Sure.
13
MR. JANIS: Just one more point on this
13
Q Okay, and that throughout the time frames
14 welre talking about here, which I guess boil down to kind
14 one. let me ask you to tum to page 87, line 18 to 19.
15 Actually, read just 14 to 21. Youlll see where I
15 of '96 through 2004 or 15 or whatever 16
A 16.
16 highlighted that part there.
17
Q -- 2006, I mean, it sold in January of
17
MR. WILKINSON: Starting with "When"?
18
MR. JANIS: Yeah.
18 2006; right?
19
THE WITNESS: Okay.
19
A Uh-huh.
20
Q BY MR. JANIS: The one thing I had there
20
Q Yes?
21
A I believe that is right.
21 that I was thinking of is the last part which I think
22
Q Weill just call it early 2006.
22 youlre quoting your dad. Yeah, it is, him saying that
23 all I, ' 1' referring to Ron Thomas, want; right?
23
A Okay.
24
A What line are you on?
24
Q And throughout that time frame from when
25
Q Three - well, 16.
25 you first started talking about going to work there,
18
20
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1
A That all I want is amodest check out of
2 the place when your mom and I retire.
3
Q The "I" in that sentence is Ron Thomas?
4
A Uh-huh.
5
Q Right?
6
A Yes.
7
Q And Ron then going on to tell you words to
8 the effect of it don't take me much to live, that I, Ron
9 Thomas, don't have to have alot to live on, but I do
10 want something out of the business; right?
11
A Uh-huh.
.12
Q Is that ayes?
113
A Yes, I read that.
14
Q I mean, thafs you telling me what your
15 dad had told you?
116
A And I believe he used the word "we" once
17 in awhile, but at the time, I, we, my mom and dad, all
18 and the same.
19
Q Sure, and the only point that I was trying
20 to get at, Drew, is in these conversations which you had
21 over the years with your dad wherein there was a
22 discussion about how much you would pay your mom and dad
23 after the business was transferred that he was telling
24 you that he wants something out of the bUSiness?
25
A Yes.

21

Q And basically you were saying in effect,
1
2 okay, I agree with that?
A It was reasonable, yes, I agreed with·
3

4 that.
5
Q But there was just never aparticular

6 agreement reached on whether ~ would be 3,000, 5,000 or
7 some particular number in between?
8
A Correct.
9
Q All right. Now, the next thing I wanted
10 to ask you about this -- before I do that, it sounds like
11 you had a number of conversations wherein this discussion
12 about how much you would pay when the business
13 transferred to you and it turned out to be something in
14 the range of 3to $5,000 that there were a number of
15 .those conversations, not just one of those.
l6
A Correct.
l7
Q can you give me an estimate of how many
.8 times you had aconversation along those lines?
9
A Throughout the years, at least once or
o twice a year, you know, so as many as 16, as few as 10.
1
Q But it was always the same content it
2 sounds like.
J
A In that conversation, it was the same
I content, that when he retired that him and Mom would like
to have a check or something from the business when it
22

H.L.C1H..'
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1 moved on to my generation and then when I went on to
2 retirement, my kids' generation and on and on is what he
3 talked about.
4
Q And the only point I was getting at is 5 well, acouple of points, I guess. One, it was talked
6 about whatever number of times you just said; in other
7 words, a number of times over the years; correct?
8
A Yes.
9
Q And secondly, it sounds like the
10 conversation went Similarly each time.
11
A Basically.
12
Q And so this notion that the agreement here
13 is such that you agreed with your mom and dad that in
14 exchange for your work and doing what you were doing that
15 they would transfer the business to you and you in turn
16 would pay them somewhere between 3 and $5,000, that was
17 the substance of this conversation that took ~ace once
18 or twice ayear for almost 10 years?
19
A Correct.
20
Q All right, and did that include
21 conversations that took place, in other words, is that
22 conversations that took ~ace before you actually went to
23 work for Thomas Motors or what turned out to be Thomas
24 Motors? I mean, I know ~ was Johannesen to start off
25 with.
23

1
A rd have to think. I don't remember prior
2 to me leaving Berg that specific conversation happening,
3 but I can't say that ~ didnt I do remember ~ at the
4 dealership.
5
Q Back to the affidavit which is Exhib~ 8,
6 paragraph 18, I just have some specifIC questions now
7 about acouple of things in the affidavit Paragraph 18
8 makes reference to the fact that Thomas Motors was out of
9 trust, if you will, for $300,000 somewhere in 2000, the
10 year 2000. Do you see that?
11
A Yes.
12
Q Do you have aknowledge of how that
13 300,000 was taken care of? There was a debt, basically,
14 to Wells Fargo for the line of credit for $300,000.
15
A Right, we were out of trust by that
16 much.
17
Q And do you have amemory of how the 300 18 how Wells Fargo was paid off?
19
A We struggled - we worked through - Rob
20 Wilde and I worked together through agal named Vicky
21 Perkins with Wells Fargo for aperiod of time and I don't
22 exactly remember exactly how much time, but Rob, myself
23 and even Dad, I think, was involved alittle b~ in
24 having another bank come in and take out the Wells Fargo
25 flooring line and pay everything current.
24
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1
Q So it was KeyBank that paid off Wells
2 Fargo?
3
A I believe thaes right.
4
Q And your dad you understood was signing
5 off for the personal guarantee with KeyBank for the line
6 of credit?
7
A I would say thars correct.
8
Q So you understood, then, that your -- I'm
9 not actual~ sure if it's your mom and dad or just your
o dad, but at least your dad started off the financing
1 relationship with KeyBank 300,000 in the hole?
A Possib~.
Q I mean, this thing, 300,000.
A That makes sense. Well, I'd have to look
15 back on the paperwork, maybe get with Rob and find out
16 for sure, review it and see how much, if any, was paid
17 down while we tried to operate through the transference
18 of Wells Fargo to KeyBank.
19
Q But at the very least, the lionls share of
the 3OOrooo was paid off by KeyBank?
A I would say that's correct.
Q And one of the reasons I ask about that is
if you look at the management contract which is Exhibit
4, if you tum to page 2of it, section 5 it's calledr do
25 you see it, working capital?
1
A Uh-huh.
2
Q It talks about the shareholders. That
3 would be defined as Ron -- your mom and dad would loan to
4 the corporation up to $300,000. Now, this is in the same
5 time frame that your 300,000 _. that Thomas Motors, I
6 mean, is $300,000 out of trust and this agreement which
7 is being made at the same time is talking about Ron and
8 Elaine lending 300,000 to the corporation. Did you
9 understand that was for the purpose of dealing with this
10 out-of-trust issue?
11
A I did not.
12
Q What was this fori then?
13
A Working capital, as I understood it.
14
Q And so did this agreement at all deal with
15 this 300,000 out-of-trust-issue?
16
A Not to my knowledge, no, it was
1'"
t
.1 separa e.
18
Q Kind of look at subsection "a" there. It
19 says the 300,000 is _. its number one purpose is to
20 "bringing corporation into compliance with its flooring
21 line of credit with the bank. II
,
22
A That could be, but again, this agreement
23 never came to fruition. I never had away to make it
24 enacted.
25
Q Well, one thing that was enacted under
26
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this management contract is the amount that it talked
about as your compensation. You were paid that amount
thereafter?
A My salary?
Q Right
A Yes.
Q So at least that part of the management
contract was continuing, ongoing, agreed to and followed
up with?
A I believe that was in the same time frame,
but by the time that carl Harder was no longer with us
and this never came back to me in any way, shape or form
as far as copies and -Q All I'm asking about is one of the things
this management contract says is what your salary is
going to be from that date forward?
A Yes.
Q And that was in fact your salary from that
date forward?
A I believe thafs right.
Q And there was also in fact acommitment by
your mom and dad to get the $300,000 that was •• the
corporation was brought into compliance with its flooring
line of credit with the bank at that point with the new
lending arrangements with KeyBank; right?
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1
A I dont understand your question.
2
Q The new financial arrangement was made
3 with KeyBank to arrange for a line of cred~ which in
4 fact satisfied the 300,000 that was out of trust with
5 Wells Fargo?
6
A I believe, if I remember correctly, when
7 KeyBank came into play and take Wells Fargo out that
8 that, yes, was all covered. Now, again, I donlt know how
9 much we worked through exactly dollar amount-wise, but it
10 was taken care of.
11
Q It was your mother and father who were the
12 persons that were personally responsible for that
13 out-of·trust amoun~ whatever ~ was, at the time KeyBank
14 took over?
15
A Yes.
16
Q And my point there, of course, is no one
17 else was personal~ responsible for that money?
18
A Not to my knowledge.
19
Q Paragraph 19 of this affidavit, the first
20 sentence, are you with me?
21
A Yes.
22
Q Basical~, I'm looking at the part where
23 it says "financial diffICUlties, which had been caused by
24 Ronls spending habits," do you see that?
25
A Yes.
28
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